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GI£NERAL SUMMARY
In the past two decades there has been an enormous growth
internationally ill public and academic debate about the role of women in
society and in the economy. This dcbate has been taking place in Ireland
also. It encompasses a range of analytical and policy issues such as: tile
policy implications tbr taxation and social security.of married women’s
increased lal)our force i)articipation, tile economic value of women’s unpaid
work in the house as mothers and carers, tile social and economic factors
associated with changing patterns of family life.
This study is concerned with one aspect of the changing patterns of
family liilz -- the growth of lone parent families and tile consequence of this
growth for tile State’s system of social security. At the outset the study
locates tile concept "lone parent" in the wider fi’amework of family [brmation
-- this is a necessary reminder of the variety of"routes" into lone parenthood
and of the varying types and duration of lone parenthood. Following
convention in studies in this area, this study focuses oll lone mothers with
dependent children. Fi~t, ahnost all lone parents are mothers. Second, lone
mothers with childreu in the dependent age groups are more likely to
experience the needs Ibr income and other social supports and hence are of
particular concern for public policy.
The study identifies significant limitations witfi tile official data on lone
parents. Notably, the Census data incorporates an undereount of some types
of lone parents (those residing in their parents’ homes as part of a wider
household) and an ovcrcount of others (those married who are counted as
having "absent" partncrs duc to tile de faclo definition of residence in the
Census). The Census data suggest that the lone parent population has been
growing very rapidly in recent years. These families comprised just 7 per
cent of all families in 1981 and 9 per cent ill 1986. Single, unmarried
mothers are the most rapidly increasing segment of the lone parent
population -- an increase of over 135 per cent from 1981 to 1986.
When tile definition of families is restricted to parents with children
under 15, the Census figures record a growth of 24 per cent fi’om 1981 to
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1986 in tile nunlber of Ionc modlcr lamities. In 1981, 5.2 per cent of all
children under 15 ill private households lived ill lone parent units -- this
had incrcased to 6.6 per cent by 1986. Data from the Labour Force Survey
differs from Census data in a number of respects: it is based on a large,
rcprcsentative sample survey, it utilises an interviewer-administered
questionnaire, and employs a "usual residence" conccpt of residence. These
data confirm the picture of a significant increase in the number of lone
parent families. The Labour Force Survey data suggest an annual average
rate of growth of 5.5 per cent in respect of lone parent Ihmilies where
children are defined as those aged 0-18.
Differences in the demographic character of various types of lone parent
Ihmilies emerged in tile analysis. Unmarried lone parents are by and large
in tile younger age groups and are at an early stage in the family life cycle
-- two-thirds of them have their youngest child in the 0-4 age bracket.
Widows, by contrast, are at tile later stage of the llfe cycle: the youngest
child of three-quarters of widows on the other hand is aged 20 or over.
The analysis of trends in tile inflozo into lone parenthood records tile
very diminished scale of widowhood amoug tile young and middle aged. In
1991, for example, there were a mere 4 widows per 1,000 married persons
aged 25-34, and tile overall "widowhood rate" had declined from 163 to
145 per 1,000 population from 1961 to 1991. In contrast, the inflow to lone
parenthood from non-marital births and marital breakdown has been
increasing significantly. Tile number of persons "separated" (including
divorced, annulled, etc.) rose from about 14,000 to 47,000 over tile decade
to 1991: per 1,000 married persons the increase was from 11.5 to 34.8. This
represents an annual average rate of increase of nearly 12 per cent.
The data also records a rapid increase in non-marital births. The
numbers of these births, their rate per 1,000 of the population and their
share of all births have all grown rapidly. In 1971, non-marital births
numbered 2,005, a rate per 1,000 of the population of 0.66, representing 2.9
per cent of all births. The respective figures in 1991 were 8,766 (number),
2.49 (per 1,000 population) and 16.6 per cent (of all birdas). A combination
of an increase in non-marital births and a decline in adoptions has led to an
increased inflow into lone parenthood. Adoptions as a proportion of non-
marital births were over 70 per cent in 1971, but this had plummeted to
around 8 per cent by 1990.
Overall, the demographic trends associated with lone parenthood have
recently brought about two related changes. First, a very marked increase
in the extent of lone parenthood and, second, a shift in its composition away
from widowhood and towards "new" forms of lone parenthood. These
changes in Ireland broadly reflect international trends.
GENERAL SUMMARY
The study notes the absence of significant research on the social and
economic aspects of lone parenthood and the limitations of the data available
for analysis. An analysis was undertaken, however, of a small sub-sample (N
= 214) of lone parent families living as independent households contained
in the Household Budget Survey data for 1987. This sub-sample comprised
widows (22 per cent), unmarried parents (29 per cent), and separated
parents (47 per cent): an age limit of 18 was used as the cut-off point to
identify lone parents with dependent childrcn. In the analysis of these data
it emerged that lone parents arc significantly more likely than those in two
parent families to he out of the labour market, and to be dependent on
State services and benefits. For example, over 90 per cent of unmarried lone
parents’ hotzscholds receive 80 per ccnt or more of their gross income fi’om
social welfarc payments, compared with less than 30 per cent of all
households. Approximately 70 per cent and 60 per cent of Umllarried and
separated lone parents rcspectively arc local autho~:ity tenants compared
with 10 per cent of all households.
An analysis of the relative income levels of Ionc parent families and
families in general was tmdcrtakcn. The average disposable incomes r,f
unmarried and separated lone parents respectively were .~81 and ,/~110 (per
week, in 1987), in comparison with ~201 for all families. When per capita
equivalent adjustments are made these comparisons hold. The incomes of
widowed lone parents are, on average, higher than those of other lone
parents. Larger, two parent families (2 parents and 4 or more children, for
example) are also susccptible to lower incomes: their incomes, on average,
are less than those of widowed lone parents and very significantly less than
the incomes of households in general.
When the income data for houscholds of different types are analysed to
calculate relative risks of poverty, tmmarried lone parents emerge as the
highest risk category. At a "poverty line" of 50 per cent of mean disposable
inconle (per capita equivalent) 35 per cent of them fall below thc "poverty
line". The figure for separated lone parents was 28 per cent and for all
households 14 per cent. Widowed lone parents’ risk was 14 per cent --
significantly less than that for the large two parent family. The exlenl of
poverty anaong lone parents measured in these terms is sensitive to the
actual choice of pcr capita equivalent adjustment: where a more generous
adjustment is made the poverty risks arc significantly higher~ ahhough the
relative risks between households of different types remain unchanged.
If lone parents who are not economically active are compared with
other families whose heads arc out of work, the relative risks of poverty are
reversed. For example, these larger two parcnt families (4 or more children)
have a poverty risk of almost 80 per cent, compared with under 40 per cent
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and under 20 pet" cent, for unmarried and separated lone parents respectively.
The analysis suggests that these rclativitics reflect variations in the per capita
equivalent levels of social welfare payments. Two parcnt families (ill 1987)
with unemployed heads had social welfare paynaents (in 1987) which were
low relative to those of lone parent families. The clear policy implication of
tile analysis is that the income nceds of lone parents cannot be assessed in
isolation from the inco~lles of the generafity of families.
The study briefly reports the historical development of social security
provisions in Ireland for lone parent families. First, in the 1930s payments
for widows were introduced on a restrictive b~Jsis. Extensions and
improvements were later made to these schenaes (tile age limit was lowered
successively for instance). Second, in the early 1970s new schemes were
devised to cater for the growing population of lone mother families. These
schemes applied to categories of lone mothers --- "Unmarried Mothers",
"Deserted Wives". Third, in recent years social security provision has become
more integrated. Male Ioue parents are now eligible to receive a payment
and the categorisatiou has given way to a more comprehensive payment for
lone parents -- whether single, married, deserted, and so on.
Since tile introduction of social security payments for lone parents,
public expenditure on these schemes has increased significantly. This is due
to a combination of increases in the number of beneficiaries and improvements
in the rate of payment per beneficiary. In the case of unmarried lone
mothers, tbr example, the number of recipients grew from just over 2,000 in
the ycar of its introduction (1974.) to over 21,000 in 1991. Since 1984 the
annual average rate of increase in recipient numbers among all lone parents
has been in excess of 7 per cent. The real value of the social security
payments for lone parents rose continuously from 1974 to 1982, a real
reduction took place for one year, and since then a very gradual real
increase has continued. During the decade 1981-1991 the annual average
rate of increase in total expenditure on these social security schemes was
14.2 per cent: this contrasts with a figure of 3.7 per cent for the social
security system as a whole. Rising beneficiary numbers played the major
role in this expenditure increase and increased real payments the minor role.
Illustrative data in the study suggests that over time there has been
some convergence between the incomes of lone parent social security
recipients and the net earnings of employees with spouses and children. This
convergence took place in the pcriod up to 1982.
Against the background of increased public expenditure on social
security in respect of lone parents the study outlines a number of criticisms
of existing social security policy. First, provisions in this area may need to
be reformed in the light of the EC’s Equality Directive regarding tile
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treatment of men and women in social security. Specifically, the existence of
social insurance based widow’s pensions for women, but not fox" men, may
leave existing arrangements opcn to legal challenge on grounds of scx
discrimination, l:’urthermore, an insurance-based payment in respect of
marital brcakdown -- the Deserted Wife’s Benefit -- applies only to women
and this too is open to chaliengc.
Morc widely, general efficiency and equity principles raise important
strategic questions about Ireland’s social security provisions for lone parents.
In relation to equity and adequacy, it is clear that no systematic consideration
has informed policy afl’eeting time level of social security payments, the need
to obtain horizontal equity across lone parent families and between lone
parent and two-parent families, and the extent of special needs and costs
which might impinge on lone parcnt families. The efficiency aspect of policy
is highlighted by the very low levels of labour force participation of lone
mothers. It is suggcsted in the study that lone mothers in Ireland may face
obstacles to work participation -- in effect a "poverty trap". ’Social security
is implicated in this "trap" in as much as the mcaus tested Lone Parent’s
Allowance embodies only a very modest disregard of earned income and
reduces social security support at a withdrawal rate of 100 per cent above
the level of disregarded earnings.
It is emphasised in the study that the social security system interacts
with other aspccts of public policy -- notably, child care and training policy.
The "poverty trap" For lone parents must therefore be viewcd, the study
argues, as a general problem facilitating women with children (low income,
low skill women in particular -- to re-enter the labour market) a problem
which can only bc addressed if a range of inter-related policies are dcvcloped.
This approach to understanding the lone parent poverty trap shottld be
distinguished from an overly narrow approach which would focus on~ on
direct financial issues such as social security payments, means tests, and
nmrginal tax rates.
Thc stud), also outlines a mmaber of specific issues affecting social
security for lone parents which require to be resolved. Lone parents in
receipt of payz’nents are precluded from cohabiting with partners -- an
exclusion which has generated considerable policy debate in other countries.
’]’lle rationale for this exclusion is acknowledged -- the need to ensure
horizontal equity between tnnmarried and married couples in a context of
an aggregated unit of benefit entitlement in social security. However~ it is
pointed out that the exclusion nmy have the tmintended effcct of preventing
time natural development of relationships (new relationships or reconciliations)
and of prolonging dependence on State social security payments. The study
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argues that the issue of cohabitation can best be resolved if the wider social
security system evolves towards a more individualised unit of entitlement.
Social security provision for lone parents in Ireland must be viewed in
the light of the system of judicial rnaintenance in respect of spouses and
children. The study, refers to the substantial international evidence of the
ineffectiveness of judicial maintenance in securing adequate private incomes
for lone mothers to supplement -- or replace -- their iucorne from public
sources. Research in Ireland on this issue suggests that Ireland’s experience
conforms with the international experience. The final policy issue raised is
the status of the Deserted Wife’s Benefit -- the only benefit of its kind
internationally,. It is suggested that there is a weak rationale for a benefit of
this type.
The study concludes with an outline of how, in the author’s view,
future social security arrangements for lone parents in h’eland should evolve.
In summary, the strategy proposed is one which involves streugthening
potential sources ofprivate income -- such as earnings and family maintenance
-- and improving and restructuring public income sources, i.e., social security.
To devise such a strategy requires, first, a co-ordinated range of policy,
initiatives directed at low income women with children, including lone
rnothcrs, to facilitate their access to, and participation in, the labour market.
These initiatives, it is suggested, must encompass child care and training as
well as social security. Future policy should not be founded as past policy
has apparently been, on the assumption that lone mothers should be detached
from the labour market and wholly dependent on social security for their
incomes for very long periods of time. Second, a change to an administrative
system of family maintenance, in preference to the current judicial system
could make the family maintenance arrangements -- the second potential
source ofprivate income -- more adequate and secure.
Third, the integration of lone parents payments into one uniform means
tested allowance for all lone parents is advocated. This would remove
remaining gender discrimination from the system and could underpin labour
market incentives if the means tests were appropriately structured. The
benefits of any such reform would be enhanced if accompanied by a fourth
proposed reform -- a restructuring of child income support for all families.
It is suggested that the role of Child Benefit in the income package of lone
parents be enhanced and that of Child Dependant Additions reduced.
Poverty, traps affecting families with children would be significantly
anaeliorated. In the case of lone parents in particular the reduced role of
Child Dependant Additions would "protect" a greater portion of their
income from the means test, and, correspondingly, make their child-related
income more secure. Fifth, it is also argued that the exclusion of cohabiting
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lone parents fi’om social security necds to be reviewed, in part because it
may be preventing the consolidation of new relationships and the
reconciliation of longer standing relationships. The study acknowledges that
the cohabitation rule does have a firm rationale in the contcxt of the
dependency based unit of cntitlcment in social sccurity gcncrally. It is
suggcsted, howevcr, that if the principled arguments in favour of a more
individualised basis of entitlement were accepted and rcflectcd in policy,
then it would provide a fi’esh context in which the problems associated with
the cohabitation rule could be addressed.
Finally, the study points out the dearth of social research on lone
parents. There is an urgent need for data on the social and economic
circumstances of lone parents.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increased interest in social policy
research in the social and economic circumstances of women and in particular
in the extent of their poverty and financial vulnerability (Glendinning and
Millar, 1987). First, a distinctly feminist critique of social and economic
structures has emerged. This critique has drav.,n attention to the inter-
depel~dence of tile public world of employment and the economy and the
private world of home and family -- traditionally deemed the separate
domains of men and women respectively (Delphy, 1984). Accordingly,
informal unpaid work in the home has been juxtaposed with formal, paid
work in the labour market. Furthermore, this feminist critique has brought
into focus the internal organisation of home and the family economy, the
traditionally unequal roles of men and women in the family, and the
important role played by women in low income families in managing
resources within the family (Land, 1983; Graham, 1984).
Second, the trend internationally towards increased female labour force
participation has undermined the historical assumption of women’s economic
dependence on men which has informed both policy and research
(Glendinning and Millar, 1987). This trend, in conjunction with the growth
in births outside marriage and in marital breakdown, has led to an increase
in households beaded by women and hence to a concern in both policy and
research with the incomes and economic circumstances of women. For
example, there has been considerable attention given in public policy and
in social research to the factors affecting female labour force participation,
to the earnings and labour market experiences of women and to the policy
instruments required to obtain greater equalisation in tile employment and
economic statuses of men and women.
The material shift in the position of women in tile economy and the
increased influence of feminist perspectives have together given rise to a
concern about the "feminisation" of poverty (Scott, 1984). This feminisation
thesis essentially asserts that the risk of female headed households experiencing
poverty has been rising over time and that the share of female headed
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households among tile poor was also rising. However, work by Lewis and
Piachaud in relation to the United Kingdonl has shown that tile risk of
poverty Ibr womizn and tile incidence of poverty as between men and women
has remained largely unchanged in this century (Lewis and Piachaud, 1987).
On tile contrary, they conclude that "tile idea tllat poverty has recently
19ccome fcminised is wrong". Women constitute "a roughly similar proportion
of tile poor today as in 1900". The issue of the feminisation of poverty
highlights the fact that women’s economic position and their poverty is now
more uislble, because of their changed economic status and because of the
focus brought to bear in feminist analyses.
In Ireland to date no overall analytical work has been undertaken on
women’s economic vulnerability. Ideally, a more comprehensive study would
examine the historical and current economic status of women and the
vai’ious sources of women’s economic vulnerability, including the unpaid
nature of family care, the opportunity costs of women’s family and caring
roles, and gentler inequalities within the family and the labour market. No
such comprehensive stucly is attempted here. The purpose of this more
limited stud), is to focus, in an Irish context, on one set of issues which is
relevant to these broader questions of women and poverty -- tile growth of
lone parenthood and its implications for social security.
In Ireland in the last three decades there has been a continual growth
in the incidence of lone parenthood. This reflects international trends and is
attributable to two key factors -- the growth of non-marital fertility and an
increase in marital breakdown. Countries differ, however, in the relative
importance of these two factors. Historically, lone parenthood arose largely
in the form of widowhood but in recent decades, as mortality and other
den’tographic patterns have evolved, widowhood has become concentrated
among those who are elderly or in late middle age.
Lone parenthood raises significant and complex issues for I~tmily law,
family policy, labour markets and, most significantly, social security and
income maintenance policy. However, in Ireland, public debate about lone
parenthood has been concerned largely with contentious rnoral, legal and
constitutional issues. Significant though such issues are, preoccupation with
them has distracted attention from the social and economic aspects of
changing family structures (Duncan, 1987). In 1983 and 1986 respectively
contentious referenda were held on the issues of abortion and divorce. In
1992 the White Paper, Marital Breakdown: A Reviezo and Proposed Changes was
published.
This White Paper arguably reflects again the relative neglect of the
socio-economic aspects of the family which marked the earlier referenda. For
instance, the 1992 White Paper contains a mere three pages devoted to
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social security -- likewise to taxation. ,Most recently, in November 1992, a
second referendum on aspects of abortion was held, occasioned by a Supreme
Court judgement interpreting the Constitutional Amendment on ahortion
which was adopted ill the 1983 referendum.
The backdrop to the analysis of lone parents which follows therefore
comprises both tile underlying research and policy issues affecting women in
the economy, and the proximate issue of tbe neglect of social security and
related topics in tile continuing debate on the family in Ireland.
This paper consists of a description of tile social and economic status of
lone parents and an analysis of social security policies affecting tbcm. At
present, in Ireland, tbere are a number of categorical social security schemes
for lone parents. Expenditure on these schemes exceeded £400m in 1990 (if
widow’s pensions are included) and this figure has grown cumulatively in
both nominal and real terms in tile last two decades. There arc also "tax
expenditures" attributable to lone parents in tile personal income tax system.
The increased public expenditure associated with tile growth of lone
parenthood offers a rationale (not the only, or necessarily the most important,
rationale) for a critical scrutiny of these social security arrangements.
In Chapter I an account is given of the growth oflooe parenthood in
Ireland, preceded by a brief clarification of concepts and terminology, and
an explanation of tile limited data sources in Ireland. This chapter also
contains some descriptive data on lone parents, based on 1986 Census data.
Chapter 2 offers a description of tile social and economic circumstances
of lone parents, and a brief description of tile demographic factors associated
with lone parenthood in Ireland.
The current social security treatment of lone parents is described in
C’,hapter 3. In this chapter also the evolution of social welfare policy and
the growtb of social welfare expenditure are descrihed.
Chapter 4 evaluates the current social security arrangements, and raises
strategic, long-tern1 issues which require fiH’ther research and policy resolntion
in the future. An outline of a future social security strategy for lone parents
is given in Chapter 5.
Chapter I
LONI£ PARENTS IN IRELAND: I£NUMERA TION AND DESCRIPTION
(i) "Lone Parents"
Before proceeding to an analysis of the available data on lone parents
in Ireland it is necessary to consider the definition of "Lone Parents" anad
to conceptualise the link between lone parenthood and the general process
of family formation.
In the research and policy literature the descriptions "single parent
family", "one parent family", "fatherless family" and "lone parent family"
have all been used. In this stud), the latter term is used. The adjective
"single" is inappropriate as it invites confnsion with "single" marital status;
the descriptions "one parent" and "fatherless" simply ignore the fact that
all children have two parents in a biological sense. "Lone", howcver, is
neutral with respect to marital status, it invites a contrast with the norm of
the two parent family, and invokes the actual experience of many women
in particular -- having the sole, or prime responsibility, for their children
for very extended periods of timc, in the absence of a husband, or a partner.
However, it is important not to presume that the description "lone"
necessarily applies to the broad social experience of all women in these
circumstances. For example, some "lone" mothers may live in extended
family situations which offer extensive social and emotional support. If lone
mothers are in employnlent they may have a network of acquaintances in
work. Lone mothers may also have contacts with, and friendships with,
relatives and neighbours. What the association is, if any, between "[one
parenthood" and social participation and integration more generally is a
matter for research. ~,’Vith this caveat in mind the term "lone" is used
throttghout the study, except where the context requires the use of other
terminology such as "single", "non+marital", separated and so on.
The term "lone parents" in Fact describes a significant diversity of
households and families. Interpreted literally the description would encompass
an elderly widow living with an adult son or daughter; a teenage unmarried
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mother living with and caring for a young child; or an aduh mother or
father separated or divorced with custody of the children. In these examples
the sources of the "lone-hess" are, respectively, the death of a spouse, the
absence of a partner, and the hreakdown of a marriage. Various stages of
the life cycle are also represented: typically, the widow is in the latest stage
and no longer has economic dependants, the single mother, I)y contrast, is
in the earliest stage in terms of her own age and in terms of child
dependency.
This demographic and legal diversity among lone parents may be
associated with diverging resources, needs and economic opportunities. An
elderly widow may own her own home outright if she is an owner occupier:
her social security entitlement may be a eontrihutory widow’s pension which
is at the more adequate etad of the welfare payments continuum; she may
also have some savings or an occupational widow’s pension. The separated
parent, however, may still be at the stage of family formation with the
associated housing costs and child rearing expenses. Further, an employed
parent may be impelled to withdraw fi’om work at the onset of lone
parenthood. In the case of a separated woman, her own, and her children’s
standard of living will depend, in part, on the level and regularity of family
maintenance payments. Many single mothers with young children, on the
other hand, will not have had the opportunity to acquire owner occupied
housing. Their living standards may be critically dependent on social security
payments, as their child care preferences or constraints, or labour market
conditions, prevent them from working outside the home. Unlike separated
women, single mothers are not Jegal]y entitled to maintenance from (putative)
fathers, except in respcct of the child.
Given this divcrsity -- which requires to be documented and analyscd
by research -- what should be the primary focus of policy discussion in
relation to lone parents? First, elderly lone parents whose children are now
aduhs are, in effect, part of the retired/elderly population. Second, unmarricd
parents, or parents separated from spouses, who are cohabiting with partners
are, in all but formality, "normal" families in social and economic terms.
Therefore, to adopt O’Higgins’ formulation:
In terms of t!le primary public policy concerns about lone
parent families, a useful definition would require that the
parent he non cohabiting, while the children he I)elow a
conventional age of labour markct and financial iudcpcndcncc
(e.g. 16 or 18) with other children included if they were still
in full time education, were financially dependent and had
their home residence in the family home (O’Higgins, 1987).
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One of the tasks attempted later is the identification and description of
such families it] Ireland and a comparison of them with other households
and families. Existing published data do not permit such an analysis at
present.
In adopting the working definition above, it should be noted that it
focuses, as Millar (1989) points out, on the custodial parent. Research on
lone parents and their children is typically in this vein and therefore little is
known about "absent" parents.
(it) Lone Parenthood and Family Formation
To understand the social, economic and demographic context of lone
parents it is necessary to place lone paremhood in the dynamic context of
the life cycle. Chart I represents this wider context in stylised fashion. It
can be seen that there are a number of "routes" into, and "exits" from lone
parenthood. One route is through widowhood: adults in "couples with
children" families lose a partner through death. Increasingly, however, the
loss of a partner is through the breakdown of marriage. Re-marriage would
return the person to the "COLtplc" status.
A direct entr/:e to lone parenthood is through a non-marital birth.
However, parents may marry or cohabit after the birth of a child and lone
parenthood for these parents is a temporary status en route to the nlore
usual couple-with-children situation. The short lived nature of lone
parenthood for some mothers arises from adoption: some lone (unmarried)
mothers will give up the children for adoption and they therefore resume
their prior single "adult" status.
A nun]her of key points arise fi’om a consideration of Chart 1. First,
the status "[one parent" must be seen as one phase in the process of family
formation and dissolution. Second, any cross section perspective on the extent
of lone parenthood understates the numbers who experience that status.
Third, it is increasingly clear that there is growing diversity in family
patterns: the conventional sequence of single aduh-marriage-children, etc.,
is giving way to less conventional family forms. For example, some aduhs
will directly enter the "couples with children" status by choosing partners
with children who arc unmarried or separated]divorced; separated or
divorced [one parents may reconcile or enter new "couple" relationships.
Fi.a[ly, it may be hypothesised that the time scales involved it] various types
of lone parent family formation will vary significantly; many lone, tmmarried
mothers, for example, may marry within I-2 years of the birth of their
children and thereafter embark on a conventional family career; ahernatively,
a parent in mid-life with dependent children who becomes widowed ’,,,,ill
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probably remain a lone parent as the incidence of re-marriage is not very
high (and varies hy age and sex).
Ill Ireland, there is little research on various aspects of lone parenthood.
The number of lone parent families in the population, the types of lone
parents, and tile patterns of lone parent family fornmtion all require to be
quantified and analysed. A preliminary analysis of these issues is contained
in the next section.
(iii) Data on Lone Parents in Ireland
Tile Census of Population is potentially a definitive and comprehensive
data source on lone parents. Two aspects of tile Census data should be
noted, however. In tile first place, the Census is conducted on a de faclo
basis and counts as household naembers all those actually present in a
household on Census night. Parents temporarily absent due to employment
Ioeation~ hospitalisation, holidays, etc., are not counted and this implies an
over-count of tile number of lone l)arents. A second and a more important
difficulty arises in tile identification of families in the Census data. The
Census requests data on all household members. Q.uestlon 3 on tile Census
form inquires of the relationship of each person in the household to the
person returned on the Census form as tile head of tile household. Tile
Census form itself under Question 3 then gives examples of the kind of
relationships which might be listed:
"Husband"
"Wife"
"Daughter"
"Visitor"
"Patient"
"Employee", etc.
Significantly, tile relationships "grandson/grandaughtcr" are not listed.
Furthermore, the Census form does not require each child or parent to be
explicitly ascribed to their parent/child.
If some lone parents reside in extended or non-standard households
there will therefore be a tendency Ibr under-identification of such t’amily units.
In particular, young lone mothers with children may tend to reside in their
own family of origin. Unless all of these children are recorded as
grandchildren and their mothers as daughters of tile household head, these
separate lone-parent family units will not be identified. In tile first place, all
Census respondents may not be candid in giving details of household
memhers and, secondly, tile qttestion format might not prompt respondents
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to give the level of detail necessary to ensure identification of lone parent
family units in these wider households.
Tile CSO point out in relation to tile 1981 Census that:
... tile Census information does not usually enable
identification of a family unit of one unmarried parent with
a child especially if living with other persons (Census of
Population 1981, Volume 3, page xvii, 1985).
In the case of tile 1986 Census thc CSO again referred to this difficulty:
¯ . . there were problems in identifying some nnmarried
parents with children as separate family units. This happened
particularly where one unmarried parent with oue or more
child(ren) lived with his/her parents and tile information
given on the relationship to head of household did not clearly
identify tile parent/child relationship. In such cases, tile
unmarried parent and children were subsunled in another
family unit and as a resuh of this the number of family units
identified as consisting of a lone parent with children is
probably underestimated to some degree (Census of Population
1986, 2nd Series, Summary Population Report, pages 11-12,
1989).
In summary, the Census data on lone parents embody an undercount of
lone parents arising from tile Census question format, and an overeount due
to the underlying methodology of de facto residence. In practise, as the
analysis below will reveal, the net outcome is a significant undereount of
unmarried lone mothers. An accurate enumeration of lone parent family
units will presumably require an alteration in the Census’s question Format
so that all children of adults in tile household are directly "linked" to a
parent.
"File annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a complementary data
source. It differs in two important respects from tile Census: the households
are defined in terms of usual residence, thereby eliminating the undercount
implicit in the Census and the survey is conducted by interviewers. In the
puhlished data on the 1988 and subsequent LFS, lone parents are identified
as a family type in one table. These data refer to lone parcnts with children
of any age. However, tile data compiled in the LFS permit identification
and analysis of Ionc parents with children in tile dependent age groups and
these data will bc presented below.
Administrative statistics on social security recipients and beneficiaries of
the lone parcnt tax allowances are an additional source of data. Thcy refer
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only to the relevant recipient population and are of use primarily as indicators
of tile minimum numbers of lone parents. Social welfare data arc available
for an extended time series on an annual basis: data currently availablc refer
to tile previous calendar year. Revenue Commissioner’s published figures are
published with a time lag. Details of these benefits/allowances and an
analysis of tile data arc given in a later chapter.
General household surveys, such as tile Household Budget Survey
undertaken every seven years in Ireland, would contain relatively small
numbers of such sub-sets of tile population as lone parents. Only limited
analyses of lone parents can be undertaken using these generic surveys. Tile
h-ish Houschold Budget Survey contains income intbrmation and, as will be
seen below, some analysis of the economic and social circumstances of lone
parents can be undertaken. Finally, in Ireland no representative or
comprehensive study of lone parents has yet been completed. Three cross
section studies of single mothers have been undertaken and these provide
somc background data on the social circumstances of unmarried mothers
(O’Hare, Dromcy et al, 1987; Richardson and Winston, 1989; Donohoc,
Fitzpatrick et al., 1990).
(iv) 7"rends in Lone Parenthood
The tahles below offer an analysis of recent trends in the extent of lone
parenthood in h’cland. Tile focus in this analysis is on families with children
in tile dependent age groups. To place this material in context, Appendix
Table AI presents summary data from the 1981 and 1986 Censuses on
family units of all types in private households.
Tile feature of these data is the predominance of two parent families
and tile growth fi’om a small base of tile number of lone parent families
(with children of all ages). Appendix Table A2 is confined to lone parent
families and shows that tile number of families of this type increased by 9.0
per cent from 1981 to 1986, with widows declining and tile nunlbers of
single and separated lone parents growing rapidly. (Further data on tile
incidencc and agc distribution of widows are given in Table A3.)
The LFS data can be used to confirm tile growth in lone parent
familics. Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 below present data for the 1983-1990
Labour Force Surveys. These data define lone parent families in terms of
lone parents with children aged 0-18. For the years (since 1988) for which
the LFS volume contains published data, the figures in Table 1.1 are lower
as tile published figures include familics with children of all ages. A
significant increase in lone parent family units is recorded in Table 1.1. The
figure for 1983 is 32,100, and for 1990 almost 47,000, an .:lnnual growth
rate of 5.5 per cent. This confirms thc picture suggested by the Census data,
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FIGURE 1,1
LONE PARENT FAMILIES (000s)
of a rapid increase in the lone parent family population. In interpreting the
LFS figures it should be noted that they differ from the Census in these
respects: they are estimates grossed up from a sample, the "usual residence"
criterion defines household membership, and the LFS is an interview survey.
It is of particular interest to identify family units with children in the
younger, dependent age groups. Table 1.2, based on the Census data, shows
the number of family units with at least one child under 15~ in 1981 and
1986.
These family traits numbered in excess of 420,000 in 1986, a growth of
2.5 pet" cent over the 1981-1986 period. However, the table indicates a
significant growth in lone mother families wlaen this narrower age definition
i In the Labour Force Sup.’ey data the age Iimil for children was taken as 18. This was because
tile LFS data are subject to sampling error. To minimise this, the sub-sample of lone parents was
wlden~.’d to age 18 for dependenl children. ’While Ibis clearly affecLs the size of the estlmaled population
it do,:s nol all’eel Ihe trend over time which is the fc.zus of the analysis in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1.
Tab}e 1.1:
LONE I’ARENTS IN IRELAND: ENUMERATION AND DESCRII’TION
Estimated Total aVumber of Lone Parent Families, 1983-1990
(labour Force Survo, Estimates)
19
No. (’O00s)
1983 32.1
1984 34.7
1985 40.2
1986 41.8
1987 41.6
1988 45.9
1989 49.0
1990 46.8
Source: labour Force Surveys, 1983-1990. Central Statistics Office.
of children is applied. Lone mother families increased by 29.1 per cent, in
contrast to a small percentage decline for lone father families and virtually
no change for "couple" families. Lone parent families comprised 7.1 per
cent of all families (with children under 15) in 1981 and 8.6 per cent in
1986. It should be noted that the absolute numbers of lone parent families
are small. Further data on couples and lone parents are given in Table 1.3.
Table 1.2: Families With at Least One Child Under 15 by Family Type, 198l and 1986
aVumber % of :Ill % of Lone
Families Parent Families % Change
1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986 1981-1986
Couple 383,409 386,963 92.8 91.4 -- -- 0.9
Lone Molher 23,684 30,568 5.7 7.2 79.9 84.1 29.1
Lone Father 5,974 5,785 1.4 1.4 20.1 15.9 -- 3.2
Lone Parents 29,658 36,353 7.1 8.6 -- -- 22.6
Total 413,067 423,316 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.5
Source: Census of Population 1981, Volume 3," Census of Population 1986, Volume 3.
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Table 1.3:
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Families HZith at Least One Child Under 15 in 198I and 1986 Classified by Family Type
and Total aVumber of Children, and Proportion of Families [.Vith l"oun~est Child Aged 0-4
Number of Couples Lone Mothers Lone Fathers
C71ildren 1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986
I 16 15.5 27 30.7 21 22.1
2 26 27.3 25 26.8 24 26.7
3 23 24.8 19 18.9 21 22.3
4 or more 34 32.4 30 23.6 34 28.9
I00 100.0 I00 I00.0 I00 100.0
l~’l I]1111 Nunlber
of C:hildren 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 3.1 2.8
Youngest
Child Aged 58% 54.2% 36°/,, 40% 30% 28%
0-4
N 383,409 386,963 23,684 30,568 5,974 5,785
Notes: The classification of number of children is based on all children, including those
aged over 15.
Source: Census of Population 1981, Volume 3; Census of Population, 1986, Volume 3.
’Fhe general decline in fertility in h’cland is reflected in the decreased
average family size -- fi’om 3.1 to 3.0 for couples, 2.8 to 2.6 for lone mothers
and 3.1 to 2.8 for lone fathers. Over 40 per cent of lone mother families
have yotmg children -- an increase From 36 per cent in 1981. By contrast,
there was a decline in the proportiola -- from 58 per cent to 54 per cent --
of couples with children in this earliest stage of the family cycle.
In Table 1.4., the focus is brought to bear on individual children, as
distinct from family units. The growing significance of lone motbers recorded
in earlier tables is also clearly evident in these data. There was a growth of
almost 25 per cent in the number of children in lone parent units: this figure
embodies a decline of 5.6 per cent in the lone father category and an
increase of 32.7 per cent in the lone mother category. This latter finding of
a growth of one-third over the five year period in the number of dependent
children in lone mother families is particularly significant. In general, the
composition of households has shifted away from heterogeneous type
households -- such as "couples with children and others" and "other"
households.
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(v) Lone Pareats in 1986
The previous section has shown that lone parenthood as a family type
has been growing significantly and that this growth is confinecI to lone
mothers. It is usefid, therefore, to attempt some description of the population
of lone parents and to offer a comparison between d~em and the generality
of parents. To place lone parents in the context of the adult population as
a whole, Table A3 in the Appendix classifies all persons aged over 15 by Ihmily
status and marital status, h can be seen that of the population aged over
15, i8.6 per cent are chiiclren still living witll both parents, while 5.,I. per
cent are children with their lone parents. The largest sub-category by tar,
50.4 per cenh are parents living with dleir partners, die overwllelming
majority of whom are married. Over a filth of the aduh population (21.4
per cent) are in non-family units and 4.2 per cent, almost 105,000, are
enumerated as parents in lone parent family units.
A more detailed description of lone parents can bc obtained by
extracting the "parents in lone parent fallfilies" sub-calegory in Table A3
and analysing them separately. This is done in Table 1.5 which contains
data on lone parents by age, the age of lone parents’ youngest children,
their household circumstances and marital status. Of the 104,713 lone
parcnts identified in 1986 almost 68,000 (65 per cent) are widows, a further
13,632 are married, and an additional 17,173 are separated. A small
minority of 5 per cent of lone parents are "single".
The latter figure, however, must be open to question. A’figure of 6,281
is recorded in Table A3 for female, single lone parents: this must be a
significant underestimate of the actual number of single female parents. In the
same ),ear the number of recipients of the Unmarried Mother’s Allowance
was 12,000: the latter figure which, like the Census figure, is a cross-section
figure referring to a single point in time, must be considered a de facto
minimum estimate of the population in question. Single mothers who are not
cohabiting and had weekly incomes below ~12 per week in 1986, would
have been entitled to the full allowance. Roughly speaking, single mothers
in fnll time cmployment or cohabiting with their partners are excluded from
the 12,000 figure. Considered in this light, the Census count of 6,281 single
mothers must be a very significant undercount of tfic number of "unmarried
mothers". The qualifications noted above about the estimated numbers of
lone mothers are therefore full), justified. In fact, the undercount appears to
bc of a very significant magnitude.
A further qualification attaching to the data in Tablc 1.5, and Tables
1.6 and 1.7, is the figure for "married" lone parents. As indicated earlier,
the Census’s use of d e facto residence, rather than usual residence, will tend
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Table 1.4: Children Aged Under 15 in private Households by Type of Family in Which They Liue,
1981 and 1986
1981 1986 oilo Change
Type of Family
aVo. Per cent aVo. Per cent     1981-1986
1. Couples v..ith Children 804,450 78.0 810,184 79.7 0.7
(of any age)
2. Couples v,.ith Children 132,497 12.9 114,360 11.3 -13.7
(and others)
3. Couples -- I + 2 936,947 90.9 924,544 91.0 -- 1.4
4. Lone Mothers 42,213 4.1 56,016 5.5 32.7
5. Lone Fathers 11,651 I.I 11,003 I.I -- 5.6
6. Lone Parents -- 4 + 5 53,864 5.2 67,019 6.6 24.8
7.    Other 39,970 5.9 24,492 2.4 -- 38.7
All 1,031,051 I00.0 1,016,055 100.0 -- 1.5
No. of Private 910,700 976,304 7.2
Households
jVotes: The "other" catego~’ includes multiple family households and non-family households
and minute numbers of one person households of one individual under 15.
Source: Census of Population 1981, Volume 3; Census of Population 1986, Volume 3.
to overestimate the numbers of lone parents, i.e., married persons whose
spouses are away from home will be identified as lone parents.
The data in the other panels of Table 1.5 must be viewed in the light
of the undercount of single mothers who are largely in the younger age
group, with younger children. In the case of the age distribution, only 0.5
per cent and 7.7 per cent respectively are recorded in the first and second
age categories, and in relation to the age of the youngest child classification
13.3 per cent are classified in the 0-4 category. The apparent undercount of
single mothers may also give a misleading picture in relation to other
variables. Because of the under-identification of single lone parents and the
possible over-identification of married lone parents, it is advisable to cross
classify the data first by marital status, to confine the analysis to classifications
within marital status, as in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, and to avoid presenting
aggregate data for all marital status categories.
In Table 1.6, lone parents of each marital status category, are classified
by age and by the age of the youngest child. Among single lone parents
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Table 1.5: Lone Parents (Males and Females) Classified by Age, Age of I’oun£est Child, Household
Composition and A4arital Status, 1986
Age of Lone Parent Males I~malcs All
aVo. Per cent JVO. Per cent .Aeo. Per cent
15- 19 3 0.0 507 0.5 510 0.5
20 - 29 432 2.3 7,600 8.9 8,032 7.7
30 - 39 1,914 10. l 11,854 13.8 13,678 13.1
40 -49 2,906 15.3 I 1,905 13.9 14,811 I,t.1
50 - 59 3,697 19.4 15,510 18.1 19,207 18.3
60 + I 0~068 52.9 38~317 44.7 48.385 46.2
Total 19T020 100.0 85~693 I00.0 104,713 100.0
Age of ~’ottngest Child
0 - 4 1,607 8.5 12,308 8.4 13,915 13.3
5 - 9 1,764 9.3 8,967 9.3 10,731 10.2
10 - 14 2,414 12.7 9,293 12.7 10,707 I 1.2
15- 19 3,237 17.0 I 1,080 17.0 1,1-,317 13.7
20 + 9~998 52.6 44r045 52.6 5,L043 51.6
Total 191020 100.0 851693 100.0 1041713 100.0
Household Composition
Lone Mother with Children
66,156 77.2 66,156 63.2
Lone Father with Children
14,931 78.5 I4,931 14.3
Lone Mother with Children
& Others 13,876 16.2 13,876 13.3
Lone Father with Children
& Others 3,026 15.9 3,026 2.9
Two Family Units and
Od~ers
1,040 5.5 5,495 6.4 6,535 6.2
Three and Family Units and
OIhers 23 0.1 166 0.2 189 0.1
"l~tal 19~020     100.0     85~693     100.0    104~713    100.0
Marital Status
Single II0 0.6 6,281 7.3 6,391 6.1
Married 3,932 20.7 9,700 11.3 13,632 13.0
Widowed 12,770 67.1 54,747 63.9 67,517 64.5
Separated 2,208 II.6 14T965 17.5 17,173 16.4
Total 19~020 I00.0 85~693 100.0 104~713 100.0
Source: Census of Population 1986, Central Statistics Office, Special Tabulations.
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(overwhelmingly females as we have seen above) two-thirds have very young
children: the yoonge.st-’~h:i’l-c/of 66.5 per cent of them is in the 0-4 category.
A further 18 per cent are in tile 5-9 age category. As the numbers in the
cells reveal, the largest single block of single lone parents comprises 3,046
who are in their twenties (20-29) and have young children (0-4). The
number of teenage lone parents (15-19) is not insignificant.
By contrast, thc widowed lone parents are largely in the latest stages of
the family life cycle. The children of almost three-quarters (72.7 per cent)
of the widows are aged 20 or over. The largest sub-set of widows in the
table is that containing widows over 60 years, whose youngest child is aged
20 or over. In fact, this sub-set of over 42,000 comprises 63 per cent of all
widows.
Married and separated lone parents occupy an intermediate position in
the life cycle. They are concentrated in the age groups 30-39 and 40-49
(ahhougfi not overwhelmingly so) and the distribution of their youngest
children spans the age ranges. For example, among the separated lone
parents, 23.2 per cent are in the 0-4 age range in respect of their youngest
child, a further quarter are in the 5-9 age span, and 37.8 per cent in the
10-14. In summary, single lone parents are in the earliest, widows in the
latest, and married/separated in the intermediate phases of the life cycle.
The relationship between lone parent family units and households is
explored in Table 1.7. It is of some interest to assess to what extent lone
parents share homes and accommodation in extended family households.
Commentary on "[’able 1.7 must first be placed in the context of the
difficulties discussed earlier with the Census data. Lone parents in extended
family households (for example, lone mothers with their original families)
are less likely to be identified and enumerated. Consequently many such
parent family units arc snbsnmed into wider families. With this important
caveat in mind, it can be observed that in all status categories, there are
high proportions of lone parent households comprised only of the lone parent
family -- the proportions are all in excess of approximately 70 per cent.
Widows arc more likely (80 per cent) to live in these households and single
mothers with children aged 0-4 less likely (66.8 per cent).
Among single mothers overall 69 per cent are in their own separate
households, and 17 per cent have additional persons in the household. It
might have been expected that dae pattern of family-household relationship
would differ across the life cycle. In fact the distribution across types of
household is remarkably unil’orm. For example, there is no pattern in the
data of lone parents with young children showing a greater choice of mixed
and extended households. One interesting exception to this uniformity in the
data is the proportion of single and separated parents at the earliest stage
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of the familv cycle who are in Iwo famllv households. One sixill (16.1 per
cent) of those single mothers whose youngest child is 0-4 arc in two family
households and the corresponding figure for "married" lone parents is 17.2
per cent. If the CSO’s guidance on the underestimation of single lone
parents in particular is taken into account, then the proportion for nmhiple
family households mav in I~tct be higher, and for independent households
lower.
(vi) Comparative Data
The Irish pattern of a rapid increase in the lone parent population is
not unique: other countries have a high and growing proportion of lone
parent families in their populations. Millar’s comparative compilation, given
below in Table 1.8, along with h’ish Census data for 1981 and 1986, shows
that the lone parent family population has been growing substantiallv in
manv other countries. It is also evident fi’om the data that Ireland shares a
further specifc experience in relation to lone parenthood: the decline of
widowhood as "the main route into lone parenthood" (Millar, 1989).
The international data indicates a shift in thc composition of lone
parent families towards fanlilies headed hy divorced mothers, rather than
single mothers. This pattern reflecu the rapid growth in many cOmtries of
divorce rates in the 1970s and 1980s. Ermisch calculated that for five major
OECD countries (USA, Great Britain, Germany, France and Belgium), by
f~r the largest single contribution to the increase in lone parent families
fi’om 1970 to about the earlv 1980s was the increased number of divorced
or separated mothers (Ermisch, 1990).
No reliable comparison of these data with the limited Irish data can be
offered. The data in Chapter 2 will suggest that both non-marital births and
marital breakdown are increasing rapidlv in Ireland. But tile relative
contributions of these sources of lone parenthood cannot be reliahlv
determined because of the deficiences in the available Census data (see
Table 1.8 and text above).
Table 1.6: Lone Parents Classified b3 Marital Status, Age and Age of Youngest Child 07~
ll’it~vd
~t, ,/ Si~llr Mnrn~d So, fatal
JatcRi Ale *f tk~tra Ct~d .4~t of IMlest (:hild AXt of IkuRta Ckild Age of I~t~gctt CkiM
0-4 5-9 IO-Iq 15 19 ~0+ All0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20+ All0-4    5-9 10-14 15-19 ~0+ All 0-4 5-9 m-14 15-19 20+ All
5-L9 465                    465 31 31 I I 13 13
100 t00 100 100 IC~ 100
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Table 1.8: Trends in the sVumber and Type of Lone Parent Families, Selected Countries*
Country             Year aVumber % of All           P’amily Type %(O00s)
Families I’V D SP S
tultlt
Children
F.R. Germany 1970 750 8.7 39 33 I 1 13
1982 930 I 1.4 25 43 18 13
France 1968 720 8.7 54 17 21 8
1982 890 9.8 31 39 15 151"
The Netherlands 1971 220 10.0 63 16 12 6
1983 280 10.0 23 59 5 13
United Kingdom 1971 520 8.0 24 24 34 18
1984 940 13.0 13 44 19 2’t
Australia 1975 170 8.5 27 21 41 II
1982 300 14.1 14 37 30 19
US Wilite 1970 2,600 10.1 24 -- 73 -- 3
1984 5,500 20.0 9 -- 76 -- /5
US Black 1970 1,150 35.7 16 -- 69 -- 15
1984 2,800 59.2 6 -- 44 -- 49
|re]and 198t 30 5.6 -- N.A. --
1986 36 8.6 -- N.A. I
Sources: Millar (1989), Table 1.7. h’ish data fi’om Census of Population, 1981 and 1986 (see
Table 1.17.
* The definitions of lone parents in these countries vary I see Source.
Author’s estimate.
N.A. is not available.
(vii) Summary
In this chapter trends in relation to the growth of lone parent families
were reported and basic demographic data on lone parents were given. The
following are the key findings in this analysis:
Lone parent families (with dependent children) comprised almost 9
per cent of all families in 1986, compared with a 1981 figure of 7.1
pel" cenL
Single mothers are the most rapidly growing type of lone parent
family -- an increase of 135 per cent over the 1981-1986 inter-censal
period, widowed families are on the decline, and separated lone
parents show a significant increase.
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Labour Force Survey estimates for the 1980s confirm the Census
picture of a very rapid growth in lone parent family numbers --
almost 46 per cent from 1983 to 1990.
Lone mother families witla dependent children aged under 15
increased in number by 29 per cent fronl 1981 to 1986, in contrast
to a 0.9 per cent increase in respect of couples.
In 1981, 5.2 per cent of children aged under 15 in private households
lived in lone parent families and by 1986 this figure had increased to
6.6 per cent.
The 1986 Census data in respect of aduhs (over the age of 15) gives
a figure of 105,000 for persons living as parents in lone parent families,
of whom 68,000 are widowed, 32,000 married/separated and 6,000
single.
The Census data are a very significant underestimate of tile number of
lone parents: specifically, tile Census figure for single lone mothers
(6,281) is approximately half of the number of relevant social welfare
recipients and the latter must be taken as a de facto minimum
estimate.
Most single lone parents haveyoung children, two-thirds of them in the
age category (for the youngest child) of 0-4 and a further 18 per
cent in the 5-9 category; by contrast, the youngest child of about
three-quarters of the widows was aged 20 or over.
The rising population of lone parents is an international phenomenon.
Ireland shares with other countries the decline in widowhood as a
factor in lone parenthood, but the relative importance of non-marital
births and marital breakdown in the Formation of the lone parent
population in Ireland cannot be quantified.
Chapter 2
LOJVE PARE.NTS: A PRELIMIJVAR~~ PROFILE
(i) Introduction
The previous chapter outlined tile concepts and definitions associated
with .lone parenthood and documented tile extent and recent growth of tile
lone parent population in Ireland. In this chapter, two fiH’ther descriptive
analyses are given. First, the demographic trends underpinning the growth
of lone parenthood are described. Tile purpose of the demographic analysis
is to record trends which are related to inflows into [one parenthood -- for
example, non-marital births. Second, a preliminary socio-economic profile of
lone parent families is given, based on tile 1987 Household Budget Survey.
(ii) Demographic Trends- Widows
One feature of tile data in Chapter ] was tile contrast between widows
and other lone mothers (especially single mother families). The latter are
growing rapidly in number while tile former (i.e., widows with dependent
children) are declining. It is useful, therefore, to note the long-run trend in
relation to widows. As Table A4 shows, tile overall "widowhood rate"
(widows per 1,000 population) has declined over a long period -- for
example, the figure fell fi’om 163 in 1971 to 139 in 1981. Tile trend reflects
a secular increase in life expectancy and has resulted in an ageing of tile
widowed population and the virtual disappearance of widowhood in the
younger adult age groups. Table A4 shows that in 1991 there were 4 widows
per 1,000 married persons among 25-34 year olds and 10 among 35--’1.4 year
olds.
The most recent data on the numbers of widows by age are given for
selected years in the 1980s in Table A5. It is noteworthy that within the
context of a small absolute increase in the nunabers of all widows, the
nunaber of elderly widows has grown significantly. From 1981 to 1991, the
number of widows aged 65 or over grew by 17 per cent and tile share of
these aged widows in tile total rose from 69 per cent to 75 per cent. In
3O
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Ireland, tile shift of the widowed population away from the younger aduh
age groups and the consequent clecline of the widowed population with
dependent children broadly reflects the long-run demographic and social
changes experienced internationally (Kammerman and Kahn, 1989; Gilliaud,
1989).
(iii) Demographic Trends- Marital Breakdown
To compile a time series on marital breakdown both C’.ensus and
Labour Force Survey data must be used. The Census data must be
interpreted witb caution. The 1979 Census was the first Census in which a
catcgory of marital status apart fi’om the conventional categories of married,
single, widowed was allowed. A classification based on "present legal status"
was given to respondents and this permitted the usual single/married/
widowed options as well as "other". The latter was intended "only to relate
to persons who had obtained a divorce in another country". In 1981 the
samc procedure was followed. In both years, according to the CSO, some
persons using the designation "other" gave additional information indicating
that present legal status was acttmlly married. For this reason these Censuses
include the "other" responses in "married" in the main published tables
and give separate details on tbose classified as "other" in Appendix tables.
In relation to the 1981 Census, the CSO also point out tbat the
"increased level of interest" in tbe question afl’ected the pattern of answering
more than in 1979. A further point to note about Census data is that in the
1986 Census, the question format was changed. Respondents were first asked
to indicate (Question 5) whether the listed household members were "ever
married" and, secondly (Q.nestion 6) to indicate the present "actual marital
status irrespective of the legal status" of those ever married. The classifications
available in this question included "married but separated", with the latter
subclassified into "deserted", "marriage annulled", "legally separated",
"other separated" and "divorced in another country". Finally in relation to
tbe Census data, the 1986 Census took place (April 1986) a short time
before the Referendum on Civil Divorce (.June 1986) was field and therefore
at a time of extensive and controversial debate on the extent, causes,
consequences and anlclioration of marital breakdown. This may have had
an effect ot~t the pattern of responses to the questions on marital status.
Census data difl~zr from the Labour Force Survey data in that the latter
is an interview survey and the former a self completion census. The LFS
questionnaire administered to respondents ascertains the marital status of
housebold members with a category included for "married but separated,
divorced, annulled . . "
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In interpreting tile data in Table 2.1 the difficuhies noted above should
be kept in mind. For example, the 1986 figure represents a huge increase
over the 1985 figure for marital breakdown. However, as the figure again
"declines" in 1987, the 1986 figure must be seen in part as a function of the
change in question wording and the impact of the divorce referendum
debate. The 1979 figure is perhaps best considered an understatement of the
extent of actual marital breakdown. Whatever qualifications must attacb to
these data it is clear that the level of marital breakdown has increased
rapidly in the last decade. The 1991 rate of 34.8 per 1,000 married persons
(on a Labour Force Survey measure) is three times the Census measure of
11.5 for 1981 -- an annual average rate of increase of 11.7 per cent.
That the underlying trend in marital breakdown in Ireland is upwards
is hardly in doubt: tbis would be broadly convergent with international
experience. However, the extent of the measured increase is sensitive to the
data used and to the choice of time period.
FIGURE 2.1
SEPARATED PERSONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
Figure 2.1 (a) Figure 2.1 (b)
Number of Selxtrated Pcrsons Separated Persons per 1,000
1979 - 1991 1979 - 1991
a I
aVotes: 1979 and 1986 are Census data; other years Labour Force Survey Data. The LFS
data are rounded.
Sources: Censuses of Population 1979, 1986, I"oL II Ages and Marital Status. Labour Force Survfys
1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991.
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Table 2. I: Marital Breakdown in Ireland 1979-1991: ~Vumber of Persons ’:Separated" (Included
"Divorced", "’Annulled", etc.)
~’ear
Males Females :Ill Per 1,000
Married
Persons
(’000)
1979 2.4 5.2 7.6 6.1
1981 5.1 9.0 14.1 I 1.5
1983 8.3 12.8 21.1 16.2
1984 8.5 15.9 24.4 18.3
1985 8.0 17.2 25.2 19.0
1986 14.6 22.6 37.2 28.6
1987 11.2 20.6 31.9 23.7
1988 I 1.9 24.6 36.5 26.9
1989 12.8 25.0 37.8 28.1
1990 14.2 25.5 39.7 29.7
1991 17. I 29.6 46.7 34.8
Notes: 1979 and 1986 are Census data; other years Labour Force Survey Data. "[’he LFS
data are rounded.
Sources: Censuses of Population 1979, 1986, Vol. I1 Ages aM Marital Status. labour Force Survo,s
1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991.
(ix,) Demographic Trends -- ~\’bn-Marital Birlhs
Time series data on non-marital births are given in Table A7 in the
appendix; graphs derived fi’om the data are presented in Figure 2.2. A long
run and continual increase in non-marital I)irths is evident. In 1961 there
were 975 such births; by 1981 the figure had more than quadrupled to
3,914. The most recent available figure (for 1991) is 8,766 representing an
increase of almost ninefold over the three decades. When the trend is
reported as a rate pcr 1,000 i)opulation, or as a percentage of all births, it
is no less dramatic. The rate per 1,000 population increased to 2.49 from
0.34 (1961-1991), and as a percentage of all births thc figure reached 16.6
per cent in 1991 from 1.6 per cent in 1961.
From Figure 2.2 below, anad the detailed figures in Table A7, it appears
that non-marital births grew as rapidly in the 1980s as in the previous two
decades. For example, from 1981 to 1989 the share of non-marital births in
the total doubled and the number rose fi’om 3,914 to 8,766. The rising share
of non-marital births in the total is a function of both marital and non-
marital births: marital births have been declining and non-marital births
rising. Taking the decade 1980-91, marital births fell from over 72,000 to
just over 44,000, a decline of about 40 per cent, while non-marital births
rose by 124 per cent from 3,91,!- to 8,766
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FIGURE 2.2
NON MARITAL BIRTHS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 1961 - 1991
Figure 2.2 (a)
Number in Thousands
1961 - 1991
Figure 2.2 (b)
Rate per 1,000 Population
1961 - 1991
= I .............................
t4
01 .............................
Figure 2.2 (c)
As % of All Births
1961 - 1991
11 LI e~ ~ su 71 P~ ~ 17 ~ i1 sQ Q~ 87 i$ tl
Source: Reports on Vital ,~tatistics, Central Statistics Office.
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FIGURE 2-3
ADOPTIONS AND NON-MARITAL BIRTHS
1961-1991
Figure 2.3 (a) Figure 2.3 (b)
Adoptions as % of Non-Marital Births       Non-Marital Birtl~ and Adoptions
1961 - 1991                               1961 - 1991
. !
? :
D .................
°. .....................-,-., " ........ ..........
Source: See Table 2.2.
An appreciation of the link betwecn non-marital births and the
formation of lone parent family units must lake into account trends in the
level of adoptions (almost all of which relate to non-marital children). In
the last decade and a half the number of adoptions has been declining as
the number of non-marital births has bccn increasing. This fall off in
adoptions has undoubtedly contributed significantly to the growth in lone
parent filmily units. Table 2.2 below shows the data on non-marital births
and the corresponding data on adoptions. The number of adoptions was in
the range 1,000 to 1,500 during the 1970s, but in the last decade adoptions
have declined continuously, and reached a figure of 590 in 1991. As a
proportion of the non-marital births total, the adoption figure was 6.7 per
cent in 1991, compared with 41.4 per cent in 1978 and 86.2 per cent in
1968.
Figure _’2.3 displays the adoptions and non-marital births data for 1961-
1991. The divcrgeuce between the trends commenced early in the 1970s and
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accentuated fi’om tile mid-1970s. While the social factors nnderpinning these
trends are not the primary focus here, a number of factors associated with
the decline in adoptions may be briefly noted. First, improvements were
made to tile income maintenance provisions for lone mothers in the period
1970-1974, notably the introduction of the Unmarried Mothers’ Allowance
in 1973. Second, there was a growth in the social work and social services
support for lone mothers. Third, tile climate of opinion on social and moral
questions became less hostile and stigmatising towards lone parents.
It is important to examine the incidence of non-marital births according
to mothers’ ages. In the first instance changes in the age structure of the
single female population may have contributed to tile grov.,th irt non-marital
births. Secondly, tile incidence of non-marital births in the younger age
groups is a matter of considerable policy significance, as younger single
mothers may be tile ones most likely to need income maintenance and social
services support.
The first of these issues can be addressed by analysing the growth of
non-marital births in terms of the numbers of single women in different age
groups and the rate of non-marital births in these age groups. Changes in
the number of non-marital births can then be apportioned to populalion
effects (changes in tile number of single women)fertility effects (changes in
the rate of non-marital births) and interaction effects (the effect of
simuhaneous population and fertility changes). This analysis was undertaken
for the periods 1961-71, 1971-81 and 1981-91 and the restllts are given in
Table 2.3.
In the period 1961-71, 54 per cent of the additional births were due to
the increased size of tile population of single females, and 31 per cent to an
increased rate of births per 1,000 single females. A notable result is the
decomposition of the increase in this period for 20-29 year olds -- the group
accounting for the bulk of the increase. This population group tripled in size
over the decade (from 32,000 to 99,800), but the number of births doubled.
This is reflected in a lower rate of births in 1971 compared with 1961 --
10.85 per 1,000 compared with 14.95 per 1,000. Accordingly, tile rise in
births of 582 is attributable to a growth in tile relevant population group,
with changes in the rate of births exercising a downward influence on births.
The pattern for 1971-1981 stands in marked contrast. Almost 80 per
cent of the change was due to an increased rate of non-marital births, and
less than 10 per cent to a growth in the population of single women. More
recently, in the decade 1981-1991 the dominance of tile increased rate of
births continued; three-quarters of tile increase in births arose from this
source, and 13 per cent from an enhanced population of single females.
Overall, the figures confirm that tile enormous rise in non-marital fertility is
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Table 2.2: aVon-Marital Births and Adoptions, 1961-1991
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Adoptions as
]’ear Births Adoptions % of Births
1961 975 547 56.1
1962 1,111 699 62.9
1963 1,157 840 72.6
1964 1,292 1,003 77.6
1965 1,403 1,049 74.8
1966 1,436 1,178 82.0
1967 1,540 1,493 96.9
1968 1,558 1,343 86.2
1969 1,642 1,225 74.6
1970 1,709 1,414 82.7
1971 1,842 1,305 70.8
1972 2,005 1,291 64.4
1973 2,167 1,402 64.7
1974 2,309 1,415 61.3
1975 2,515 1,4,t3 57.4
1976 2,545 1,104 43.4
1977 2,879 1,127 39.1
1978 3,003 1,223 40.7
1979 3,331 988 29.7
1980 3,723 I,II5 29.9
1981 3,914 1,191 30.4
1982 4,358 1,191 27.3
1983 4,552 1,184 26.0
1984 5,116 1,195 23.4
1985 5,282 882 16.7
1986 5,877 800 13.6
1987 6,381 715 11.2
1988 6,336 649 10.2
1989 6,522 615 9.4
1990 7,660 648 8.5
1991 8,766 590 6.7
Source: Annual Reports of An Bord Uachtala (Adoption Board), Reports on Vital Statistics.
aVotes N.A. ---- Not Available.
the important factor underlying the recent and continuing rise in non-
marital births.
As regards non-marital births to very young mothers, the data are
indicative of a significant growth in the age group under 19 years. Table
2.4 records the rate per 1,000 single women 15-19 and per 1,000 (single)
women in the child bearing years 15-49, for selected years. Clearly, the rate
in respect of teenage mothers is significantly lower througbout the period
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Table 2.3: Decomposition of Increase in sVon-Marital Births by Age C~te&oo,, 1961-1991
Population Fertility
Age P2ffect Effect          htteraction Total
Y N N X
1981-1991
- 19 ] 22 880 74 996
20-29 568 1,804 487 2,859
30-39 92 557 100 839
0-49 -- I 93 --6 7 I
Total 647 3,656 612 4~915
% 13.2 74.4 12.5 I00
1971-1981
-19 131 882 193 1,206
20-29 301 1,478 413 2,192
30-39 481 2 483
40-49 -- 6 9 1 I 14
Total 304 3,080 51 I 3,895
% 7.8 79.0 13. I 100
1961-1971
-19 43 224 33 300
20-29 987 -- 135 -- 271 582
30-39 -- 50 86 -- 32 4
40-49 -- 4 4 2 2
Total 477 273 137 888
% 53.7 30.7 15.4 100
Source: Report on Vital Statistics, various issues.
aVotr: The calculations exclude the small numbers of birtbs io women 50 and over, and
the "ilgc i|o[ stated" ca$c$.
than the rate for all single women. However, the figure for young women
grew more rapidly- more than five fold over the period to 1991 -- and
thus there was a degree of convergence towards the figure for all women. In
1991, the rates for young women and all women respectively were 14.5 and
22.8 per 1,000 single women.
The bar charts in Figure 2.4 give the rate (per 1,000 single women) for
the age groups 15-19, 20-29, 30-39 and 40-49, for selected years. In all of
the ),ears, the highest rate is among women in the 20-29 age category with
the figure for 15-19 year olds significantly less. This relatively low rate
should not obscure the imporlance of tfie absolute nulnbers involved --
which are not insignificant. In every year since 1981 the number has not
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FIGURE 2.4
NON MARITAL BIRTH RATES (PER 1,000 SINGLE WOMEN)
BY AGE GROUP, SELECTED YEARS
Figure 2.4 (a) Figure 2.4 (b)
1961 1971
Figure2.4 (c)
1981
Figure 2.4 (d)
1991
Source." See Table 2.3.
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been less than 1,500; it grew from 1,507 in 1981 to 1,811 in 1986 and
almost 2,500 in 1991. This represents a potentially large demand on social
services as these mothers may be the ones most reliant on adoption, social
work, income maintenance and other social sen,ices.
Finally in relation to non-marital births, it is important to note that
while these data refer to a growing sub-group of the population fi’om which
lone parent families are drawn, there are conceptual and definitional
boundaries to be borne in mind. For example, as indicated earlier, some
non-marital births result in adoption rather than tile formation of a lone
parent family. Furthermore, some non-marital births are attributable to
unmarried, cohabiting couples and others to married women, now separated
and engaged in a new relationship. However, the data do offer a reliable
guide to tile trend over time in the inflow to lone parenthood from single
mothers.
(v) Lone Parents." Socio Ecoaomic Data
Studies of lone parents in the UK, USA and other countries report a
pattern of poor socio-cconomic status, marginal attachment to the labour
force and generally low standards of living (OECD, 1990). There are reasons
to hypothesise that lone parents in Ireland may also be susceptible to such
patterns. The large number of non-marital births to young unmarried
women, tile poor labour market conditions for women, and the growth of
social security expenditures all suggest that lone parents in Ireland may
have a similar socio-economic status to their counterparts in other countries.
It is difficuh to document tile socio-economic circumstances of lone
parents in [reland because of the absence of studies and limitations on the
existing data. In principle, the 1986 Census data could be analysed and the
occupational, educational, geographical, and other characteristics of all lone
parents could be ascertained. However, as pointed out in Chapter I, there
are significant difficulties associated with the use of Census data. On the one
hand, there is a significant undercount of some lone mother families and, on
the other, a potential overcount because of tile de facto basis of household
membership. These limitations, while arguably not sufl~cienl to preclude use
of tile Census data, are compounded by the absence of any household or
family bzcome data.
For these reasons the Household Budget Survey offers a useful alternative
data source. The Household Budget Survey is undertaken cvel’y seven years
and compiles data on a wide range ofvariables for a nationally representative
sample of households. Primarily, the data are collcctcd to obtain detailed
expenditure information for updating tile Consumer Price Index commodity
weights, but a significant amount of data on tile socio-economic character
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Table 2.4: aVon-Marital Birth Rate for :Ill Single H/omen Aged 15-49 and Single H/omen 15-49,
Selected Years, 1961-1991
Age Group
Year                                         15 -- 19                        15 -- 49
(’000)
1961 2.7 5.1
1971 4.7 6.5
1981 9.7 11.9
1983 10.2 12.9
1984 11.0 14.4
1985 10.8 15.3
198fi 11.3 15.6
1987 11.9 17.1
1988 11.6 17.3
1989 11.8 17.9
1990 13.2 20.5
1991 14.5 22.8
Source: Report on Vital Statistics (various issues); Census of Population 1961, 1971, 1981, 1986;
Labour Force Surveys 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, Central Statistics Office.
Note: The figures for the 15-49 age group include the ve~, small number of births to those
under 15 years of age.
of households are also obtained, and in particular detailed income data on all
household members are obtained.
The HBS was last undertaken in 1987, with a sample size of 7,705 and
these data permit a limited analysis of the social and economic circumstances
of lone parents. Two important limitations to the data must be noted. First,
tbe HBS is a survey of all households and lone parent households form only
a small sub set of the overall sample. Consequently, as will be outlined
below, sample size constrains the analysis which can be permitted. Second,
the HBS is a survey of households: although data are compiled on family
units and persons within the sample households, the Central Statistics Office
which is responsible for production of the data and access to the data will
not undertake analysis at the level of families rather than households. It is
possible tberefore to identify and analyse only those lone parent families
which are also independent households.~ Within these limitations, it is
possible to compile a description of lone parent households and to compare
tbem with other households.
A household is defined in the’HBS as a "a single person or group of people who regularly reside
together in the same accommtxlation and who share the same catering arrangements" (lIousehold Budgel
Survey 1987. Vo[. I, Appcndix 3).
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Ill tile paragraphs below, lone parent households are contrasted with
two other household types -- two adult households with children and other
households. The classification of households was devised as follows: First,
lone parent households were dcfined for purposes of this analysis as households
comprising one adull and one or more children aged 0-18. The number of lone
parent households in the HBS sample is sensitive to the age demarcation
between adults and children -- 134 with 14 as the upper age limit for
children and 214 with 18 as the limit, as Table 2.5 shows. To provide
adequate sample numbers, the age limit of 18 is chosen giving a prelimiuary
figure n -- 214. This initial identification recorded 9 households in the
"young", "middle aged" and "retired" phases of the life cycle which are
supposedly "non-family" and "noll-child" households. These anomalous 9
cases (see right hand half of lower panel of Table 2.5) are excluded, yielding
a sample of 205 lone parent households for analysis.
Second, lone parents include single and widowed adults and households
(with children aged 0-18) where the aduh is "married" with an absent spouse.
The HBS distinguishes "temporary" and "pernlanent" absences but both
forms of absence are included in the definition of "n+arried" lone parents.
This is an entirely ad hoc procedure to sustain sample numbers, as 16
households would have to be excluded if the criterion only allowed
"permanent" absences (see Table 2.5). These "married" lone parenu are
designated "separated" in the tables below.
Third, two adult households (children aged 0-18) are identified as a
point of comparison with one adult households. These two adult households,
it should be noted, are comprised overwhelmingly of married couples and
their children: for example, 92 per cent of tbe "two adult and one child"
households are standard "married couples with child" families. However,
this category also includes a residual of non-standard households and families
and is not exactly coterminous with the two parent nuclear family. Therefore,
the term "two adult and one (two, etc.) child", rather than the term "two
parent" is used in the tables below in the interests of precision.
Fourth, households other than lone adult and two adult types are all
classified in a heterogenous "other" category.
It should be recalled that the purpose of the classification is not to
construct a sociologically valid typology of families, but to identify lone
parent houscholds and to offer a preliminary comparison of them with other
households. Finally, before considering thc data on different types of
households the gender contposition of lone parent in the HBS, as reported
in TaMe 2.5, can be seen. Only 17 (80/0) of the 205 lone parents are males.
Table 2.6 below summarises the resuhs of the comparisons between lone
parent households, twu aduh households and other houscholds. This summary
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Table 2.5: "Lone Parent" Households in 1987 Household Budget SurvO,
Children Defined As
(a) Marital Status                         0 - 14                        0 - 18
~v % jv %
Single                                  61 45.5 63 29.4
Widowed 13 9.7 49 22.9
Married
Spouse Temporarily
Absent 7 5.2 16 7.5
Spouse Permanently
Absent 53 39.6 86 40.2
All 134 100.0 214 100.0
Children Defined As
(b) Life Cycle                    0 - 14                0 - 18
N % y %
You ng I 0. I 2 0.9
Middle Aged 2 0.9
Retired I 0.1 5 2.3
Pro School 44 32.8 44 20.6
Early School 51 38. I 5 ] 23.8
Pre Adolescent 37 27.6 56 26.2
Adolescent -- I 54 25.2
All 134 100.0 214 100.0
.Arole: Figures arc unadjusted sample numbers,
Source: Household Budget Survey, 1987, Special Analysis.
offers a simple comparison of the percentages of households in a specific
category for a range of variables.~ Two aduh households are subdivided hy
family size (one, two, three and four or more) but no sub-division of the
lone parent category is possible given the small sample numbers involved.
The first two columns of Table 2.6 suggest that lone parents are largely
detached from the ]abour market in stark contrast to those in two adult
households. In single lone parent households, almost 90 per cent have
household heads who are not economically active, and 90 per cent of these
households contain no economically active persons. There are also high
proportions in these categories (in the range 60-65%) among widowed and
"separated" lone parent households. Only very small proportions of two
The original cross tabulations on which the summary data in Table 2.6 are based are available
from the author.
Table 2.6: Socio-Eeonomic Comparisons of Lone Parent Households attd Other Households
Type of Household                   A        B        C        D        E        F        G        H        I        .7
Lone Parent: Single 88.5 88.5 88.5 66.6 93.4 72.1 93.4 2.9 27.9 61
Separated, etc. 65.0 66.0 68.0 77.0 54.0 59.0 76.0 3.5 45.0 100 ’~Lone Parent: I
Lone F’arent: Widov.,ed 59.1 61.4 61.4 63.6 52.2 25.0 68.2 3.2 45.0 44 "-z
Tv,,o Aduhs: One Child 6.0 10.6 17.3 51.4 17.0 15.4 23.1 3.0 39.7 566 ~z
Two Adults: Two Children 2.3 5.5 10.7 57.0 15.0 17.1 21.6 4.0 37.3 824
Tv.’o Adults: Three Children 0.2 4.2 9.8 61.2 16.0 15.6 23.8 5.0 38.1 743
Tv,’o Adults: Four or More 2.0 4.5 17.6 68,1 23.1 21.1 37.1 6.7 39.4 758 -.T..:-z-,
Children
m
All Other Households 33.3 45.2 35.0 70.9 28.5 10.3 45.5 2.9 56.6 4,609
-.z
c.
Source: Household Budget Survey, 1987, Special Analysis.
Notes: A = % With No Economically Active Persons
B -- % Household Heads Not Eeonoraically Active
C -- % Household Heads in Lowest Social Group
D = % Household Heads Left School at 14- 16
1’2 = % of Households with Social Welfare as 80% or inore of G ro~ Income
F = % of Households ir~ Local Authority Rental Housir~g
G -- % of Households with Full "Medical Card" Health Entitlement
H --= Average Household Size
[ = Average Age of Household Head
J -- Sample N (Unadjusted)
i
©
t--
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aduh households are in these categories (10% or below). A crude picture of
tile general socio-economic status of these householcis can be gleaned from
tile third colu’mn: this shows the proportion of household heads who are in
tile lowest soclo-economic group in tile CSO’s classification. These data also
indicate distinctive differences between lone and dual parent households,
with higher proportions of the former in this socio-economic group. The
data on education, specifically the proportions of household heads who [eft
school at age 14, 15 or 16, are not definitive. Thc small sample uunlbers do
not permit the cross classifications by the age of the head of household, or
of life cycle, which would bc required to conclusively establish a pattern of
earlier school leaving among especially single and separated lone parents.
That such a pattern exists is suggested, however, by tile respective data for
sioglc and separated [one parcnts: their proportions in the early school
leaving category are (in a range around 65%) markedly higher than their
counterparts in two adult households.
Three further columns Of tile table ofl’er summary measures of the
significance of State transfers and services in household income. It is clear
that for many lone parent households, there is a high degree of dependence
on State transfers. Ninety three per cent of single lone parents (all mothers)
receive more than 80 per cent of their gross income from transfer paynlents.
An identical proportion of these household heads have full ("medic’at card")
health service entitlcnlent and 72 per cent of them are local authority
tenants. This level of utiJisation of State transfers and benefits is vastly
higher than for dual adult households and all other types of household. For
widowed and separated ]one parents, this contrast is also evident but by no
means as dramatic as the case of single lone mothers. Overall, the evidence
portrays lone parent households as having a dlstiucdy [owcr level of economic
resources.
These findings echo tile findings of other studies in Ireland and
elsewhere. For example, the Federation of Services for Unmarried Parents
and their Children (FSUPC) conducted a study of all unmarried mothers
who give birth in h’eland in 1983; more recently Richardson and Winston
reported survey results for unmarried mothers in one large maternity hospital
in Dublin (O’Hare, et al., 1987; Richardson and Winston, 1989). Both
studies report a pattern universally found in studies of single mothers -- a
very disproportionate incidence of mothers in the lowest socio-economic
group. FSUPC’s study records 55 per cent of tile mothers in tile semiskilled
and unskilled manual group, and tile Dublin study 51.5 per cent.4 A further
finding in both studies, )vhich also reflects international research findings, is
’ Neither published study, it should be nol~l, gives full details of the social class chi~ificaiions tised
in the analysis.
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tile marginal labour force attachment of tile mothers. In the nationally
representative study by FSUPC an unemployment rate of 43 per cent is
recorded,5 while the Dublin study shows a figure of 52 per cent. The
unenaployment rate among the fathers of non-marital children in the Dublin
study was 33 per cent -- significantly higher than tile national uneml)loynlent
rate applicable at the time of tile study.
The high incidence of State social welfare payments and utilisation of
State services has also been documented in respect of lone mothers in tile
UK (Millar, 1989; Bradshaw and Millar, 1991). In 1991, Bradshaw and
Millar’s survey results showed that there is a heavy reliance on means tested
social security payments anaong the UK lone parent population: 72 per cent
were in receipt of some inconae support, only 29 per cent received
maintenance income from absent partners, and 40 per cent had some
earnings. Lone parents in the UK, as in Ireland, also had a proportionately
higher prescnce in local authority tenancies: 57 per cent were in this tenure
(65 pcr cent in tile case of single mother families). Finally, thc lower level
of labour force activity among Ionc parents reported abovc for h’eland also
applied in the UK, although not as dramatically. Only ,1-6 per cent of UK
lone parents were economically active and tile overall rate of labour force
participation among lone parents has been declining over time (Bradshaw
and Millar, 1991; Millar, 1989).
(vi) Lone Parents’ Incomes
The 1987 HBS also permits an analysis of the income levels and sources
of income of households. Table A8 in the Appendix provides tile basic
descriptive data on the levels and sources of households’ incomes in 1987.
In passing, it may be noted that tile table gives further evidence of the
relatively large role of transfer payments in tile inconles of lone parent
households. On average, State transfer payments comprised 73 per cent, 48
per cent and 48 per cent of the gross income of single, widowed and
separated lone parent households respectively, compared to 18 per cent for
all households.
Thc figures in Table A8 are not standardised to allow for the variable
size and composition of houscholds. Table 2.7, however, gives the average
disposable income data alongside these same data standardised in per capita
equivalent terms. Two variants of the per capita equivalence adjustment are
givcn. One of these, 1.0, 0.66 and 0.33 (for household head, each additional
adult and each child) is implicit in tile payments to certain social welfare
rccipicnts. Thc second higher adjustment is rclevant as the definition of child
in these data refers to 0-18 ycars olds, justifying a moderately large
This figure is glvt:n in Ih¢! leXl, allhlmugh no lable of rc~;uh.~ is given in Ihe pub[ic;Hi¢~ll.
Table 2.7:
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Average Disposable Income and :lverage Disposable Income per Capita Equivalent, Lone
Parent, Two Adult and Other Itousehohls, 1987
Disposable &come
Disposalabte Per Capita
Income I-quivalent
I         II
Lone Parent: Single
Lone Parent: Separated
Lone Parent: Widowed
Two Aduhs, One Child
Two Aduhs, Two Children
Two Adults, Three Children
Two Adults, Four or More Children
Oll~er Households
£ week@
80.70 56.79 49.57
110.30 62.43 51.88
133.07 78.11 65.23
206.49 103.77 93.86
213.55 92.05 79.09
217.79 82.19 68.06
220.56 69.36 55.21
197.15 96.02 92.31
All 200.96 91.82 84.80
Source: Household Bridget Survey, 1987, Special Analysis.
a%’btes: Per Capita Equivalence scales (I = 1.0, 0.66, 0.33; I I = 1.0, 0.7j 0.5).
equivalence rating. As the recent h’ish research on poverty suggests, it is
importaut to ascertain whether the extent of measured poverty (defined in
income terms) and its composition is affected by the choice of equivalence
scale (Callan, Nolan el al., 1989; Nolan and Farrell, 1990).6
A clear hierarchy in income terms is suggested by Table 2.7. Single
lone parents’ average incomes are the lowest, followed by separated lone
parents and then the largest family category among two aduh households
two aduhs and four or more children. This pattern, as will be seen below,
is reflected in the relative risks of poverty among the different types of
household. Average weekly disposable income per capita for 1987 is
calculated as ~’92 and L85 using the lower and higher per capita scales
respectively. These averages provide the benchmark against which the
relative income measures of poverty arc calculated. "Poverty lines" are
derived as 40 per cent, 50 per cent and 60 per cent of the overall averages.
"Poverty" here is opcrationalised in &come terms and specifically in relative
income terms.
Scale [ has been used ill a number ofearller sludles of po’~’erl? and income distribution in Ireland
because of ils implied incorporation in social welfare paymenl rales. Scale II has I~en used in a number
of studies for Ihe EC Commission and by die French Slalislical Office (Nolan and Farreff, 1990).
48 LONE PARENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
A number of observations about this methodology should be made
before considering the actual details. First, tile use of poverty "lines" below
which a household is deemed to he poor is somewhat crude. It takes no
account of the "poverty gap" between tile poverty line and poor households’
actual incomes, or of the distribution of households above and below a given
poverty line. For example, a poor household with an income of £1.00 less
than the poverty line is weighted the same as one with £10.00 less than the
line. Conversely, with households above tile line: those barely above it are
weighted the same as households with very high incomes. A methodology
has heen developed to take this problem into account (Nolan and Callan,
1989). However, the very small numhers of lone parent households do not
permit anything other than a simple count of households on a poverty line
basis.
Second, there is no universally agreed definition of poverty -- the
search for which has been likened by one commentator to "a search for the
Holy Grail" (Piachaud, 1981). Consequently, poverty line results must be
presented for a number of lines to show tile sensitivity of poverty estimates
to the choice of poverty line.
Third, tile relative income measure does not directly measure consumption.
Ultimately, poverty is concerned with deprivation in terms of standards of
consumption and life style. The relative income measure, however, is
concerned witl~ resources. Recent research has made progress in conceptualising
and measuring the link between income and consumption (Whelan et al.,
1991; Mack and Lausley, 1985). The HBS data available here do not
facilitate a dlorough analysis of this relationship. However, the expenditure
data and limited data on ownership of durable goods broadly suggests a
strong correlation between income and other measures of life style and
consumption (data not given).
Finally, tile concern in this paper is not tile measurement of poverty in
Ireland in general, or the conceptual problems which such an exercise would
encounter. Tile primary focus is tile situation of lone parent households and
their status relative to tile generality of households.
Table 2.8 summarises the poverty line framework. There are, in fact,
s/x lines derived on the basis of two (per capita equivalent) scales and three
possible l)roportions of mean income. For scale i, at 50 per cent of mean
income, tile poverty threshold is £46.00 weekly (1987 data). These figures
compare with the following weekly social welfare rates for one person in 1987
(post-July):7
7 The tale [’or the lone parents payments is a composite payment for aduh and child and is not
directly comparable to the i~er’sonal rates noted above. For information, however, it can be noted that
the post-July 1987 rate for the Unmarried ,~,lother’s Allowance (1 child) was £57.80,
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Table 2.8: PoeerO, Lines 1987:40 Per Cent, 50 Per Cent and 60 Per cent of Mean (Per Capita
Equivalent) Disposable Income l.I;eeklp, for Alternative I-quivalence Scales
PoverO’ Lines (% of Mean Equivatence)Equivalence Scale 40% 50% 60%
£ Wee~’ty
1 (I.0, 0.66, 0.33) 36.72           45.91 55.09
II (I.0, 0.7, 0.5) 33.92 42.40 50.88
Source: Houaehold Budget Survey, 1987, Special Analysis.
Notes: Mean (per capita equivalent) disposable income per week is ~’91.82 (Scale I), or
£84.80 (So:de II).
Unemployment Benefit
~’42.30
Widow’s Contributory Pension £49.50
Contrihutory Old Age Pension ~’55.10
Long-term Unemployment
Assistance
~’37.80
Widow’s Non-Contributory
Pension £46.20
(Flat Rate)
(Aged under 66)
(Aged 66 - 80)
(Urhan Rate)
(Aged under 66).
The 50 per cent poverty line will he used in the tables below as the
focus for the analysis, with the higher and lower lines also being presented
for comparative purposes.
As expected, the rate of poverty is highly sensitive to the choice of line.
Table 2.9 shows the proportions of households below thc poverty lines for
the lower equivalence scale (I). At the 50 per cent line, the overall
proportion is 13.5 per cent. The main [bcus here, however, is the relative
position of lone aduh and two adult households. Single (i.e., unmarried
mother) lone parent households have the highest risk of poverty, 35 per cent,
followed by the large two adult family: 30 per cent of the two adult and 4
or more children households are below dte 50 per cent poverty line. The
figure for separated lone parent households is 27.6 per cent. One significant
contrast between the data for the 50 per cent line and the highest, 60 per
cent, line is that the relative proportions for large two adult households and
separated one parent households are reversed: the latter hecame the second
highest in terms of the risk of being below the poverty line. At this highest
poverty line, larger two adult households face a 43.7 per cent risk of poverty.
The first overall point to observe fi’om these figures is that the low
incomes and financial circumstances of lone parent households must be
viewed in the context of families in general. A second point is the role of
the social security system in affecting the risk of poverty. It can he seen, for
example, that among widows and single mother households, the risk of
50
Table 2.9:
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Per Cent of Households below Alternative Poverty Lines* for Lone Parent,
Other Households, Per Capita Equivalence Scale I**
7-too Parent and
Poverty Lines
40% 50% 60%
Lone Parent: Single
Lone Parent: "Separated"
Lone Parem: Widowed
Two Parents, One Child
Two Parents, Two Children
Two Parents, Three Children
Two Parents, Four]More Clhilch’en
Other Households
1.5 35.0 79.9
15.5 27.6 64.3
-- 14.0 42.1
3.5 13.2 22.6
3.4 14.0 22.4
4.9 19,8 31.1
9.9 30.2 43.7
3.8 9.7 23.5
All 4.5 13.5 26.8
Source: Household Budget Surv(7, 1987, Special Analysis.
aVotes: * Poverty IJnes are percentages of mean disposable income per capita equivalent.
¯ * Per Capita Equivalence Scale 1:1.00 Adult; 0.66 Additional Aduh; 0.33 Child
(0-18).
poverty is zero or virtually zero at the lowest (40%) line; however, the
figures are 14 per cent and 35 per cent at the middle (50%) line. This
reflects the predominance of social security in these households’ incomes and
the absence of other income sources. The impact of social security is to hold
these households above the most stringent poverty line but to retain them
at a low level of income: 80 pet" cent of singlc lone parent households, for
example, fall below the higher poverty line. Thirdly, the figures suggest a
somewhat lower risk of poverty faced hy widows. Their risk is much less
than that of other lone parent households and ortwo aduh, larger households
(recall here that children are defined as 0-18 year olds).
Corresponding data on the risk of poverty for equivalence Scale II are
reported in Table 2.10. The effect of using the stricter equivalence measures
is to raise the overall risk of poverty at the 50 per cent line to 15.8 per cent.
Among diffcrcnt household types, the pattern is similar to that found in
Table 2.9 in respect of equivalence Scale 1. Single lone parent households
face a very high risk: 68 per’cent fall below the 50 per cent line, likewise 57
per cent of the separated lone parents. Again, two adult larger families with
a poverty risk of 42.7 per cent (at the 50°/0 line) feature as one of the high
risk categories, more so than one of the lone parent categories widows.
The tables above offer simple comparisons of different types of
households, without the effect of other intervening variahles taken into
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"[’able 2.10: Per Cent of Households Below AIternatiue Poverty Lines* for Lone Parent, "l’wo Parent
and Other Households, 1987, Per Capita Equivalence Scale I1"*
Pouerty Lines
40% 50% 60%
Lone Parent: Siz~gle
Lone Parenl: "Separated"
Lone Parent: Widowed
Two Parents, One Child
Two Parents, Two Children
Two Parents, Three Children
Two Parents, Four/More Children
Other Houscholds
3.0 67.7 88.0
20.6 57.3 68.4
7.2 32.9 48.0
’1.5 13.9 23.4
8.9 16.9 28.8
14.6 26.6 38.8
23.6 42.7 56.1
3.4 9.1 19.5
All 6.9 15.8 26.8
Source:
a%toles:
Household Budget Survo,
, 
1987, Special Analysis.
* Poverly Lines are percentages of mearL disposable income per capita equivalent.
** Per Capita Equivalence Scale I1:1.00 Adult; 0.7 Additional Adult; 0.5 Child (0-
18).
account. There are severe limits on the extent to which other variables can
be incorporated in the analysis because of the small number of lone parent
households in the sample. However, within these constraints, it is possible to
implement limited controls in the comparisons between lone parent auad two
aduh households. First, and most important, it is necessary to look at the
impact of economic status and, in particular, of labour force status and
unemployment on the relative risks of poverty anaong different Imusehold
types. Sample numbers do not permit a disaggregation of lone parents by
economic status. Table 2.1 I, however, shows the poverty risk figures for two
adult households and other households, where the head of the household is out of
work, and compares these with lone parent households where the head of
the household is not economically active. The latter is a broader category than
out of work but this ad hoc procedure is necessitated by the limits of the
data. In any case, the comparison of poverty risks is now confined to those
not currently in employment (data in this and the next table are only givca
where sample numbers are 25 or more).
Clearly, the risk of desceat below the poverty line is associated with
lack of employment or economic activity in most types of household. This
association, however; is especially strong among two aduh households. The
high proportions below the poverty line for the larger families shown in
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 ascend to very high levels when compared to those "out
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Table 2.1 I:
LONE PARENTS IN THF. REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
Per Cent Household Below the 50% Poverty Line (Scale I) for Households Where Head
of Household is Out of Work (2 Adult Households) or aVot Economically Active (Lone
Parent Households)
aV = Bose Per cent
Lone Parent: Single N = 43 38.8
Lone Parent: "Separated" N -- 61 2,1.8
Lone Parent: Widowed N -- 28 18.5
Two Aduhs, One Child N -- 92 47.0
Two Aduhs, Two Children N -- 124 57.9
Two Adults, Three Children N = 119 67.0
Two Adults, Four or More Children N -- 157 79.4
Other Households N -- 401 39.0
All N = 919 53.5
Household Budget Survo,, 1987, Special Analy.sis.
The Lone Parent data refer to heads of households who are "not economically
active" while the other data refer only m heads of households who are "out of
work". The figure for ALL refers to tile households in tile total sample where the
head of household is out of work. See Text.
"N" is the adjusted sample number on which the per cent is calculated
of work". Almost 80 per cent of the largest two aduh households afflicted
by tmemployrnent have incomes below the 50 per cent line, a poverty rate
which substantially exceeds that for lone parent families.8 The impact of
unemployment on poverty observed here echoes, in general terrns, the
findings of Callan and Nolan in their analysis of the ESR1 data for 1987 on
household incomes (Callan, Nolau el al., 1989). They record a rising risk of
poverty among households with children (0-14) over the periods 1973-1980
and 1980-1987 and, in particular, calculate that "the predominant cause of
the increased risk of poverty for households with children is indeed the
increase in unemployment" (Callan and Nolan et al., 1989). Nolan and
Farrell’s analysis of child poverty also revealed a relatively high risk of
poverty in households with children where the household head was
unemployed and, in particular, where the head of the household was in
receipt of means tested unemployment assistance (Nolan and Farrell, 1990).
The predominance of transfer payments in the incontes of lone parent
families, and their enhanced role for families affected by unemployment
points to the structure of the social security system as the proximate source
¯ The povcrty rate for Ihe’ae families if Scale I1 is applied rlse~ to 89.6 per cent, and if Scale II and
the higher poverty line (60% of mean income) are applied, it becomes 94.8 per cent (data available
from the author).
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Table 2.12: Risk of Poverty at 50% Cent Line at Pre-School and I-arly School Phase of the Life Cycle
(&ale 1)
aV = Base Per cent
Lone Parent: Single
Lone Parent: "Separated"
Lone Parent: Widowed
Two Adults, One Child
Two Aduhs, "[’wo Children
Two Aduhs, Three Children
Two AdultS, Four or More Children
Other Households
N = 42 38.0
N = 35 42.9
N = 46 13.0
N = 327 13.1
N = 453 14.1
N = 275 22.2
N = 134 35.8
N -- 55 5.5
All N = 1,280 15.9
Source: Household Budget Surog,
, 
1987, Special Analysis.
aVotes: "N" is the adjusted salnplc numbers on which die percentages are based.
of the rclative impoverishment of two parent families. Specifically, the per
capita equivalent social security support for lone parents was more adequate
than that provided, for example, to an unemployed man with a dependent
spouse and four children. In 1987, the per capita equivalent long-term social
welfare means tested payments for a lone mother and child and a married
man, his spouse and four children were, respectively, £’43.40 and £’34.70
per week. These comparisons highlight again the necessity of viewing the
incomes, and susceptibility to poverty, of lone parents in the wider context
of family poverty.
A further variable which may affect the relative poverty rates of
different household and family types is the family life cycle. The definition
of "family" embodied in the Tables above entails an age span of 0 - 18 for
"children". This wide age span encompasses a broad spectrum of the thmily
life cycle -- a spectrum along which there may be variable risks of poverty.
As with die data on employment status, sample numbers do not permit a
classification of poverty rates by family lil~: cycle. Table 2.12, therefore,
presents results for the two earliest phases of the life cycle, pre-school and
early school, by combining them into one overall phasc. Respectively, these
phases are defined in terms of the age of the oldest child being 0--4 and
5-9. The composite life cycle category given in the Table provides sufficient
numbers for all household types.
It might be hypothesised that households at these earlier phases of the
life cycle would have a higher than average risk of poverty due to the
constraints on labour force participation among women. Howcvcr, this is
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not borne out in the data in Table 2.12. The risks of poverty are broadly
similar to those recorded for all households in Table 2.9. Furtbel’nlore, the
pattern of poverty across household types is also very similar. One exception
is the case of separated lone parents wbo have a 43 per cent poverty risk in
the early life cycle phase, compared with 28 per cent (Table 2.9) overall.
Whether tbis differential is associated with labour market participation
cannot be ascertained within the limits of the HBS data.
Finally, in relation to the 1987 HBS data, the broad trends in incomes
and social welfare payments since then should be noted. There has been a
cumulative growth in real gross, and net, earnings since 1987. In addition,
the real value of lone parent social welfare paymel~tS has remained
approximately constant in real terms over that period. One notable
development was tbe improven~ent, in real terms and relative to other
incomes, in the social welfare payments to unemployed persons with cbildren
(NESC, 1990). The overall implication of these trends for the extent of
measured poverty is difficult to assess. Two consequences can be hypothesised
however. First, the significant gap in the poverty risks between lone parents
and large families wltb household heads out of work may have narrowed in
favour of the latter. Second, with the real (social welfare) incomes of many
lone parents remaining conslanl and real earnings and other incomes growing,
tbe extent of poverty (measured in terms of a proportion of average
disposable income) among lone parents may have increased since 1987.
Summary
Tbis chapter outlined the demographic trends in relation to widowhood,
non-marital births, and marital breakdown which underpin the growth in
lone parent families. The limited data available in tbe 1987 Household
Budget Survey were analysed to provide a preliminary profile of the social
and financial circuntstances of lone parents living as separate households. In
this analysis, which compares different types of households with households
headed by lone parents living independently, the central findings were that:
Lone parent households have low levels of income, very high
levels of dependence on State transfers and a high level of
utilisation of State benefits and services.
At a poverty line of £46 per week in 1987 (per capita
equivalent), over one-tbird of single lone parents and one
quarter of separated lone parents are "poor"; two aduh
housebolds with large numbers of cbildren also bare a higb risk
of poverty.
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Two aduh households with children headed by an uneml)loyed
person experience higher risks of poverty than lone parent
households with relative rates of social welfare support playing
the key role in this differential.
Chapter 3
SOCIAL WELFARE PRO VISIONS: AN 0 VER VIEW
(i) Introduction
In this chapter, the evolution of social welfare provisions in respect of
lone parents is described and tile trends in relation to beneficiaries,
expenditure and payment levels are given. In 1989 and 1990, legislative and
administrative changes were introduced which have altered provisions in
respect of lone parents. These changes are also briefly described.
(ii) Widow’s Pensions
Provision in respect of widows (married women whose spouses are
deceased) is the most long-standing element in lone parent social security
provisions. [n 1935, a non-contributory (means tested scheme) was
introduced; this was matched by a corresponding contributory (insurance
based) entitlement. This initiative arose from the work of the Commission on
the Relief of the Sick and Destitute Poor (1927) and removed income support for
widows fi’om the Poor Laws for the first time (Farley, 1964).’~
Both tile contributory and non-contributory widows’ pensions were
administered from a Widow’s and Orphan’s Pensions Fund established under
the Widow’s and Orphan’s Pensions Act, 1935. This separate fund, into which
was paid both employer and employee contributions as well as exchequer
subvention, continued until 1952. The 1952 Social Welfare Act established
the general social insurance and social assistance schemes. Under these new
arrangements tile contribntory pension became payable fi’om a general social
insurance fund and tile non-contributory one from tile general exchequer.
In retrospect, a notable feature of tile non-contributory widows’ scheme
were the provisions in regard to the age of widows and their family
circumstances. In tile initial 1935 scheme, widows were required to be 60
years or over, or, if under that age, to have at least one dependent child
’* In I~dct, Ihe Commission had a majority rcporl and two minority reports.
56
SOCIAL WELFARE PROVISIONS: AN OVI’RVIEW 57
(14 or under, or 16 if the child was at school or an invalid). Subsequently,
the qualifying age for widows without dependent children was reduced to
55 (in 1937) and to 48 (in 19,!-8). This agc threshold of 48 remained in force
until 1965 and thereafter was phased out. This age and dependency condition
was to re-appear later when schemes for "deserted wives" wcre introduced,
as will be seen below. Interestingly, the Report of the Commission on the Status
of I’Vomen (1972) recommended that tile Widow’s Contributory Pension be
restricted on tile basis of age or child dependency, or both.
The provisions for widows have been gradually improved and extended
in many respects since their inception. Age restrictions were eventually
abolished, the age limit for child dependants was increased over time to 21,
and tile means test was modified on a number of occasions.
(iii) Deserted [,Vife’s Benefit and Allowance
In 1970 and 1973 rcspectively, insurance and assistance schemes were
intcoduced for women "deserted" by their husbands. The defining features
of these schellaes were as follows:
-- "Desertion" rather than tile voluntary "separation"’of partners
was the basis of eligibility: husbands must have departed and
must have remained apart fronl their spouses for a period of at
least three months.
-- The "deserted" spouse must ilOt be receiving maintenance from
tile absent partner and must have made "reasonable" eff’orts to
procure maintenance.
-- The deserted spouse must be over 40 or, if under ’10, have at
least one dependent child.
The Deserted Wife’s Benefit (contributory) could be awarded on either
spouse’s social insurance contribution record. However, entitlement to this
"insurance" payment was restricted on the basis of tile maintenance being
paid to tile family: if this exceeded a threshold (tile relevant UA rate) then
maintenance was deemed to be paid and the spouse was not entitled to the
benefit.
A number of issues stand out in the implementation and evolution of
these schemes. First, the concept of desertion was difficult to administer: it
required social welfare officers to make judgements about tile nature and
cause of marital breakdowns. In particular, the distinction between
"voluntary" separations and desertion proved not to be elearcut. As a result,
there was a high level of refusal of applications, and a consequently high
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appeal rate, resulting in a long time lag between application and payment.
For instance, the Commission on Social Welfare’s survey of social welfare
assistance applicants revealed that of those Deserted Wife’s Allowance
applicants in the survey who had received a decision on their claim, only
13.5 per cent had received the decision in 10 weeks or less (O’Connor,
Hearne~ Walsh, 1986, Table 7.2)]° As regards the appeal rate, the 1989
Social Welfare figures show that of 3,103 claims received for the Deserted
Wife’s payments, 1,086 were rcjected, a rejection rate of 35 per cent. In
turn, 385 cases resulted in an appeal -- an appeal rate of 35.5 per cent.
While there are no published data on the outcome of the appeals, the 1984
data given by the Commissima on Social Welfare show that almost half (48
per cent) of the appeals were upheld (Commission on Social Welfare, 1986,
Table 21.3). In all, the high rates of rejection and appeal suggest a degree
of difficulty in implementing the "desertion" schemes.
Second, the existence of an income maintenance category for "desertion"
as distinct from "voluntary" separation embodied a horizontal inequity
based on the supposed nature or cause of marital breakdown. Lone parents
in identical economic and income circumstances were treated difl’erently:
those deemed "deserted" being entitled to a payment and other lone mothers
deemed "separated", not so entitled. Furthermore, it might be argued that
the distinction between "desertion" and other forms of marital breakdown
actually created an incentive for spouses to desert rather than negotiate a
voltmtary separation. This incentive could have operated through the
medium of the income maintenance provisions. Deserting husbands could
choose nol to offer maintenance to their partners in the knowledge that the
absence of this maintenance could trigger an entitlenaent to a Deserted
Wife’s Benefit or Allowance.
Third, the co-existence of the Deserted Wife’s payments, the Unmarried
Mother’s Allowance and Widow’s payments created anomalies as between
the difl’crent categories of lone mother. This problem arose because of the
family law context. For example, a woman with a child, who had been
married and divorced in England might not be eligible for a "deserted"
payment, nor eligible for an Unmarried Mother’s Allowance. On the one
hand, she is excluded From the UMA as her marriage is legally recognised
-- she is not "unmarried". On the other, divorce is not the same as
"desertion" and therefore she might be ineligible for the deserted wife’s
benefit or allowance. A woman aged over 40 whose children were above the
dependency age limit, and who had been cohabiting with her partncr
(rather than legally marricd) who is deceased, would be neither a widow, a
,o This survey was ofasslstance applicants and the finding refers to Deserted Wife’s .’lllo~,’ance only.
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deserted wife, nor an unmarried mother for social welfare purposes. The
categorical nature of the schemes, therefore, could result in cases which
fitted none of the categories.
(iv) Unmarried Mother’s Allowance
This scheme was inauguraled in 1973~ with the expressed intcntion of
facilitating women never married, with children to retain custody of their
children rather than giving them up for adoption. In 1972, the Report of the
Commission on the Status of H/omen made a specific recommendation that:
...an unmarried mother who keeps her child should be
entitled to a social welfare allowance at the same rate and
on the same conditions that apply to a deserted wife, for a
period of not less than one year after the birth of the child.
(Commission on the Status of ~.’Vomen, 1972, p. 235.)
The Commission appeared to assume that some time limit should apply
to the payment of the allowance. When introduced in 1973, the allowance
had no time limit other than that imposed by dependency circumstances:
the allowance would apply until the unmarried mother’s child was 18 (or
21, if in ftdl-time education).
The allowance appeared to be structured on the basis that recipients
should be full-time mothers, rather than part-time or full-time employees.
For instance, only a limited amount of earned income was exempt for means
tested purposes, and there was no statutory provision to offset child care
costs against earned income in the means test. (In practice, however, in
recent years, child care costs have been offset and the official publicity on
the UMA scheme has adverted to this. There is no statutory basis for this
more recent practice.)
(v) Recent Provisions
In 1989, a further addition was made to the suite of entitlements:
separate means tested allowances for male lone parents were introduced. A
means tested Widower’s Allowance was established for widowers with
dependent children -- those without dependent children were excluded. The
means test was the same as for a non-contributory widow’s pension.
Additionally, a parallel payment for deserted husbands was also
introduced, with the similar exclusion of all such husbands without dependent
children from the scheme.
These innovations were intended to meet the sexist bias in existing
provisions and to offer male lone parents an income sufficient for them to
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be full-time parents, without labour market obligations. One significant
difference between male and female lone parent’s provisions was the
institutionalisation of conventional assumptions about labour market
attachments. In the male schemes, lone parents of all ages were required to
have dependent children to be eligible, whereas women may be childless
and still eligible. Widows of all ages, for instance, with and without children
may be eligible for the widows’ payments. Notably, in the case of recipients
of the contributory widow’s pension, based on social insurance entitlement,
all widows may apply for a full contributory pension even if in the work
force full time.
Most recently, in 1990, steps were taken to integrate the above
provisions for the various categories of lone parents.HFirst, a new payment,
Lone Parent’s Allowance, has been introduced which incorporates the existing
Unmarried Mother’s Allowance, the recently introduced payments for male
lone parents (Widowers and Deserted Husbands), the Prisoner’s Wife’s
Allowance and the pre-existing Widow’s Non-Contributory Pension and
Deserted Wife’s Allowance. However, this integrating scheme applies only
where applicants have dependent children. The separate schemes for widows
and deserted women continue for those who do not have depeodcnt children
and the insurance based scheme, Deserted Wife’s Benefit, is also separately
retained. Second, the new allowance also broadens the range of marital
breakdown situations which may apply to include separated spouses with
dependent children. Third, legislative changes have been introduced in the
relationship between maintenance obligations and entitlement to social
welfare.
In relation to maintenance, a deserted spouse claimant was heretofore
obliged to make reasonable efforts to obtain maintenance fi’om a spouse.
Where maintenance was paid and was deemed "inconsiderable" (less than
the appropriate rate of Unemployment Assistance), it did not affect
entitlement to Deserted Wiles’ Benefit nor did it result in a reduced means
tested allowance.’2 Under the terms of thc Social Welfare Act, 1989 (S.12), the
concept of "liable relatives" was introduced. Liable relatives of a new
recipient (after the commencement date for the legislation I not yet known)
are legally obliged to contribute towards the benefit or allowance. Where a
liable relative pays maintenance to a spouse in receipt of an allowance,
either voluntarily or on foot of a Court Order, then this maintenance offsets
(or even completely cancels) the liable relatives’ liability. The allowance
L~ The relevant legislation is Section 12 of Social Welfare Act, 1990, Statuto~’ Instruments 270, 271,
272, 273.
~7 It should be noted llmt where a nlainl~nance payment was apporlioned belween a spouse and
children, the portion for children was not assessed as means for purposes of the allowance.
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recipient who receives tile maintenance must transfer tile maintenance to
the Department of Social Welfare -- alternatively, if the recipient retains
tile maintenance, the allowance will be reduced by the amount the recipient
is required to transfer.
If a relative does not pay maintenance, the Department of Social
Wellhre may get a Court Order to decide how much a liable relative should
contribute. The legislation does not provide a statutou basis as to how this
should be done. In practise, a liable relative’s income after tax, PRSI and
housing costs is assessed, and allowance is also made Ibr any relatives
residing with the liable relative. Half of the remaining income is then
required as a contribution to the Lone Parent Allowance (LPA) subject to
a maximum which is tile amount of tbe allowance in payment to tile lone
pa ten t.
Tile significant aspect of the legislation is that the Department of Social
H/elf are can now apply for a Court Order to obtain a contribution from a
liable relative. However, tile existing .requirement on spouses to make
reasonable eflbrts to obtain maintenance remains. This means, according to
Ward’s critical summary of this new legislation, that:
Before the 1989 Act a wifc could keep inconsiderable
maintenance and retain the full rate of deserted wife’s benefit.
If she was on deserted wife’s allowance, any part of the
inconsiderable amount that was for tile support of the
children was not assessed as means for the purposes of the
means test. Under tile new Act, however, any maintenance
which a new claimant receives has to be handed over to tile.
Department. So, any benefit a claimant might get fi’om
future court action is now denied to her while tile obligation
to take such actions may remain (Ward, 1990).
This new legislation on "liable relatives" will apply only to maintenance
sought after tile legislation’s commencement date (variations on maintenance
orders after commencement will, however, be relevant: an increase in
maintenance will be required to be "handed over"). This may bring
significant horizontal inequities into play.
The introduction of the Lone Parent AIIowancc applies only to parents:
the categorical schemes in relation to desertion still apply to women without
children. The LPA is, however, a partial integration of social welfare
provision for lone parents and may bca response to tile Comn’dssion on
Social Welfare’s view that some rationalisatlon and greater integration were
required in these provisions. Notably, the Conlnlission argued that lone
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parent’s provisions should be neutral with regard to the gender of lone
parents and tile cause of the lone parenthood (Commission on Social
Welfare, 1986). Chart 2 below summarises the social security provisions for
lone parents which currently apply.
In 1992, some further changes were made. In the case of Deserted
Wife’s Benefit a means test has been imposed, such that a woman with
earnings over ~’10,000 per annum will receive a reduced payment and will
be excluded if earnings exceed £14,000: this means test does not apply to
the child dependant portion of the payment. Additionally, the changes
introduced to maintenance arrangements in 1989 have been extended. All
n3aintcnailce order paynlcnts 11o matter when granted are now "tra,’=sferahle"
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and this requirement also applies to maintenance for children unlike tile
arrangements heretofore.
(vi) Recipient Numbers, Rates of Benefit and Social Security Expenditure
Table A9 in the Appendix gives detailed data on the numbers of
beneficiaries under tile relevant social welfare schemes since 1971. Figure 3.1
reports these data in graphic form. The data must be interpreted with care.
Not all recipients of these "lone parent" payments are receiving payments
in respect of dependent children. In the case of widows, as will be seen
below, those widows in receipt of child dependant payments are in a small
minority of widow recipients. Conversely, all UMA beneficiaries have at
least one dependent child; and most deserted wives have a dependent child.
Figure 3.1 shows the trends in the number of social welfare lone parent
beneficiaries. Notably, among widows the trend for child dependants has
heen continually downwards, although recipient numbers grew over the
period from 70,000 in 1971 to over 100,000 hy 1991. In the case of deserted
wives, their numbers record very significant growth over the period, with
the total nunaber of beneficiaries in the region of 50,000 by 1991. Similarly
in the case of the Unmarried Mother’s Allowance. Overall totals for all
schemes are given in Figure 3.1 (c). These figures reveal a gradual, but
continual growth in the lone parent social security population. From a figure
just over 100,000 in 1971, this population grew to over 200,000 by 1991.
In Figure 3.1 and Table A9 no distinction is made between recipients
with and without dependent children, as these time series data to 1984 only
comprise aggregate totals of recipients and children. A more accurate picture
of trends in recipient numbers can therefore be gleaned from the series in
Figure 3.2, which shows the totals tbr recipients, children and beneficiaries
minus the relevant figures for widows. The rationale for this presentation lies
in the difl’erence between widows and other lone parent recipients: few
widows have children, while the majority of all other recipients have. Figure
3.2 shows the trends with the figures for widows excluded. The slope of the
beneficiaries graph is very steep; the actual numhers grew from approximately
30,000 to approximately 100,000, from 1971 to 1991. This is a more than
three fold increase, the rate of which did not abate in the later years of the
series.
Figures for the period from 1984 cohfirm the very rapid increase in
lone parent social security recipients. Official statistics since then record not
only the total numbers of recipients and children, but also the numhcr of
recipients who have one dependent child or more. A shorter series for the
period 1984 to 1990 is therefore given in Table 3.1. First, the table reveals
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FIGURE 3.1
LONE PARENT SOCIAL WELFARE RECIPIENTS, 1971 - 1991
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the difl’erences between tile various social welfare categories in terms of tile
levcl of child dependency. Among widows, the proportion of all recipients
with child dependants was approximately 9 per cent in 1991, having declined
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FIGURE 3.2
TOTAL LONE PARENTS MINUS WIDOWS
1971-1991
o
So.tee: Dcparu.ent of Social Welfare.
continually over the seven ),ear period. All UMA’3 recipients, by definition,
have at least one child, and among DWA and DWB recipients and lone
parent allowance recipients the proportion is approximately 75 per cent.
Second, the overall figure for lone parenl recipients, properly defined, is also
growing rapidly, fi’om 27,000 in 1984 to 45,000 in 1991, a total increase of
64 per cent, or an annual average rate of increase of 7.3 per cent. This
pattern of growth is the net outcome of decline in respect or widows and of
very rapid growth in respect of deserted wives and UMA recipients. The
last row of Table 3.1 gives the annual rates of growth for the recipient
populations: the deserted wives and related categories have the most rapid
13 This gro.p "*~’ould include a small llunlber of Ullnlarrled [’alhers
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Table 3. I : Lone Parents: Sodal Welfare Recipients with Dependent Children 1984-1991 (Wumber and
Per Cent of All Recipients)
Deserted[ Unmarried
All}’ear Widows Separated Parents
Spou£e$
~Vo % jX" o % jVo % ~Vo %
1984 I 1,653 13.0 5,483 70.0 10,309 100.0 27,445 25.0
1985 I 1,484 12.0 6,705 73.0 11,530 100.0 29,719 25.6
1986 10,743 I 1.0 7,875 74.2 12,039 100.0 30,657 25.6
1987 10,427 10.5 9,107 74.8 13,930 100.0 33,464 26.7
1988 9,903 9.8 10,220 75.1 15,062 100.0 35,185 27.2
1989 9,563 9.4 10,920 74.5 16,564 100.0 37,054 27.8
1990 10,981 9.8 12,124 74.3 18,761 100.0 41,866 30.6
1991 9,566 9.3 14,017 75.2 21,366 100.0 44,949 31.0
% Growth
Per -3.0 14.3 I 1.0 7.3
Annuw~
Wotes:
Statistical Information on Social I Velfare Services, Department of Social Welfare (Annually).
The 1990 and 1991 data for Deserted/Separated spouses include the new categories
of recipient.
growth rates, 14.3 per cent per annum, compared with I I per cent for single
mothersJ+
Finally in relation to the long-run trends in the composition of lone
parents, Table 3.2 shows the percentage distribution of lone parent recipients
across social welfare categories for tbe period 1984 to 1991 and Figure 3.3
displays the numbers over the same period. The declining share of widows
among recipients is highlighted. In 1991 they comprised 21.3 per cent,
corupared with 42.4 per cent in 1984. Correspondingly, the Deserted Spouse’s
and Unmarried Mother’s schemes loom larger in the social security lone
parent family population as time proceeds. Of the 45,000 lone parent
recipients in 1991, 47.5 per cent were single mothers, 31 per cent were
separated and deserted parents, and the balance widows.
As regards rates of social security payments, the details given in
Appendix Table AI0 and Figure 3.3 below show the trends in tbe real value
" The ralcs of increase for 1984-1991 in respect of all recipients with children and in respecl of the
desc:rted wives and relaled categories are affected by tfie eligihilily cfiangt~ in 1989190 which allowed
separaled, divorced, etc., parents to claim the new Lone Parent’s Allowance. This ted to a significantly
more rapid increase from 1989 to 1990 in the deserted wives category than would otfierwisc have
occurred. It is useful, therefi~re, to note lhal lhe 1984-1989 am~ua[ rate of increase was 6.2 per ecru for
the 1oral, compared with 7.3 per eem for tfie 1984-1991 figure.
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Table 3.2: Percentage Distribution of Lone Parent Social Welfare Recipients, 1984-1991, b), Categoly
1"ear I Vidow~ Deserted/ Unmarried Total aVumber
Separated Parents
Per cent
1984 42.4 20.0 37.6 100 27,445
1985 38.6 22.6 38.8 100 29,719
1986 35.0 25.7 39.3 100 30,657
1987 31.1 27.2 41.6 100 33,464
1988 28.1 29.0 42.8 100 35,185
1989 25.8 29.5 44.7 tOO 37,054
1990 26.2 29.0 44.8 100 41,866
1991 21.3 31.2 47.5 100 44,949
Source: Statistical Information on Social II"elfare Services, Departn~cnt of Social Welfare (Annually).
of payments since 1974. The real value of the payments grew gradually and
virtually continuously over the entire period -- the trend was interrupted in
the year 1982/83. During the period 1977-1982, the most rapid rate of
improvement took place. In the latter five years, there has been a modest
real increase in the payments.
How these trends compare with the incomes of families in general is of
equal interest. However, there are no data available which allow a
representative picture to be drawn of trends in the relative incomes of lone
parent and other families, lllustrativc data are given in Table AII on the
incomes of lone parent [hmilies on social security and the net earnings of an
employee on average earnings who is stzpporting a spousc and two children.
The illustrative comparisons are summarised in Figure 3.5 in terms of
the ratio (percentage) of social security allowances and benefits to net
average malc earnings for a two child family. Over the period 1974-1982,
the ratio rose; from 1983 to 1986 it was broadly unchanged and in latter
years the ratio has hcen gradually declining. This pattern reflects the
unintended outcomes of both endogenous factors and policy choice. In thc
early period, real social welfarc payments were increasing (as Table AI0
shows). While earnings were also increasing, so too were the direct tax
liabilities of cmployces. For example, the tax allowance in respect of a
dependent child was reduced in nominal terms fi’om £240 in 1977/78 to a
mere £100 in 1985/86 and then aholished. This, combined with changes in
tax rates, PRSI contributions and other factors, all conspired to increase the
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FIGURE 3.3
LONE PARENT SOCIAL SECURITY RECIPIEIq’I~ 1984 - 1991
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tax liabilities of PAYE earners, including those with children. Tile decline
in tile welfare/net earnings ratio since 1986 reflects, first, tile resumption of
earnings growth, secondly, the stabilisation and then small decline in tile
tax burden on employees and, thirdly, the slower rate of increase in social
security payments.
Tile comparison of relative incomes would not be complete without
some discussion of the data adjusted tbr per capita equivalence. Table All
also contains relative income illustrations for tile period 1974-1991 adjusted
on a per capita equivalence basis using Scale I (I.0: 0.66: 0.33). The
resulting per cent ratios of social welfare incomes to net earnings are shown
in Figure 3.5 (b). At their highest level in 1982, these adjusted ratios were
64 pet" cent in respcct of the assistancc allowance and 70 per cent in rcspect
of the insurance benefit. In 1991, these ratios were 58 per cent and 62 per
cent respectively. In summary, tile admittedly limited data are indicative of
FIGURE 3.5
LONE PARENT SOCIAL WELFARE PAYMENTS AS % OF NET
EARNINGS OF FAMILY
Figure 3.5 (a)
Unadjusted
Figure 3.5 (b)
Per Capita Equivalent
^
@ I ...............
Source." Table AI I.
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some convergence in tile incomes of lone parent social security recipients
and those of two parent families with average earnings)~
In relation to social security expenditure, Table 3.3 below summarises
the data for tile past decade. Two sets of figures are reported, tile first of
which (in Column I) shows total expenditure on social welfare as a whole.
h can be seen that in real terms total expenditure rose during the decade,
except for the years 1987-1989 at a time of rapidly rising employment and
falling unemployment. The annual average rate of increase recorded was 3.7
per cent.
Tile second set of figures gives total expenditure on lone parents’
schemes. These figures do not include expenditure on tile small number of
widows with children. Expenditure on lone parents increased very rapidly
during the decade -- a cumulative increase of more than three fold, and an
annual average rate of increase of 14.2 per cent. Ahhough lone parents’
expenditure is small in absolute terms its rate of increase is such that it is
commanding a growing share of total social security expenditure, as the
final column of Table 3.3 shows.
The growth iu social welfare expenditure on lone parents has been
analysed elsewhere (McCasbin, 1988; NESC, 1990). These analyses have
indicated that the bulk of the increased expenditure is attributable to the
escalating beneficiary population rather than increased real payment levels.
Confirmation of this explanation is provided in Table 3.4. There it can be
observed that 72 per cent (£20m) of tile increase from 1981 to 1986 arose
because of increased numbers of recipients and children, and from 1986-
1991 all of tile increase arose from this source. In fact, tile analysls indicates
a very slight average decline in real payments per beneficiary during this
period: this is due to the failure to increase tile child depeudant portion of
the payments in the 1986 Budget and tile slight decline in tile real value of
the personal rates of payment from 1989 to 1990 (see Table AI0).
The details of the arithmetical decomposition in Table 3.4 are
unimportant, as the precise figures may be sensitive to the time period
chosen and the method of calculation (for example, Table 3.4 is based on
beneficiaries, i.e., recipients and children). It is clear that tile dominant force
in driving social security expenditure upwards is the escalating number of
recipients. In turn, the latter derives from the underlying demographic
changes documented in Chapters 1 and 2. Clearly, if these demographic
cbanges continue and real payment rates and eligibility criteria remain
t~ Some reassurance as to the reliability of these illustrations can be taken from the ratios of
disl~osable income for lone parent families and two parent families in 1987 as revealed in tile 1987 HBS
data hi Table AS. The ratios implicit in the latter data are very close to tile illustrative data [’or 1987
in Table All.
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Table 3.3: Growth in Total Social Security E.~7~enditure and Social Security E.~7~enditure on Lone
Parent’s Schemes, 1981-1991 (Constant 1981 Prices)
Total Social I.one Parent’s
1"tar Security Schemes (2) as % of
(i) (2) (i)
£1n £1~1 Per C¢111
1981 1,192 23 1.9
1982 1,384 28 2.0
1983 1,465 32 2.2
1984 1,484 39 2.6
1985 1,545 43 2.8
1986 1,612 51 3.2
1987 1,630 56 3.4
1988 1,611 62 3.8
1989 1,577 69 4.4
1990 1,608 76 4.7
1991 1,710 87 5.1
% Increase 3.7 14.2
Per All iltli~l
Source: Statistical Information on Social ll;elfare Services, [)el)artment of Social Welfare (AnnuMly).
Notes: These figures include all expenditure on Ihe Unmarried Mother’s Allowance, Deserted
Wife’s Allowance and Deserted Wife’s Benefit Schcmes. Payments to widows with
dependent children arc not included. To provide a consistent series, the Lone Parents
Allowance figures for 1990 and 1991 were adjusted to exclude an estimated figure fbr
widows with dependent children.
unchanged, then a further significant increase in social security expenditure
is in prospect.
Finally, in relation to trends in recipients and expenditure two
qualifications to the discussion should be recorded. First, to gain a complete
picture of the impact of lone parenthood on social security and more widely
on income maintenance -- the ancillary expenditure on Child Benefit,
Supplementary Welfare Allowances, Maternity Benefit and the One Parent
Tax Allowance~6 would need to be identified and added to the direct
expenditure under the lone parent’s schemes. Second, the social security
"cost" oflone parenthood is not necessarily identical to the actual expenditure
on lone parent’s and ancillary schemes. Such costs are best considered as
~6 In 1979180 a one parent tax allowance was introduced into the p~r~Oll~I iiicom¢ lax $ysler=l~
allowing a lone parent to claim a "double" personal allowance in r~pect of a married couple.
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Table 3.4: Social Welfare: Decomposition of Real Expenditure Growth on lone Parents" Schemes,
1981-1991 (£m 1981 Prices)
Real Increase Due to:
Increase
Beneficiary Average
~m aVumbers Payment Residual
Rates
1981-1986               28 20.1 4.2 3.7
1986-1991 36 40.5 -2.5 -2.0
Source: See Text and Table 3.3.
the difference between actual expenditure and what expenditure would be
otherwise. For example, the socio-economic background of many lone parents
suggests that if they did not become lone parents they might experience
unemployment and claim unemployment payments. If this were the case for
all lone parents, the "cost" of lone parenthood would be the difl’erence
between the unemployment payments which would arise and the actual
expenditure on lone parents’ schemes.
Summary
In this chapter, an ove~,iew was given of the evolution of social security
provisions in respect of lone parents and of trends in the social security
population and social security expenditure. In summary:
-- Ireland’s social security response to the lone parenthood
phenomenon was, initially, the introduction of discrete,
categorical schemes and later, an attempt to consolidate and
integrate provisions into an overall scheme;
-- The numbers of beneficiaries of social security has grown rapidly
and continues to grow;
-- Expenditure on social security provisions for lone parents has
risen very rapidly in the last decade and the increased number
of beneficiaries has been the dominant influence on expenditure
growth.
Chapter 4
SOCIAL SECURITI’: A CRITICAL PERSPEC771/E
(i) Introduction
The previous chapter outlined the origins and recent development of
social security provisions and briefly described current provisions. In this
chapter a critical perspective is adopted for a number of reasons, First, as
outlined in Chapter 3, if past trends in relation to the increased number of
social security beneficiaries continue there will be a further very significant
increase in tbis segment of the social security population with a consequential
increase in expenditure. Walker’s observation on this subject in the context
of lone parents in the UK is applicable also to Ireland:
Thus, lone parents are of policy interest that is out of
proportion to their numbers because of their growing relative
importance as welfare clients (Walker, 1990).
Second, the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 of lone parents’ socio-
economic circumstances indicated a generally low socio-economic profile, a
high utilisation of State transfer payments and social services, and a rapid
growth in the number of lone parents in receipt of social security. An overall
policy issue arises here: the grov,,th of this subgroup is arguably not entirely
independent of the developments in income maintenance provisions. In
short, the policy responses to the grmvth of lone parenthood -- such as
improved income maintenance, may be contributing to tbe growing stock of
lone parent families outside of the labour market. For example, studies in
the UK point out that the labour force participation rate of lone mothers
has been falling while that of married women has been rising, and some
analyses argue that the evolution of social security provisions is strongly
correlated with the decline in work participation {Walker, |990}.
In addition to these general concerns there are a range of specific
problems in the operation of current provisions such as the treatment of
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family maintenance payments, the role of child care deductions in the means
tests and the anomalous status of the Deserted Wife’s Benefit. Against this
background of both general and specific concerns the paragraphs below offer
a critique of existing provisions.
(ii) EC Equal Treatment Directives
The social security systems of EC member states have been shaped ill
part by a series of Directives on the equality of treatment of men and
women in social security. These Directives have required member states to
modify their provisions in certain respects. In Ireland, for example, time
entitlements of married women in respect of unemployment and other
I)ayments were extended so as to confer on married women similar
entitlements to men (and single women),t7
The next phase in the progressive adaptation of countries’ social security
regimes to the equality principle is concerned with family benefits. Specifically,
the EC Directive in this area requires member states to implement equality
of treatnlent in relation to "family benefits and survivorship payments",js
(The latter term refers to provisions for tile widowed.) This Directive raises
fundamental long-term questions about time entire basis of social security
provisions for lone parents.
In Ireland and the UK and in many other countries "survivorship"
provisions took the form of widows’ pensions based on spouses’ social
insurance contributions (supplemented perhaps by a means tcsted schcme
for thosc not entitled to pensions). Widowed women in these Beveridgean
systems were assumed to be largely tire economic dependants of their
husbands, and widows’ pensions were therefore seen as reflecting the
economic loss of a family’s main earner. Under these arrangements widows’
pensions came to be provided without labour market conditions. In Ireland,
for example, widowed women, with and without children, have been eligible
for pensions without work related obligations. On to this core of provisions,
countries have added, in various ways, additional provisions in respect non-
widowed lone parents -- whose numbers have grown relatively rapidly. In
Ireland, as was seen in Chapter 3, these additions took the form of ad hoc
schemes for various categories of lone mothers, and more recently lone
fathers.
Time terms of time EC Equality Directive requirements, however, imply
possibly radical restructuring of Irish provisions towards more gender neutral
i~ The key Directive is EC Directive 79/7 and tile main implementing legislation in Ireland was the
Saclal Welfare (#Vo. 2) Act, 1985.
t~ Proposal lbr a Coul~cil Directive C~mpleting the Implemet~tadon of the Principle of I:;qua/
"rreamlent of Men and I,V,’~men in Statutory and Occupational Social Security Schemes (1987).
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arraugements. In the first instance, the contributory, insurance payments for
widowed and deserted women have no counterpart for men: this would be
likely to be judged discriminatory in thc terms of the EC Equality Directive.
Moreover, judgement under Irish Jawt9 has been sought in respect of a male
plaintift" who has argued that the absence of a "Descrtcd Husband’s Benefit"
is discriminatory (Scekamp, 1992). Second, ahhough social assistance
provisions in respect of male lone parents have been introduced, traditional
gender roles are still firmly institutionaliscd: males who are scparated or
widowed must have dependent children to be eligible, not so females. Among
females, widows’ cntitlemcnts are not conditional on agc/child depcndency
criteria, but the entitlement of tl~ose who are single or separated or deserted
are (sec Chapter 3).
It is clear that implementation of the Equality Directive in this area
will raise awkward problems in Irish circumstances. Ou the one hand,
Government may be pressurised to "equalise upwards’~ by attempting to
extend the provisions in respcct of widows (for example) to widozoers. On the
other hand, this could have enormous public expenditure implications as
well as adding significantly to the complcxity of the social security system.
More fundamentally, the issues raised by the Equality Directive bring into
focus the increasing obsolescence of the assumptions on" which current
arrangements are devised. Notably, the long-run increase in married women’s
labour market participation has greatly weakened the male breadwitmcr/
female dcpcndaut model of social security provision. The challenge facing
Ireland’s system of social security, therefore, is to develop lone parent
provisions from their present complex and differentiated state to streamlined,
gender neutral provisions which are consistent with evolving male and
female roles in the labour market.
The ad hoc development and improvement of provisions Ibr lone parents
has now arrived at the point where it will be more difficult to devise
coherent and simplified provisions. Widows’ pensions, as pointed out in
Chapter 3, were initially structured on an age/child dependency basis: those
under a certain age without dependent children were not eligible. Over time
eligibility for widows’ pensions was extended to all widows, irrespective of
age or family circumstances. This relatively favourable treatment for widows
may now pose an obstacle to the eventual reform of lone parent provisions.
If some age/dependency condition (as rccommended, for instance, by the
Commission on the Status of Women in 1972) had been retained for widows’
pensions, the schemes for non-widowed lone mothers introduced in the 1970s
could have been devised to have been exactly parallel to the widows’
iq The plaintiff" is a separated fiklhcr with custody of his two children.
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pensions eligibility conditions. This would have made further reform notably
the inclusion of male lone parents on a gender equality basis more feasible.
(iii) Equity and Efficiency
Equity has both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Ill the former
instance, it is clear that lone parents in Ireland are generally in the lower
income ranges and experience a higher than average risk of poverty. They
sbare this predicament with low income large families and, ill particular,
with such families affected by unemployment. A factor which must be
considered here is the likely duration of lone parenthood, and specifically the
extent and duration of lone parents’ exclusive reliance on social welfare
payments. Bradshaw and Millar estimated a median duration of lone
parenthood of over 3 years (46 months) for those with one "episode" of lone
parenthood, and over 5 years (66 months) in tile case of those with more
than one episode (Bradshaw and Millar, 1991). There are no data available
on the duration of [one parenthood in Ireland, or on the duration of receipt
of social welfare payments.2° If the figures are broadly comparable to those
for the UK, then it points to a growing segment of lone parent families with
extensive reliance on social welfare payments over very extended time
periods.
In the UK and the US the existence of a growing body of families
experiencing long-term "dependence" on State payments has given rise to
controversial debate both academically and politically. At this point, three
observations are offered regarding Ireland’s case. First, it is likely that in
Ireland also there is a significant stock of long duration lone parents with
some reliance on social security. Women’s labour market status is relatively
inferior as evidenced by the persistence of occupational segregation, a higher
than average rate of low pay an’tong women and a degree of ’,’.,age
discrimination (Blackwell, 1989; Nolan, 1990; Callan, 1991). Morcover,
women with cbildren may face particular obstacles to labour market
participation (NESC, 1991). The weak labour market position of women
combines with an ineffective system of family maintenance to result in a
limited potential contribution from private income sources to the overall
incomes of lone mothers. Correspondingly, this enhances the significance of
State social welfare payments. The absence of civil divorce should also be
noted. This legal prohibition on remarriage closes off one route out of lone
Stocks and flows of lone parenls "in" and "out" of social welfare schemes can be estimated. For
example, from 1990 to 1991 tile net increase in Lone Parent Allowance recipients was 3,953 (from
25,231 Io 29,184). There was inflow of new rceipients in the year of 8,389 and, as a residual, the outflow
is 4,436 or 18 per cent of the initial "’stock". Thus, 82 per ¢enl of LPA recipients in 1990 rcrnained
recipients a year later (Statistical Information on Social "Welfare Services, 1990 and 1991).
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parenthood for separated or deserted persons and may resuh in a larger
stock of long duration lone parents than would otherwise exist.
Second, there may be social costs resulting from the existence of lone
parent families who subsist on low incomes for extended durations. For
example, O’Higgins and Boyle documented the high incidence of admission
to institutional care among children from lone parent families (O’Higgins
and Boyle, 1988). It is a plausible hypothesis that the O’Higgins and Boyle
evidence in relation to child care admissions may be part of a wider pattern
of social problems affecting lone parent families and that this is correlated
in some way with material conditions and incomes. Any appraisal of the
cost of maintaining and improving social security payments to one parent
families should therefore take cognisance of the indirect, but very real, social
costs attributable to their low standard of living.
Clearly, there is a need, both conceptually and empirically, to distinguish
those aspects of lone parents’ circumstances which might be ascribed to their
status as [one parents per se from those which reflect the impact of policies
towards lone parents. Some commentaries (Millar, 1987; Millar, 1989;
Phoenix, 1991) argue that the duality of roles irnposed on lone parents
(economic as well as parental roles) renders them economically vulnerable,
but that the existence of social deprivation among lone parents reflects the
inadequacy or ineffectiveness of policy interventions. A countervailing view
expressed most recently in work on separated and divorced lone mothers in
the UK (Jenkins, Ermisch and Wright, 1990) suggests that there may be a
process of "adverse selection". "Women at greatest risk of becoming lone
mothers" according to this line of reasoning, "are also those more at risk of
being in poor economic circumstances" (Jenkins et al., 1990). In the Irish
case, there has been no empirical analysis of the causal mechanisms which
correlate family structure, material circumstances and the incidence of social
malaise such as family break-up, ill health, and so on.
Third, it appears that when payments for categories of lone parent
families were added to the social welfare system in Ireland a rationale for
the level and structure of payments was not articulated. Insurance and
assistance payments for the non-widowed lone parents’ schemes introduced
in the 1970s were set at the levels being paid to widows. No general
principles were stated in relation to a number of issues:
-- the actual and per capita equivalent payment rates
relative to two parent families;
-- the structure of the means test and in particular the
amount of earned income disregarded;
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the extent of special ,leeds and costs (child care, housing
costs) among lone parents, how these might affcct their
living standards and how the social welfare system should
accommodate these needs and costs.
The above points are not necessarily made in support of higher overall
social security payments but to illustrate the somewhat ad hoc development
of payments in respect of lone parents.
In relation to efficiency, the impact on their labour supply of the social
security provisions for lone parents must be considered. The labour supply
impact of social security in general has generated a complex and contentious
research literature, with much greater analysis focused on the relationship
between levels of unemployment and duration of unemployment on the one
hand and the structure and level of unemployment payments to unemployed
on the othcr (for overviews of these issues see: Atkinson, 1986; OECD, 1985;
Blackwell, 1986). This controversy is now reflected in international social
security policy dehates affecting lone parents (for cxample, Walker, 1990).
Basic Irish provisions are means tested. The general allowances for lone
parents may be supplemented by ancillary means tested benefits. For
instance, Family Income Supplement is payable, within the framework of a
means test, to all parents, including lone parents, who are at work full time
or part time. In addition, lone parents may be eligible for means tested,
non-cash benefits such as medical card entidement to free health services
and reduced, income related, rents if they are tenants of local authority
dwellings. Clearly, there is scope for overall marginal "tax" rates on earned
income to reach high levels, given the multiplicity of means tests. The
interaction of these benefits and services with earnings, income tax and
PRSI and child care costs for lone parents (in 1988) has been illustrated by
Blackwell (Blackwell, 1989). His calculations reveal marginal tax rates in
excess of 100 per cent over a range of gross earnings fi’om £50 to ~’110
weekly.
To what extent, therelbre, might the low level of labour force activity
among lone parents be attributable to dimioished incentives arising from the
"poverty trap"? Leaving aside the substantial technical qualifications which
must accompany any illustrative material on poverty traps (NESC, 1990)
the role of the social security system per se in shaping the labour market
decisions of lone parents must be set in a wider familial, social and
institutional context. Evidence in relation to the UK suggests that any
atlempt to understand the labour market behavioor of lone mothers, and
devise policies in this regard, within an exclusively economistic t~amcwork
relating work decisions to marginal tax rates is likely to be misleading. In
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the UK in 1980 a tapered earnings disregard (TERD) was introduced into
the social assistance regime for lone nlothers to ameliorate any poverty traps
and improve labour market incentives. Weale and Bradshaw’s analysis of
this initiative hased on survey data on [one motllers concluded that:
The proportion of persons who will be influenced positively
to participate in the labour market is quite small if policy is
restricted to a manipulation of economic incentives (Weale,
Bradshaw et al, 1984, p. 190).
The analysis documented the important role of family circumstances,
including the availability of satislactory child care, in facilitating labour
market participation. More recently, the 1991 survey report by Bradshaw
and Millar highlighted again the significance of child care as a factor in
determining labour market decisions. They reported a significantly higher
hypothetical labour supply if the child care arrangements preferred by lone
mothers -- especially in relation to cost -- were actually available to them
(Bradshaw and Millar, 1991 ).
These findings in relation to the role of child care must be considered
alongside the undouhtedly inferior labour market status and prospects of
women compared with men. Viewed in this context the difficulties lone
mothers might face in relation to child care compound a more general
pattern of labour market disadvantage. These diffficulties would be
accentuated for lone mothers, fi’om lower socio-economic groups with limited
educational qualifications. On the basis of the data in Chapter 2, these are
characteristics which naight apply to a significant proportion of lone mothers
in Ireland. The potential inefficiency of the lahour supply efffcct of the
poverty trap in Ireland is best considered, therefore, not merely as a
technical issue affecting the tax/benefit/social security nexus, but as a wider
issue concerning the social and institutional obstacles facing lower income
women with children in their attempts to take up paid employment.
This discussion begs the morc fundamental question: should labour
market objectives have any role in relation to social security policy for lone
parents? h’nplicit in the structure of currenl h’ish provisions is the apparent
assumption of non-participation in the labour market for all lone parents I
the minimal earnings disregard, the decline in the real value of the disregard,
the failure (until recently) to allow child care costs as an off]et in the means
test (it it still not a statutory entitlement). Arguably, these arrangements,
combined with the absence of publicly supported child care provisions and
the generally poor labour market prospects of women from lower socio-
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economic groups, may reinforce and institutionalise long-term, and perhaps
permanent, exclusion fi’om the labour market of many lone mothers.
If policy in this regard is informed by the conventional neutrality
principle it must halance a number of considerations. On the one hand, it
may be a widely agreed policy objective that lone parents with dependent
children should be free to choose "non-participation" and to receive adequate
social security protection. In practice, some of the observed non-particlpation
is a deliberate choice which is independent of the imnaediate incentive
structure. As Mil[ar has pointed out in a summary of qualitative data
supplementing the 1991 UK survey report:
Our in-depth interviews clearly showed the extent to which
[one parents made their decision about whether or not to
seek employment on the basis of their perceptions of the
needs of their children... (Millar, 1991).
On the other band, if lone parents wish to seek employment the social
security system and the wider features of the labour market should not
operate to diminish incentives and to discourage labour market re-entry.
While a firm conclusion on this question cannot be offered, there is a distinct
possibility that such discouragement characterises the current Irish
arrangements. It must he recalled that:
-- all lone parents (with dependent children up to age 21) are
eligible for social security;
-- the amount of income which can be earned without benefit
withdrawal is a mere £12 weekly;
-- this disregard has remained unchanged over a long period;
-- there is no statutory recognition of child care costs as an offset
against earned income;
-- there are no labour market supports or policies directed at lone
parents;
-- child care policy in relation to working parents is undeveloped
and, in particular, there is virtually no direct provision of, or
subsidy towards services.
This suite of provisions amounts to an implicit, and presumably unintended,
endorsement of very long-term withdrawal frorn the labour market and an
associated dependence on State social security payments.
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In considering the notion of "dependence" in relation to social security
the distinction drawn by Brown between "active" and "passive" dependence
is crucial (Brown, 1989,A; Brown, 1989, B). The objective of policy migbt
be seen as facilitating "active" dependence -- the deliberate and explicit
choice by tone parents to remain outside of the labour market and to care
full time for their children while avoiding "passive" dependence -- the
adoption of an assumption that it is inappropriate, or too difficult, or
financially unremunerative, to seek work because of the real costs and
obstacles of re-entering the labour market. The point of this discussion is to
raise the possibility of passive dependence in the Irish context.
To place this discussion in wider context a comparative perspective is
useful. A number of analysts have provided typologies and descriptive
comparisons of the social security and related regimes for lone parents in
various countries (Millar, 1989; Brown, 1989, B; Kamerman and Kahn,
1989). One group of countries which includes Sweden and Denmark have
co-ordinated labour market and family policies based on the wider objectives
of "the reduction of inequality and the promotion of gender equity"
(Kamerman, and Kabn, 1989). In the Swedish case the private income
sources of lone parents are strengthened. Advanced maintenance payments
ensure a degree of stability and adequacy in family maintenance, and active
labour market policies (including, most notably, comprehensive child care)
facilitate paid employment among all women with children -- those in one
parent as well as two parent situations. Countries with this configuration of
policies have high rates of labour force participation and low rates of poverty
-- in tbe Swedisb instance a labour force participation rate for lone mothers
in excess of 80 per cent and a poverty rate of 8.6 per cent2] (Millar, 1989).
A second group of countries, best exemplified by France but including
also Austria and Finland have, in Kahn and Kamerman’s description, a
universalyoung child strategy. In this policy mix, tbe focus is on families and
children in general witbout significant special benefits for one parent families.
French policy, for instance, provides generous family allowances, housing
allowances, full income replacement on maternity leave, and paid parenting
leave for parents wbo reduce tbeir working time by 50 per cent or more --
available until a child is 2 (in families with 3 or more children). These
arrangements are designed to allow parents to withdraw from tbe labour
market when children are very yotmg, but to facilitate and encourage labour
market participation thereafter.
Ireland and Britain’s policy strategy is one based on supporting poor lone
molhers at home. In practise, the strategy entails social assistance entitlements
21 Poverty defined as adjusted dispc*sable incomes le~ than US I:~verty line converted into national
currencies ttsing PPPs (.~.’lillar, 1989, Table 7.9).
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for most lone mother families, supplemented by a judicial system for family
maintenance for the deserted/separated, and a labour market framework
which poses obstacles to participation (lack of child care, absencc of training
and related policies) and limited employment and income opportunities.
This approach has been cbaracterised as "planning for long-term dependency"
(Brown, 1989A). It is associated with low rates of labour force participation
(UK, 39 per cent; h’eland 1530 per cent) and relatively high poverty rates
(UK, 38.6 per cent; Ireland, 35 per cent).22 Ireland’s policies, viewed
comparatively, are therefore somewhat extreme in their assumption and re-
enforcement of dependence, as Millar has recently observed (Millar, 1992).
It is by no means clear that this unequivocal approach is the appropriate
strategy for the future. On the contrary, the evidence in Ireland of the
modest living standards, and low labour market attacbment of lone parents,
and of the rapid growth in the social security population and expenditure,
all point to the need for a reappraisal of policy. The final chapter briefly
outlines the elements of such a reappraisal.
It must be readily acknowledged that a wide gulf separates the labour
market orientation of the policies of Sweden and Denmark (for example)
from the dependency/non-labour market cbaracter of Irish policy. This gulf
is best considered as a continuum. The point of this analysis is not that Irish
policies can, or ought, to move immediately to the other end of that
continuum, but rather tbat they could move in that direction, within the
constraints of economic and labour market conclitions here.
(ix,) Lone Parents, Cohabitation and the Unit of Payment
As the descriptive material in Chapter 3 pointed out, cohabitation has
excluded "lone parents" from eligibility for social security payments. In
policy terms the implied rationale for tbis key provision is that tbe essence
of lone parenthood in social security terms -- is the absence of financial
support for a woman from her male partner (due to death, desertion, and
so on). Therefore, where a woman with a child is deemed to be "cohabiting"
she is not considered eligible for any of the lone parents’ payments.73
Implementation of the provision requires monitoring and scrutiny of lone
mothers’ personal lives. This is occasionally reflected in public debate about
the degree of intrusion and surveillance which does take place, or ought to
"~ The Irish lalxlur force figure is based on tbe concept economically active -- see Table 2.6,
Chapter 2; the Irisb poverty rate is the proportion of single mother families with disposable income
below 50 per cent of mean (per capita equivalent) disposable income in 1987 (see Table 2.9, Cbapter
2).
7~ There is rio legal sl>ecification ill the I rish $yslem of social securby of what conslitut~ cohabitation.
In practice, a couple are deemed to be cohabiting if they "are having a social, sexual and financial
relationship" (see Dail Debatts, VI31. 390, col. 1012, 24 May, 1989/.
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take place2’~ in tile enforcement of tile cohabitation criterion. However, tile
recurring controversy about tile principle as well as about tile implemenlalion
of tile cohabitation rule is related to more fundamental policy questions.
Tile essential argument in favour of a cohabitation rule, under Irish
conditions, would be that married men and women’s entitlements can be
affected by their status. Notably, a married woman’s entitlements -- the
anaount she would receive, for example, under Unemployment Assistance --
are related to her spouse’s income in two ways. First, if she is receiving
Unemployment Assistance her husband’s income (subject to certain
disregards, etc.) is assessed as part of her means. Second, if she is not
employed outside tile home she is deemed an "adult dependant" of her
spouse and if her spouse is unemployed he receives an appropriate personal
rate of social welfare plus an additional "aduh dependant rate": the total
payment would be shout 1.6 times, nol 2.0 times, tile personal rate. Given
these family-based units of payment, if a cohabitation rule were not applied
then a lone parent in receipt of a social welfare payment cohabiting with
(for example) an unemployed man would be more favourably treated than
tile married couple in which one partner was a recipient and tile other an
"aduh dependant".~s
If tile underlying logic of these arrangements is accepted~ the question
then arises, as Brown points ouh about their Ioug-term effect on tile
probability of lone parents entering into new, or reconciled, stable
relationships (Brown, 1989A). The significance of this issue resides in the
fact that the formation of two parent families is one of tile "routes" out of
lone parenthood and consequently, as Millar and Brown suggest, a potential
route out of poverty aud economic vulnerability (Millar, 1992; Brown,
1989A). A difficuhy with tile current cohabitation rule is that it may, in
effect, prevent the natural development of relationships and deter lone
parents from embarking on possibly secure, long-term rekltionships which
could have a beneficial effect on their own and their children’s social and
financial circumstances. This line of reasoning would point to some
moderation in tile application of the cohabitation principle. For instance,
cohabitation might be permitted on a transitional basis.
Clearly, tile question of cohabitation must be viewed in tile wider
context of tile prevailing family-based unit of payment in social security. In
Ireland this framework is currently shapcd by the ulanner in which the
7¢ See, for cxartlpJe, Sunday "l’ribulle, 13 August 1988, "Social Iltdfart denies chargeJ ofharr).ing single
parents".
7~ To illustrate: the lone parent, her partner and one child would receive ~110.20 weekly fronl the
combinalion of LPA and short-term Unemplo.vment Assistance. The comparllble married family would
rccel,.,c £99.80 ( 199213 rates of s~ci:d wtzlfiire).
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principle of gender equality has been grafted onto the social welfare system.
This development has been prolonged, contentious, and litigious (McCashin
and Cooke, 1992) and gave rise to an official review of the intricacies and
difficulties involved2c’ (Department of Social Welfare, 1991). Briefly, in the
1980s the Irish social welfare system was modified to remove features which
were discriminatory towards women. Some of the modification was
uncontentious -- such as granting married women the same entitlement to
unemployment benefits and the same duration of entitlement as single
women and men. Traditionally in social welfare legislation married women
were deemed "dependants" of their spouses irrespective of their actual
employment status (i.e., an unemployed or sick husband would receive an
adult dependant payment in respect of his wife even if she were employed
or in receipt of significant earnings).
The legislation of 1985 which reformed these provisions altered, but did
not abolish, the notion of dependency. Either spouse could now be the adult
dependant, and the definition of the latter was altered so that claimants
whose spouses had very limited incomes could still claim an adult dependant
additional payment. The difficuhy with this policy was that married couples,
under the new legislation, were subject to a "limitation" in the following
way. Both husband and wife had legal entitlement to unemployment
assistance. However, where both were receiving an unemployment payment,
the married couple could not receive more than the combined total of the
personal rate and the adult dependant rate of payment, i.e., more than a
married man would receive in respect of a dependant spouse who was not,
in fact, in the labour force. This limitation was not applied to non-married
couples or other types of households or families. By contrast, a cohabiting
couple comprising a lone parent in receipt of an unemployment payment
and her partner, also unemployed, would receive two full personal rates of
payment27 (Department of Social Welfare, 1991).
This situation was challenged constitutionally in 1987 on the grounds
that it violated Article 41.3 of the Constitution in respect of the State’s
obligation to protect the institution of marriage. In 1989 the High Court
upheld the challenge, the Supreme Court supported this judgn3ent and
further legislation was introduced. This later legislation, which still obtains,
effectively extended the "limitation" to cohabiting couples, thereby formally
The relevant legislation in chronological order is: EEC Directive 7917, Sacial Welfare (no. 2) Act,
1985, especially section 12; Sodal IVelfare (no. 2) Act, 1989. The key judgment Patrick lip.land v. th~ Minister
for Social Welfare and the Attorney Gtntral, The High COurt, Judicial Review, No. 1987171, J. Barrington,
1988.
27 This nece~arily truncated discussion ignores the aggregation of means applied Io married couples
and lllat~y other complexities.
SOCIAL SECURI’IW: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 85
equalising the treatments of married and cohabiting couples. (Tiffs policy of
"equalisation downwards" takes no cognisance of a significant dift~rcnce
between cohabitees and married persons: the former are not protected by
maintenance legislation while the latter are.)
An official Review Group was established to assess the basic policy issue
involved: how individuals, families and households were to he treated in tile
social welfare code. This group did not reach a consensus on the immediate
issues but identified two alternative lines of policy development. Either the
"limitation" should he abolishcd and the structure of payments should
evolve towards two personal entitlements for all couples, or the principle of
the limitation should be upheld and extended more generally througlaont
the social welfare code. (The group considered that the arrangements in
place after the 1989 legislation -- and still in place at the time of writing
-- could not be considered permanent as they too arc of doubtful
constitutionality.)
In this discussion the substantive arguments related to the two immediate
options identified by the Review Group are not rehearsed. The relevant
point here is that if the policy of "individualisation" in social welfare rights
had been adopted, in the application of equality principles, or in the later
policy response to the Courts’ judgment on the 1985 legislation, then the
contentious comparisons between married and cohabiting wonld no longer
be relevant. In other words, if a married couple could receive two personal
rates of payment~ where both are unemployed, the underlying dcpcndency
structure of the payments would disappear and so too would the necessity
to "equalise" the situations of those married with those cohabiting. Clearly,
as the Review Group’s analysis suggests, an individualisation strategy would
be potentially costly. Nevertheless, aside from other arguments in its favour,
such a strategy would provide a context in which the whole issue of
cohabitation could be addressed anew.
(v) Prioate Maintenance
The total income of lone parents depends not only on publicly provided
income support but also on i)rivate sources of income such as earnings and
maintenance fi’om absent and non-custodial fathers and parents. In Chapter
2, the limited data fi’om the Household Budget Survey indicated that private
income sources in fact play a subsidiary role in the overall income packages
of lone parents. However, any proper assessment of the actual level of
One variant of the indivldualisation strategy would propose that all married couples where, for
example, Ihe husband is unemployed, would receive two "personal" rates of paymem, whether tile
$1-’ouse is also ill the lal:.uur markel or a deix:ndanl !tl.’ouse working ill tile home.
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maintenance payments would require representative data on lone parents
which are currently not available.
It is likely that a comprehensive examination of private maintenance
for spouses and children in Ireland would reveal significant difficulties.~9 The
Oireachtas Committee oil Marital Breakdown offered the view that the
family law maintenance systems functioned "reasonably well" (Joint Oireachtas
Committee, 1985, p.57). No empirical basis for this conclusion was offered,
however. The 1992 White Paper on marital breakdown contained a largely
descriptive account ofexisting legislation and did not propose any significant
developments (White Paper, 1992).
Recent research by Ward offers a picture of the operation of the current
maintenance regime for couples (Ward, 1990). Couples who separate or
divorce may in the first instance reach an informal, agreed arrangement
regarding financial support of the spouse and children. Some couples draw
up a formal separation agreement through solicitors and incorporate
maintenance in the agreement. Where no agreement is arrived at, where an
agreed arrangement breaks down or a spouse (invariably the hushand)
simply deserts or refuses to support the family, then the relevant legislation
becomes applicable -- the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children)
Act 1976 and the Judicial Separation and Family law Reform Act 1989.~° Under
the 1976 legislation the Courts may order a spouse to make periodic
payments and for a period of time which the Courts consider proper, to a
spouse who has applied for a maintenance order.
Certain central features of the legislation should be noted. The legislation
does not provide a precise rule for the determination of"proper" maintenance.
The Court is merely obliged to have regard to the income, earning capacity,
property and resources of tile spouses. As Ward notes, an unreported case
in the Supreme Court is the only judicial definition of adequate maintenance.
This definition simply sets out that the Courts should:
-- ascertain the minimum reasonable requirements of the wife and
children;
-- determine the income earned or capable of being earned hy the
wife -- apart from the maintenance;
-- determine the aclual net income of the husband; and decide the
reasonable living expenses of the husband (Ward, 1990, pp.3-4).
This discussion is confined 1o maintenance in relation to married persons. There arc no dala on
mainlenance in rcsl~’Cl of single molhers wllh children. Here it should I~ holed ihal a single mother is
not legally enlitlcd Io nlahllcnance from ihe child’s ~alhcr, but the child is so enihled.
A key amendment io Ihe 1976 legislation was lhe provision in Ihe 1989 Acl whh:h revoked Ihc
absoltl(¢: I)ar on ~i:,o~ls~ who had "d~erlcd" from l’co?iving malnlcnancc.
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No statutory basis exists for evaluating the effect of a husband’s second
relationship on his maintenance obligations.
In the legislation children are deemed "dependent" if aged up to 16 or
21 if in full-time education. The legislation does not provide for automatic
increases in maintenance amounts (due to cost of living increases, for
example). Any changes in the maintenance must be made on the basis of
applications by the spouses which show changes in circumstances. Most
maintenance orders are determined in the District Court which may award
a maximum of £100 weekly to a spouse and £30 weekly for one child.3~
These maxima were increased to £200 and ,~’60 respectively in The Courts
Act, 1991.3~
An Attachments of Earnings procedure, provided for in the 1976 Act,
allows the Court to order direct deductions fi’om a husband’s income --
these deductions to be paid directly to the spouse or the Court. Both
employers and employees arc obliged to report to the Court changes in
income and other circumstances of the spouses. If maintenance payments
awarded by the Courts fall into arrears the errant spouse may I)e arrested
or summoncd to appear in Court. Arrears may bc recouped through the
seizure/sale of a spouse’s goods and husbands may be imprisoned if failure
to pay the awarded maintenance was deemed to be due to sheer refusal or
culpable neglect.
The relationship between this judicial framework for maintenance and
the social security system was descrihed in part in Chapter 3. There, it was
noted that the legislation governing the new Lone Parent’s Allowance
provides a legal basis for the social security authorities to obtain maintenance
fi’om spouses -- the rationale being that spouses should "contribute" to the
cost of the State’s social security payments to the spouse’s Ihmily. The
judicial maintenance system and social security overlap in other respects,
however. Notably, applicants for the social security payments must show
that they have made efforts to obtain maintenance fi’om their spouses. Also,
if a spouse is receiving "inconsiderable" maintenance dlen she is still eligible
to apply for social security. In practice, a simple cut off" point defines
inconsiderable: if a wife is in receipt of an amount less than the cut of]" point
then her maintenance is inconsiderable.
The anomalies to which these arrangements have given rise are evident.
Eligibilitv for a Deserted Wife’s Benefit, supposedly a non-means tested
insurance based payment is being determined partly, ahhough indirectly on
the basis on means, i.e., whether or not "inconsiderable" maintenance is
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being paid: a full benefit is paid to those with merely inconsiderable
maintenance. Among recipients of means-tested allowances, the amount of
"inconsiderable" maintenance does affect the amount of the allowance. The
net effect of these arrangements therefore is to generate complex horizontal
inequities based on the various maintenance/social welfare combinations as
follows:
(i) Spouses in receipt of"considerable" maintenance, deemed to be
in the category "maintained" and therefore ineligible;
(ii) spouses with inconsiderable maintenance and insurance
entitlement to Deserted Wives’ Benefit;
(iii) spouses, as (ii) above, with maintenance and a benefit payment
and income fi’om employment (which has not affccted the
amount of I)enefit until 1992 -- now income above a limit will
exclude a woman from DWB -- supposedly a non-means tested
payment);
(iv) spouses with inconsiderable maintenance, no insurance
entitlement, entitlement to a means tested allowance, with the
allowance reduced in accordauce with the anaount of
maintenance;
(v) spouses, as in (iv) above who also have income fi+om employment,
which would further offset the amount of the allowance.
A further aspect of the social welfare/maintenance nexus is the
differential treatment of maintenance paid to spouses, as distinct from
dependent children. Maintenance in respect of children is currently not
assessed as means for purposes of determining the amount of an allowance
while that maintenance apportioned to a spouses is assessedfl3 Therefore, the
combination of the "inconsiderable" maintenance provisions and the exclusion
from means assessment of the children’s portion of maintenance awards gives
a positive incentive for maintenance applicants in the Courts to obtain
maintenance which is below the relevant threshold and earmarked, as far as
possible, for the children.
These judicial and social welfare maintenance procedures have serious
defects. Notably, as Ward’s analysis of District Court files and Department
u Millar, however, reports that the Department of Social Welfare intends to intro<lucc assc’ssmenl
of child maiz~tetmnce payments (Millar, 1992). The Social IVelfare Act, 1993, Section 24, when implemented
by means of regulation, will provide a statutoo" basis for the asse~menl of child maintenance payments
ill Ihe meiln$ tesL
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of Social Welfare records shows, the size of tile awards are relatively modest
with over 50 per cent in the range under ~’40 weekly. Default rates on court
orders are high: 28 per cent of sarnpled awards were never paid up and a
further 48 per cent were six months or more in arrears. While the available
enforcement procedures can improve the payment rate, the judicial
arrangements still result in a situation where, in Ward’s summary, "a large
majority of wives granted maintenance orders cannot be assured of either
an adequate or a secure income" (Ward, 1990, p.47).
These findings in relation to the problems of Irish judicial arrangements
for family maintenance are strongly echoed in international research on
maintenance. In an overview of a very large research literature in relation
to the United States, Weitzman offers the following three point summary:
First, not one study has found a state or county in wbich
even half of the fatbers fully comply with court orders.
Second, the research suggests that many of the fathers who
are ordered to pay support pay it irregularly and are often
in arrears. In several studies, the average arrearage is for half
or three-quarters of the money owed, and in one study the
average reached 89%. (While some contribution is certainly
preferable to the total noncompliance, irregular or infrequent
child support payments can create serious hardships for the
dependent mother and cbildren.) Third, the research indicates
that a very sizable minority of fathers -- typically between a
quarter and a third -- never make a single court-ordered
payment. (Weitzman, 1988, p. 105).
Weitzman attributes the poor maintenance compliance to "lax
enforcement" and dismisses other commonly advanced explanations such as
"excessive" maintenance awards, non-compliance being confined to lower
income men, or resistance to compliance because of child custody or
visitation problems.
In the United Kingdom, Bradshaw and Millar’s 1991 study reported
that only 29 per cent of lone mother families received regular maintenance.
The British C;overnment’s White Paper, Children Come First, referred to the
poor maintenance record of absent parents and also pointed out that among
lone parents in receipt of social security the proportion in receipt of
maintenance fell from 50 per cent in 1981 to 23 pet" cent in 1988 (Children
Come l~5"rst, 1991). A possible contrast between the US and the UK is that
in the UK there is evidence of lower incomes among absent parents. The
White Paper, for instance, observes that 20 per cent of absent parents are
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unemployed or sick and that their incomes on avcrage are lower than tile
general population ( CTffldren Come First, 1991).
Tile difficuhies associated with tile operation of maintenance procedures
in the UK have led some commentators to question tile value of largely
judicial systems of maintenance. In an assessment of tile UK position
Eekelaar argues that because of the low incomes of many absent and
custodial parents tbe potential of legal arrangements to bring about adequate
and secure maintenance is severely circumscribed:
Private law can uhimately do little to redress the disadvantage
brought about by family breakdown. It cannot generate
resources that are not there. It bites significantly only in tile
case of the more affluent, and marginally readjusts tile
circumstances of the poorer groups (Eekelaar, 1988, p. 173).
Against this background of inefl’ectiveness in legal maintenance systems
in some countries there is an increasing tendency internationally to move
towards more tmified, centralised and administrative, rather than judicial
arrangements. While no one model is being advanced as an appropriate one
for all countries, a number of elements can be identified in the various
ahernatives (Kahn and Kamerman, 1988). First, greater uniformity in
judicial decisions and less judicial discretion -- both being attempted by
means of more specific legislation -- for example, a statutory obligation on
the courts to apply a pre-specified maintenance formula to all cases. Second,
and equally important, a reduction in the effective role of legal procedures
through tile use of "advanced" or "automatic" maintenance paymenu by
tile State, with administrative recoupment of these payments by the State
directly from ahsent parents. This is essentially a generalisation of tile liable
relatives’ concept to all cases and not just social security applicants. A
variant on this proposal would be "advanced" payments in respect of
maintenance for dependent children.
(vi) Deserted Wife’s Benefit -- :l Rationale?
Millar, in a discussion of social security provisions for lone parents
internationally, remarks that Ireland is the only country to have a social
insurance payment for non-widowed lone parents (Millar, 1989). While
underlying public finance principles may provide a market failure justification
for social insurance in relation to unemployment, sickness, old age, retirement
and widowhood, it is difficult to sustain this rationale in relation to marital
breakdown.
Tv,,o essential elements would provide an analytical case for social (as
distinct from private) insurance in respect of marital breakdown. The first
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element would comprise the conventional rnarket failure criteria as they
apply to private insurance markets. On these criteria problenls of moral
hazard and adverse selection would arise: the individual could conceal the
fact of his/her high risk characteristics (adverse selection) and could affect
the probability of the insurable cvent occurring (moral hazard). In principle
these market failures might support social insurance provision (Barr, 1987,
Chapter 5). The second element, however, concerns the nature of the evenu
with which social insurance may contend. These events should be
contingencies or events over which individuals have no control -- widowhood,
old age, unemployment, etc.
Marital breakdown, however, concerns complex persovtal and emotional
experiences. It may range at one end of a continuum from ao entirely
voluntary choice to a decision brought on by a marital partner’s neglect, or
even violence. The personal nature of marital breakdown contrasts with the
contingencies afflicted on people by the loss of a spouse, industrial injury, or
unemployment for example. On the whole it is difficuh to sustain a principled
argunaent in support of an insurance payment in the case of marital
breakdown.
It has been argued that there are significant practical arguments in
support of Deserted Wife’s Benefit -- notably lack of means testing and
avoidance of povcrty traps)+ However, the 1992 Social Welfare Act
introduced a means test: while the Deserted Wife’s Benefit still exists,
entlth:ment to it will bc withdrawn (for new claimants) in a range of income
around £’12,000 per annum. In effect, Deserted Wife’s Benefit is now a
hybrid of an insurance-based benefit and a means tested allowance. In his
speech to the Drill in March 1992 on the Social Welfare Bill the M[inister
referr,:d to it as "somewhat unusual and unique in a social insurance
context" (DSil Eireann, 24th March, 1992).
l?’urthermorc, as the Minister also indicated, the existence of the Deserted
Wife’:: Benefit:
applies to women only and further developnlents in regard
to equal treatment between men and women will tmdoubtedly
require rationalisation of the present arrangements.
The weak analyticat tbundation for the Deserted Wife’s Benefit,
comb!.ned with its current insurance-cum-income limit arrangement and
with the imperative of change in the EC Equality Directive’s final phase,
sugge’.;ts that its whole rationale needs to be fundamentally reviewed.
"~ "~Thcse points were made in public debate surrounding the Social IVelfare Act, 1992. This Act
inlrociut ed a means limhs alzovc which a D~,VB I~’ould nol ~o~ payable. See briefing papers on the Bill
b}’ FLAC (Free Legal Advice Cenlre~) and INOU (Irish National Organisation of Ihe Unemployed).
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(vii) Summary -- The Need for a Policy Review
In this chapter and in previous chapters the need for an overal) review
of social security provisions for lone parents has emerged. Chapter 3
documented the significant growth in the number of lone parent recipients
of social welfare and in the associated social welfare expenditure. A number
of policy issues were highlighted in this chapter which, taken together, reveal
the need to rethink social security strategy in this area:
-- the need to develop provisions which comply with the terms of
the final phase of the EC’s Equal Treatment Directive affecting
family income support measures;
-- the unquestioned assumption -- which apparently underpins
existing arrangements -- of the non-participation of lone mothers
in the labour market, with the consequences this entails for the
income levels of lone mothers and for the scale of reliance on
social welfare payments;
-- the difficulties associated with the judicial family maintenance
arrangements for separated and deserted lone parents;
-- the anomalous status of the Deserted Wife’s Benefit; and
-- the difficulties arising from the treatment of cohabitation and
the possible benefits of reform in this area in the context of
wider changes in the status of "dependants" in social security.
Chapter 5
A POLICY STRA TEGY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
(i) Introduction
In this chapter a brief summary is given of the findings, the need for
research is pointed out and the broad outlines of an ahernative social
security policy are drawn.
(ii) Findings
There are significant limitations on the data available on lone parents
in Ireland. Notwithstanding these limitations it has been possible to quantify
a growth in the population of lone parents, with single mothers and
separated mothers increasing in number, and widows with children declining.
Ireland’s experience in these matters broadly conforms with that of many
other countries. Associated with the growth in the population of lone parents
(who are overwhelmingly lone mothers) is a significant increase in the
number of lone parents in receipt of social security.
Lone mother families have low incomes and have a significant reliance
on State transfer payments and State services. Their risk of poverty defined
in terms of per capita equivalent incomes is significantly higher than average
in the case of single and separated mothers. For example, 35 per cent of
single mothers are poor in relative income terms if half of mean income is
taken as the benchmark.
Social security provision for lone mothers has expanded in coverage
and in cost, and the population of beneficiaries has grown rapidly at’td will
continue to grow in the foreseeable future. The fundamental assumption
which appears to tmderpin social security provisions is the separation of lone
parents from the labour market. This tenet of policy was questioned, and
other policy issues and problems were identified.
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(iii) Future Strategy for Social Security -- Research aVeeds
Any policy argument regarding lone parents must be prefaced by a
recognition of the dearth of information and analysis in relation to lone
parents. A prerequisite, therefore, for informed policy debate is a significant
improvement in the available data. Two general and interrelated sets of
issues sl~ould feature on the future research agenda.
First, there are underlying social processes at work which underpin the
long-run shift in family structures and the growth in lone parent families.
In particular, it is crucial to analyse the factors which might give rise to an
apparently disproportionate incidence of lone parenthood among those from
lower socio-economic groups. If future research werc to confirm the tentative
evidence in this study of this disproportionate incidence, it would have
implications for future policy strategies. It would also imply that the
sociological aud policy implications of lone parenthood should be
coneeptualised not as a question of family structure, nor solely as a dimension
of the feminisation of poverty, but rather as a set of interactions between
general economic and social vulnerability on the one hand and gender and
family structure on the other. A starting point for such an analysis is the
emphasis by Jenkins on the "adverse selection" into lone parenthood of
mothers from poor economic circumstances (Jenkins, Ermisch and Wright,
1990), This would contrast with the emphasis given in feminist analyses to
the irnportant independent role of gender in generating lone mothers’
poverty (Millar, 1987; Mi/lar and G/endinning, 1989).
Second, at a more immediate and applied level, there is an urgent need
for policy relevant data on the social circumstances, broadly defined, of lone
parents. For example, the onset of lone parenthood might be associated with
housing mobility and changes in tenure: this in turn would have implications
Ibr lone parents’ housing costs and for the level and structure of income
maintenance support. Improvements are needed in the system of family
maintenance and representative data on the income and employment of
absent parents is also essential, therefore. If non-compliant absent parents have
very low incomes, for instance, then the scope for a judicial maintenance
system to provide adequate and secure maintenance is clearly limited.
A central focus of any future descriptive analysis of lone parents should
he the duration of lone parenthood, the associated duration of reliance on
social security, and the factors which impede or facilitate movements out of
those statuses. An analysis is urgently required of the "entry" and "exit"
rates for lone parenthood. If, for example, the evolving pattern is one of
rapid rates of inflow (due to increased marital breakdown and non-marital
births) and low rates of outflow then a large stock of long duration lone
parents would rapidly accumulate. In general, the data gaps and absence of
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research which emerge so clearly in tile earlier chapters would strongly
support Millar’s recent plea for further research:
We would argue that the most pressing short-term need is
for better data on the circumstances of lone parent families
of all types and that this should therefore he the immediate
priority (Millar, 1992).
(iv) Social Security- Objectives and Constraints
A re-statement of the objectives and rationale of social security provision
for lone parents in Ireland is necessary. Such a statement might be to the
effect that the objective of policy is to prevent income inadequacy among lone
parents, widowed and non-widowed, through equitable and efficient policies
affecting both private and public sources of income.
This objective must be pursued in the light of certain constraints-
economic, social and legal. Chief among the economic constraints are the
public expenditure implications of a large and rapidly growing population
of social security beneficiaries. The potential labour supply effect of social
security provisions are an added economic constraint. A constraint with both
economic and social dimensions is the apparently low level of resources and
low socio-economic background of lone parents. This constraint may make
it more difficult to devise appropriate labour market policies in relation to
lone parenthood. Furthermore, the fundamental social changes which
underpin the growth of lone parendlood in Ireland and internationally may
not be amenable to policy change: a socially imposed constraint on policy,
therefore, is the long run, and -- for the foreseeable furore -- continuous
growth in the numbers of lone parents. This will he reflected in a continuing
increase in the "demand" for social security provisions.
The legal system, as oudined in Chapters 3 and 4, impinges significantly
on the social security arrangements for lone parents. It is clear that while
there may be scope to improve the judicial family maintenance system, there
are limitations on judicial maintenance in the degree to which it can procure
adequate maintenance in the ease of lower income families. This is a
significant constraint on policy if a high proportion of lone parents are from
lower socio-economic groups. The constitutional prerogatives of the family
based on marriage in Ireland also set limitations on policy. Social security
support for lone parents must be structured so as to ensure balanced
provisions for two parent and one parent families. Moreover, dais
constitutional imperative must be applied in the context of some diversity in
social attitudes and values. On the one hand, there is continuing support
for the constitutional and social primacy of the family (based on marriage).
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On the other, there is also widespread acceptance of the need to make
provisions for lone parents and there is, furthermore, a segment of public
opinion which would actively support constitutional and social changes in
the status of marriage and the family (such as the legalisation of divorce).
Future policy in relation to social security for lone parents faces the challenge
of balancing these potentially conflicting orientations.
Given this preliminary statement of objectives and constraints what
particular instruments of policy might be appropriate? It is not possible here
to offer detailed proposals for an alternative social security system for lone
parents. However, tile outlines of such an ahernative can be sketched and
some more short-term initiatives consistent with this outline can be identified.
A future social security regime should, arguably, conform to the
following criteria:
-- It should encompass all lone parents of both genders, widowed
and non-widowed, and treat all categories of lone parents
uniformly;
-- It should facilitate lone parents to choose the balance between
the labour market and parenting -- offering adequate support
to those choosing full-time care for children but not posing
disincentives to lone parents wishing to seek employment;
-- It should bc underpinned by an improved system of fami~
mainlenance -- which would result in more secure maintenance
as a foundation for the overall income "package" of lone
parents, and;
-- It should be simpler, more easily understood and more easily
administered than tile present system.
(v) Policy Strategy: Private Income Sources
The Chart below provides a framework which clarifies specific policy
issues and choices in relation to lone parents’ social security provisions. As
the figure suggests, the distinction between public/state income sources on
the one hand and actual or potential private income sources on the other
must be borne in mind.
The diverse nature and source of public income supports must also be
recognised. Lone parents, for example, receive Child Benefit, as do all
families with dependent children, and therefore policy towards families in
general is one mechanism for developing future social security in relation to
lone parents. Policies towards poor families also affect social security for lone
parents: lone parents in paid employment might be eligible, in the same
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CHART 3
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SOURCES OF INCOME FOR LONE PARENTS AND POLICY
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way as other low paid parents, to receive Family Income Supplement; also,
the Lone Parents’ payments incorporate child additional payments (CDAs)
as do the generality of payments to social welfare recipients with dependent
children. In Ireland’s current social welfare system lone parents receive
income support primarily as lone parents. The significance of this distinction
is that it conveys the diversity of actual and potential income sources of lone
parents and by extension it invites a broad approach to income support
policy.
Comparative analyses of social security systems point out that Ireland’s
regime for lone parents is unusual, as it is based primarily on supporting
them qua lone parents by means of separate, categorical payments (Millar,
1989; Millar, 1992; Kamerman and Kahn, 1989). The thrust of these
comparative commentaries is that countries such as France or Sweden which
have strong labour market policies and family policies for all families, have
better provision for Ionc parents, as evidenced by their lower rates of
poverty, higher labour force participation rates and more diverse sources of
incorne.
Thefirst element in any future strategy is to ameliorate the institutional
barriers that lone mothers face in entering the labour market: those barriers
may also be faced, if to a lesser extent, by mothers in general. If these
barriers were removed, it would enhance the earnings element in the overall
income package of Ionc parents. Child care for working parents is arguably
the central issue here.
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There is no direct public provision in Ireland of child care services for
working parents and no official stance in relation to provision, subsidisation,
access and similar issttes3~. On this question, as on other specific aspects of
policy raised in the discussion, no detailed proposals are given here. What
can be stressed, however, is the need for a co-ordinaled policy in relation to
child care which invoh,es policy makers in the social security and direct
service provision areas. In addition, it is clear that policy must address
"supply" issues (availability, quality, etc) as well as "demand" issues (supporting
parents with the cost of services). In relation to the latter issue, a policy
which is targeted in some way is the more appropriate strategy -- for
example direct access to publicly provided services with charges related to
income, or means tested rebates against the cost of commercial child care
services. A general tax allowance or tax credit, by way of contrast, would
not be an appropriate policy as it might he of little or no benefit to the
lowest-income parents, including lone parents (leaving aside other possible
objections).
This proposed initiative is envisaged as a measure for all families with
children. If the stated objective of official policy -- of enhancing the
participation of women in the labour force -- is to be achieved, then the
qucstion of child care policy for all working parents must be addressed (see
NESC, 1992). As Lewis has emphatically stated:
It is not possible to abstract the problems faced by lone
parents fi’om those faced by two parent families, especially in
regard to the efforts of any parent to combine paid work
and family life (Lewis, 1989).
The impact of an enhanced child care system on reducing the constraints
facing lone parents would be bcightened if policies were also devised in
relation to trabling and in relation to the "marginal tax rates" faced by
lone parents. As regards the latter, it was suggested in Chapter 4 that since
lone parents have a high probability of experiencing a multiplicity of means
tests and deductions (tax, PRS1, medical card means test, Family Income
Supplen~eut, differential rent, etc.) that there may be scope to reduce any
poverty traps implicit in these arrangements. No detailed analysis is
3, The Progt-amme for Economic and Social Progress acknowledged that child care services were a
colleclive responsibility for Unions, Employers and Government. The NESC Report on Women’s
Partirlpation in the Irlsh labour Market stated Ihe analytical case for State [ntelx’ention in child care and
the Council of lhe NESC called for detailed planning and research to bc undertaken to identify needs
and appropri:lte tnod¢~ ofset~’ice pro~’is~on (NESC, 1991~. I~l :ill o//icial resiJorlsc (o tile NESC repot(
tile Qovernment referred to tile recenl EC Council Reeomnaendadon on Child Care and to the
eslabllshment under the Minister [’or Labour of a Working Parly, "to devise specific recomnlendations
for tile developmenl or child care partnershil~s bet*.~’een parents, local employers and community groups".
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attempted here of the complex issues involved but, as indicated in Chapter
4, there are a priori grounds for changing the structure of the means test
for the Lone Parent’s Allowance. At present, the an’~ount of income
"disregarded" in the means test is small, and above the disregard limit there
is a ",~’1 for £1" reduction in social welfare. Some aheration in the structure
of tile means test can therefore be justified -- for example, a higher disregard
or a more gradual taper above tile disregard limit.
A specific point ahout the means test is that it applies to both the aduh
and child dependant portions of the payment, so that the means test affects
the amount of social welfare support for lone parents themselves and for
their children. A fnrther mechanism for reducing tile labour market impact
of the means test would be to apply it only to tile "personal" element of
the payment. If this were done only for lone parents it would create
horizontal inequities as between lone parents and other social welfare
recipients with children. Therefore, what is suggested here, is that child
income support for all families be restructured so that Child Benefit plays a
greater role in child income support and child dependant additions a lesser
role.36This is discussed more fully later.
The argument given here -- that the means test for lone parents
payments be differentiated from that of other social welfare recipients -- is
based on a recognition of the different circumstances confronted by lone
parents. Lone parents are likely to be out of tile labour market for extended
periods and they may require a greater incentive to consider [abour market
participation. Where one parent is absent, the choice to attempt to enter
the labour market is a qualitatively different one to that made in a two
parent context. In comparing Lone parents with the unemployed -- who do
not benefit from disregards of earned income -- it must be accepted that
any moderation it’= the basic means test for unemployment assistance would
simply be inconsistent with the legal]administratlve status "unemplo’yed".
The unemployed with any "earned" income are not, in effect, unemployed
and are therefore ineligible for an unemployment payment. Furthermore,
the existing social welfare legislation permits those "signing on" for
unemployment payments to "sign off"’ for periods of time -- counted in
days -- 37 so that an unemployed person is in fact allowed to combine a
social welfare payment (for some days of the week) with income for the
other days.+
Finally, in relation to the means test faced by various categories of
social welfare recipients, the treatment of the supplementary earnings of the
For example, the Lone Parent allowance is current]), £71.80 per week. For an aduh and one
child this comprises £57.20 for Ihe adul~ al~d £ 14.60 in respec~ ~f ~he child.
s~ The weekly social weliZare payment is notionally based on an aggregate of daily "rates".
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spouses of recipients in two parent families should be noted. Under the post-
Equal Treatment Directive system which now pertains, a married social
welfare recipient (unemployed, for example) can continue to claim an adult
dependant additional payment where the dependant has earnings of up to
£55 weekly. In effect, therefore, the social welfare treatment of the two parent
family contains a significant disregard of means.
If lone parents wish to re-enter the labour force it is possible that lack
of skills and/or work experience would act as a deterrent, even where
reformed policies in relation to child care and means tests would have been
implemented. It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that access to training
programmes should be one of the elements of policy towards lone parents in
the future. The findings in Chapter 2 of low levels of formal education and
work participation should be recalled here. In the absence of more detailed
information on lone parents’ employment and training histories, it is not
possible to outline a policy in this area.
As in the area of child care, it may not be feasible to distinguish the
training needs of lone parents from the generality of women or to undertake
separate provision. However, a policy which would provide opportunities for
training and labour market rehabilitation for women with low skill levels
would compound the impact of improved child care and reformed means
tests.
The second element in Chart 3 in relation to potential private income
sources is concerned with weaknesses in the current judicial system of family
maintenance payments. Clearly, there is scope to improve the family
maintenance system and its interaction with social security. Specifically, in
his recent work Ward has argued that the legislation still obliges spouses to
pursue their partners for maintenance as a precondition for receiving a social
welfare payment, that the enforcement procedures do not result in adequate
maintenance, and that there is considerable variation in judicial calculations
of husbands’ maintenance obligations. His proposals to deal with these issues
merit consideration:
-- Allocate the primary responsibility for collecting maintenance to
the State, rather than the spouse;
Strengthen the attachment o[" earnings procedures which exist
under current legislation; and
°
u This is a crude summary of the "casual work" facility for the unemployed who are "signing on".
There are other arrangements also; Systematic ShorL Time Work, Subsidiary l’2mployment, and there is
also a Pari-Time,Job II~cenlive Scheme,
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"Specify statutorily the maintenance obligations ("proper"
maintenance) of spouses and, in particular, the criteria which
should govern the impact of "second" relationships on husbands’
maintenance liabilities Ward, 1990).39.
The most significant of these proposals is the proposal to shift
responsibility for maintenance to the State. Ward suggests that a Central
Collection Agency be established, and that all maintenance would be
administered through this agency. This proposal reflects closely the concepts
of "guaranteed maintenance"~ "adwtnccd" or "automatic" maintenance
which are widely discussed in the policy literature and enforced in some
jurisdictions (Kamerman and Kahn, 1989). Essentially these schemes envisage
first, the State paying in advance an allowance to lone parents, second, the
State adopting responsibility to obtain maintenance fi’om the spouse
according to a legally binding formula and, third, retaining the maintenance
as a "due contribution" to the cost of the lone parents’ allowances: where
the maintenance obtained would exceed thc State’s advanced allowance the
"excess" maintenance would be paid to the lone parent claimant. This
approach avoids the delay and cost entailed in private legal action, and acts
in a prevenlive manner to ensure a "guaranteed" minimum payment
independently of the outcome of the State’s effort to procure maintenance.
The authoritative report of the Finer Committee on lone parent families
in the UK advocated this approach to family maintenance in the context of
its wider proposal of a unified means tested allowance for all one parent
families to replace legal maintenance (Finer Committee, 1974).
One specific issue which currently arises in relation to maintenance and
which would still need to be resolved in any future reform is the treatment
in the means test of maintenance paid in respect of children. Heretofore,
such maintenance has not been cotmted as income in the means tests for
lone parents allowances. In 1992, however, the legislation was altered. There
are somewhat conflicting considerations here. On the one hand, one objective
of policy is that parents should meet their financial obligations towards their
children. According to this argument, it may be desirable to offer an
incentive to absent parents in the form of a disregard of child maintenance
in the means test faced by custodial parents. Against this line of reasoning
it can be argued that to exclude child maintenance introduces inequities
between lone parents, and that State payments should be targeted on those
lone parents with the least maintenance for their children.
This last proposal is not formally advanced by Ward: it is a direct deduction, however, from his
critique of the maintenance legislation, (*Nard, 1990, Chapter 1).
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Some compromise hetweeu these opposing objectives might be possible
if some child maintenance were disregardedand on balance this is the
solution suggested here. The underlying rationale for excluding some child
maintenance is analogous to the rationale for shifting child income support
towards child benefit -- a policy which is advocated below (see Section
(vi)). By excluding some child maintenance from means assessment the
degree of uncertainty which lone parents face in the event of taking up
employment, changing employment, moving from part to full time work
and so on is reduced. Similarly, the level of child benefit is invariant with
respect to the income or employment status of lone mothers.
(vi) Policy Strategy -- Public Income Sources
Popular discussion of social welfare payments -- "public" income
sources in the terms of Chart 3 above tends to focus on the level of the
payments and the size of the most recent budgetary increases. In these
paragraphs, however, the structure of social welfare support for lone mothers
is addressed.
As Chapter 4 showed, there is still considerable diversity and a lack of
horizontal equity in the treatment of lone parents in social welfare. Overall,
the strategy proposed is to attempt an integration of the payments into a
uniform, gender neutral social welfare allowance. This suggests a number of
policy changes.
First, the Deserted Wi/’e’s Benefit should be phased out over a short
time period. It has only a weak analytical rationale and its existence can be
(indeed has been) legally challenged given the absence of a parallel provision
for male lone parents. Also, its "insurance" character has been weakened by
the imposition of an income ceiling for eligibility. Second, some short-term
steps should be taken to develop common age/child dependency criteria for
eligibility for all [one parents (including widows). At present, widows of aU
ages with and without child dependants may be eligible for payments -- either
the means tested Lone Parent’s allowance or the Contributory Widow’s
Pension.
The latter point raises the particular issue of the role of the Contributory
Pension for Widows in future arrangements. In its present form, with no
age/child dependency restrictions, it poses an obstacle to more integrated
provisions. The point here is not that the concept of social insurance
provision for widows be abandoned. On the contrary, even if the labour
force participation rates of married women continue to rise in Ireland --
NESC’s study forecasts a rise in the participation rate to 35 per cent by the
end of the decade (NESC, 1991) -- a large segment of married women will
still continue to he out of the labour market after marriage or child birth,
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either permanently or for very extended periods. This in turn implies that
¯ the basic rationale of the social insurance widow’s pension -- replacement
of income after the death of the "main breadwinner" -- will remain
relevant. However, widowhood is increasingly concentrated in the older age
gronps, and as the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 showed, only a small
proportion of current widow’s pension recipients are in the "child dependent"
phase of the family cycle¯ In the future, therefore, the social insurance
pension for widows should be confined to the older age groups and "floated
off"’ the social security provisions for lone parents. In effect, the Contributory
Widow’s Pension would become part of long-term pension provisions.
This argument in favour of one overall means tested lone parent
allowance must be considered in the light of the discussion above (Section
(v)) about restructuring the means test. If the two measures were adopted
they could together resuh in a strengthening of the sources of potential
private income and in a more neutral, integrated provision of public income
sources,
In the left-hand box of the right hand panel of Chart 3 the future
strategy proposed is to unify child benefit. The rationale for this relates to
general equity and cfficicncy considerations in family income policy overall
and to specific considerations affecting Iouc parents. In regard to family
income policy overall, the case has been made before for combining all
elements of child income support (Child Dependant Additions, Family
Income Supplement, Child Benefit) into a considerably enhanced, unified
Child Benefit (Commission on Social Welfare, 1986; NESC, 1990). The
rationale is that social welfare families receive relatively large amounts of
child income support (currently .~’12.50 per child weekly for a recipient of
long-term unemployment assistancc) through Child Dependant Additions to
social welfare, while most families receive only Child Benefit (£15.80 monthly
per child for the first three children). This contributes to the high replacement
ratios and potential poverty traps observed for families with children (NESC,
1990).
It is not suggested here that it would be feasible to instantaneously
abolish Family Income Supplement and Child Dependant Additions and
replace them with Child Benefit -- a very large, and consequently very
expensive, increase in Child Benefit would be required. Howcver, as the
Commission on Social Welfare (1986) and the NESC (1990) have pointed
out it would be possible in the short term to gradually "wind-down" the
levels of the CDAs and to increase Child Benefit, thereby reducing the
poverty traps inherent in the current structure of child income support/°
Such a reform would also affect lone parents, it would restructure their
104 LONE I’ARENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
"public income" package towards Child Benefit and away from their social
welfare payment.
If this reform were combined with the proposed exclusion of the CDA
component of social welfare from the social welfare means test, then it would
result in the effective insulation of the child related element of social welfare
income from means assessment. In turn, this would be likely to enhance the
labour market participation of lone mothers. A complication to note here is
that in tile immediately unlikely event of CDAs being abolished in favour
of an enhanced Child Benefit, then the argument about excluding CDAs
from the social welfare means test becomes redundant. Briefly, and in the
terms of Cbart 3, the general strategy being proposed is to strengthen the
degree of income support lone parents receive as families and to ameliorate
the role of income support to them as poor families or as lone parents.
An ad hoc modification of Child Benefit which might be considered is to
differentiate it as between one and two parent families. In the UK, for
example, a "premium" in respect of lone parenthood is added to the general
Child Benefit payment. The advantage of such a measure is that it would
be a feasible measure to implernent as it would not be a "new" payment
and it would provide for lone parents through a general family policy
measure. However, the enduring advantage of Child Benefit is its simplicity
and universality and introduction of a "one parent premium" might invoke
contentious and invidious comparisons between lone parent and conventional,
two parent, families.
The final element to be discussed in relation to social welfare is the role
that an "individualised" unit of payment might play in a reformed structure
of social welfare support for lone parents. As suggested in Chapter 3, the
retention and recent extension of the adult dependant notion is an implicit
constraint on the personal choices faced by lone parents. The wider
arguments in favour of phasing out the "adult plus adult dependant"
structure are not given here: -- it is sufficient to note at this point that an
individualised basis for social welfare is likely to be more consistent with the
increasing role of women, including married women, in the labour market.
If married and cohabiting women are given entitlement to full personal
payments (for unemployment assistance, say), then the need to compare a
lone mother cohabiting with her partner with a "dependent" married
woman being supported by her husband disappears. In consequence, a
*0 The precise details about this proposed reform are not given here. Clearly, the implementation
and phasing in of such a reform are critically dependent on the numbers of families, the actual and
relative levels of Child Benefit and tile CDAs, and the possibility or otherwise of increased expenditure
on the reform. In Building on Realily (1985) die then Government proposed a unified child benefit but
this was not proceeded wllh (see *lcCashin, 1988).
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cohabiting lone parent in receipt of a lone parent’s allowance can be treated
as an individual without an}, requirement to establish that she is being
"supported" by a male partner. Such a situation, as well as being less
intrusive, would reflect the legal position: cohabiting lone mothers are not
legally entitled to maintenance from their male partners)~
Finally, a central issue that social security policy mnst address is the
balance of roles -- as between workers or mothers -- which policy is
attempting to achieve. At onkz end of a policy continuum it might be argued
that lone mothers should in effect be dealt with as "unemployed", i.e.,
required to "sign on" and eligible to receive unemployment payments if
unable to tqnd employment. Such an approach could only be considered
feasible in a radically different labour market context to that which now
prevails, i.e., low unemployment, more equal labour market statuses for men
and women, and fully developed child care, training and other policies
which positively facilitated and supported female labour force participation.
Ireland’s current policy is placed at the other end of the policy continuum,
where lone parents are not obliged to be in the labour market for purposes
of social welfare entitlement, and where the positive, supportive fi’amework
for female labour force participation is relatively weak.
Some countries attempt a compromise (Brown, 1989B). For example,
in France lone mothers are not required to work until the youngest child is
3 years of age: here~ however, effective child care and other policics strongly
tmderpin work participation by lone mothers (a labour force participation
rate of 78 per cent for lone mothers is achieved in France). Germany likewise
does not impose an "availability for work" test on lone parents -- this
applies to those with a child under 3: its fi’amework of training and child
care supports is lcss extensive and eft~:ctivc than France’s (Brown, 1989B).
Denmark, on the other hand, achieves a work participation rate of over 80
per cent: social security and labour market policy is strongly imbued with
the assumption that all women, with and without children, should be in the
labour market. In Denmark, however, there is high quality, aflbrdable child
care for a large proportion of the child population: there are child care
places for 46 per cent of 0-2 year olds and 61 per cent of 3-6 ),ear olds
(Brown, 1989B).
A general point to observe about those countries (France, Denmark
and other Nordic countries) which achieve greater work participation by
lone mothers -- and consequently lower poverty rates and more "mixed"
income packages -- is that they also adopt policies which in various ways
achieve more secure income support. Thus, the Nordic countries administer
*’ Iftbe male partner is tbe father of the lone parent’s child(ren) then the man is legally obliged to
support the child(ten).
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advanced maintenance payments systems which continue after (re)marriage
or cohabitation; France ofl’ers a higb level of child benefit: some countries
do not have child additional payments with social assistance so tbat means
tests do not affect child related social security income. In short, family
maintenance and social security is designed so that they provide "a reliable
base of non-means-tested income upon which work income can be buih"
(Brown, 1989B).
The point of this discussion is not to argue that lone parents in Ireland
should be compelled to seek employment, but rather to illustrate the range
of potential policies and to highlight the virtually unquestioned assumptions
which appear to have informed policies to date. A central difficulty with
Ireland’s policies is that they may be contributing to the long-term
dependence of lone mothers on social security as their only source of income
and thereby permanently excluding them from the labour market. This
problem can be dramatised if the following circumstances are hypothesised:
a lone mother who first became a welfare recipient at age 18 or 19 could
remain so until her children attain "non-dependant" status. By the time she
reaches her mid- to late 30s the lone motber could have been relying on a
social welfare payment lbr almost 20 },ears, without any contact with work
or labour market or training institutions. There are no active policies which
encourage or facilitate her to combine work income and social welfare
income, and no specific policies to effect a transition into work once her
children are grown up. (For example, lone parents in receipt of a lone
parent payment would be deemed ineligible for the Social Employment
Scheme -- the largest work/re-training route into the labour market for
those on social welfare. Participation in this scheme is for those who have
been "signing on" for unemployment payments.)
The labour market situation in Ireland is such that it would be difficult
to justify an element of labour market compulsion for all-- or even some --
lone parents. Moreover, Irish society might place a greater social value on
the role of full-time mothers than other societies. Within these parameters
there remain strong arguments for adopting more positive policies towards
labour market participation. At a minimum, social security and related
policies should be reformed to minimise obstacles to work.
(vi) Summary
In this chapter some strategic issues about social security for lone
parents in Ireland were raised. While a "blueprint" of an alternative policy
has not been given it was argued that the broad perspective informing policy
should be one that both supports and facilitates private income sources while
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restructuring public income sources. Tile key elements of such a policy
agenda, it was suggested, would be:
-- Positive arrangements to facilitate work participation and thus
earned income child care, training and tile structure of social
welfare means tests are tile keys here;
-- More reliance on tile "advanced" or "guaranteed maintenance"
systems used in other countries, and a move away fi’om tile
judicial maintenance system, to strengthen private income from
i11ailltellance payments;
-- In social welfare a properly integrated, uniform means tested
payment for all lone parents;
-- A restructuring of social welfare child income support for all
families which enhances the role of Child Benefit; and
-- A move towards greater individualisation of social welfare
entitlements with a consequent diminution in the role of
cohabitation criteria.
In conclusion, it is cmphasised that policy in respect of lone parents
must be developed in the context of policies for families in general and for
poor families. The policy agenda outlined here envisages changes which
would affect families other than lone parent families. Finally, it should be
clear that social security must be co-ordinated with child care, labour market
and other social policies afl’ecting lone parents.
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APPENDIX TABLES
Table A 1 : Family Units in Private Households, Classifed by Type 1981 and 1986
Couples Couples Lone Lone Total
without with Fathers Mothers Family
Children Children with with Units
Children Children
1981
Families
N ’0O 130.0
% i8.4
Children
N ’000
%
1986
Families
N ’000 132.1
% 17.9
Children
N ’000
%
% Change
1981-86
Families 1.6
Children
481.6 19.4 76.6 707.6
68.1 2.7 10.8 100
1,385.6 40.0 151.7 1,577.3
87.8 2.5 9.6 100
502.6 19.0 85.7 739.5
68.0 2.6 I 1.6 100
1,400.8 37.8 167.3 1,605.9
2.4 10.3 100
4.4 -I.9 11.8 4.5
1.1 -5.7 10.3 1.8
a’¢otes: Children here refer to children of any age.
Sources: Census of Population, 1981, Volume 3, Census of Population 1986.
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Lone Parents (with CTtildren of Any Age) by Sex and Marital Stalus,
1981 and 1986
1981
Women Men All
3’ % )¢ % 3~ %
3.5 108 0.6 2,770 2.9
24. I 6,003 30.9 24,463 25.5
72.4 13,272 68.5 68,746 71.6
100.0 19,383 100.0 96,029 10O.0
1986
H/omen Men All
%     ~v     %     ~v     %
Single 2,662
Married and
Separated 18,460
Widowed 55,524
Total 76,646
Single 6,281 7.3 110 2.8 6,391 6.1
Married or Separated 24,655 28.9 6,140 32.2 30,805 29.4
(14,965) (17.6) (2,208) (1.6) (17,173) (16.4)
Widowed 54,747 63.9 12,770 67.1 67,517 64.5
Total 85,693 100.0 19,020 100.0 104,713 100.0
% Change 1981-1986
Women Men :Ill
Single 135.9 0.2 130.7
Married and Separated
33.6 2.3 25.9
Widowed
-- 1.4 -- 3.8 -- 1.9
Total I 1.8
- 1.8 9.0
Census of Population 1981, Volume 3; Census of Population, 1986.
Figures in parentheses in the 1986 panel are the separate totals for "separated". [n
1981, this disaggregation was not shown and it is assumed here lhat the married
figure for 1981 is the comparative figure for the 1986 married and separated total.
I 14 LONE PARENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IREI~ND
Table A3: Population Aged Over 15 in 1986 Classified by Family Status and Family
Position
Chikh’en (any age) v.,ith Both Parents
Parents (any age) living with Partners, of whom:
Single 2.6
Married 1,264.6
Widowed 0.1
Separated 0.2
Children (any age) with Lone Parents
468. I 18.6
1,269.5 50.4
135.6
Parents in Lone Parent Families, of whom: 104.7
Single 6.4
M a tried 13.6
Widowed 67.5
Separated 17.2
Persons in Non-Family Uniu, of whom: 538.0
Single 375.6
M a tried 25.8
Widowed 118.7
Separated 17.9
5.4
4.2
21.4
Total 2,515.9 100.0
Source: Census of Population, 1986 (Special Tabulations).
Table A4:
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Widows per 1,000 A4arried Persons in Different Age Groups, Selected
Years
Age Groups 1971 1981 1986 1991
15-24 I I 2 2 0
25-34 4 3 3 4
35-44 18 12 11 10
45-54 69 58 49 46
55-64 ’200 197 188 166
65-69 432 419 425 N.A.
70-74 782 694 697 N.A.
75-79 1,174 1,194 1,170 N.A.
80-84 1,865 2, I 1 I 2,140 N.A.
B5 + 3,365 3,762 4,351 N.A.
All Ages 163 139 139 145
Sources: Census of Population 1971, Census of Population 198l, Census
Force Survey, 1991. Central Stalistics Office.
aVotes: N.A. is not available.
of Population 1986, Labour
Table A5: l, Vidozos (Male and Female) Classified by Age, Selected Tears 1981-
1991 (Thousands)
Z’ear 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65 + Total 65 + as
%of
Total
1981 0.1 I.O 3.8 13.’,’ 15.0 22.0 124.2 179.6 69.1
1983 03 0.9 4.4 14.9 15.0 21.9 122.0 179.3 68.0
1985 0.1 0.9 4.7 16.2 I,I.7 22.6 134.7 193.9 69.5
1986 0. I 1.0 3.9 12.1 13.6 21.9 133.8 186.3 71.8
1988 O.I 0.9 4.4 12.2 12.8 20.8 135.2 186.5 72.5
1989 0.2 1.1 4.3 12.0 I 1.8 21.0 139.0 189.4 73.4
1990 0.2 0.8 4.4 12.0 12.3 20.7 145.6 196.0 74.3
1991 0.2 1.2 3.7 12.9 9.8 16.2 145.1 194.6 74.6
Sources: Censuses of Population 1981, 1986, I;ol. 2," Labour Force Surveys 1983, 1985, 1988, 1989,
1991. Central Statislics Office.
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Table A6: Separated Persons in Each Age Group by Detailed Marital Status, 1986
Marital Status
Legally Other Divorced
Age Deserted Annulled Sep~d Sep’d Abroad Total
15-19 13 I 2 19 1 36
20-24 373 14 121 398 40 946
25-34 2,856 275 1,947 2,399 822 9,299
35-44 3,399 401 2,503 4,007 1,552 11,862
45-54 1,359 177 1,553 2,561 1,066 7,616
55-59 876 62 421 831 289 2,479
60-64 745 26 256 676 236 1,939
65 + 1,101 27 384 1,171 385 3,068
All 11,622 983 7,187 13,062 4,391 37,245
Source: Census of Population 1986, 17ol. 2, Ages and Marital Status, Table 5A, Central Statistics
Office.
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Table A7: aVon-Marital Births in the Republic of Ireland 1961-1991
Rate per 1,000 %
J’ear aVumber Population of all Births
1961 975 0.34 1.6
1962 I,I I I 0.39 1.8
1963 1,157 0.41 1.8
1964 1,292 0.45 2.0
1965 1,403 0.49 2.2
1966 1,436 0.50 2.3
1967 1,540 0.53 2.5
1968 1,558 0.53 2.6
1969 1,642 0.56 2.6
1970 1,709 0.58 2.7
1971 1,842 0.62 2.7
1972 2,005 0.66 2.9
1973 2,167 0.71 3.2
|974 2,~09 0.74 3.4
1975 2,515 0.79 3.7
1976 2,545 0.80 3.8.
1977 2,879 0.88 4.2
1978 3,003 0.91 4.2
1979 3,331 0.99 4.6
1980 3,723 0.92 5.0
1981 3,914 1.13 5.4
1982 4,358 1.25 6.1
1983 4,552 1.28 6.8
1984 5, I 16 1.42 7.9
1985 5,282 1.49 8.5
1986 5,877 1.66 9.6
1987 6,381 1.80 10.8
1988 6,336 1.79 I 1.7
1989 6,522 1.86 12.6
1990 7,660 2.19 14.5
1991 8,766 2.49 16.6
Source: Reports on Vital Statistics, Central Statistics Office.
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Table A8: Income Sources by Type of Household, 1987 (£ Weekly)
Tranffer
Of Which."                           Payments
Avge Dir Earnings Transfer Gross Direct Da~pos. + Gross
Income I’ayments Income Tax Income Income %
Lone Parenu 81ng[e 24.35 21.56 64.23 88.59 7.88 80.70 72.5
Lone Parent:
"Separated" 60.54 30.79 58.75 I 17.28 8.98 1 J0.30 48.4
Lone Parent:
Widowed 76.64 54.30 73.28 149.20 16.85 133.07 49.1
Two Parents, I Child 229.32 216.74 32.64 26i.96 55.47 206.49
12.5
Two Parents, 2 Children 238.05 229.70 30.44 268.49 54.94 213.55 11.3
Two Parents, 3 Children 240.22 232.83 34.47 274.49 56.71 217.79 12.6
Two P*~rent~ 4 or
More Children 212.66 202.51 53.58 266.24 45.68 220.56 20.1
Other Househokls 196.12 170.61 46.06 242.18 45.03 197.15 19.0
All 204.11 184.20 43.71 247.82 46.87 200.96 17.6
Source: Household Budget Survo,, 1987, Special Analysis.
a~:otes: The earnings figures are the earnings of the serf employed and employees.
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Table A9: Recipients of Social W’elfare Lone Pa),menls 1971-1991
(i)
119
I Vidow’s Contributory           Widow’s JVon-ContributoO,            Total All Widows
Reapients ~ildren    Total Redpients Children    Total Rtdpients Children    Total
1971 53238 20625 73863 16898 7870 24768 70136 28495 98631
1972 55120 20900 76020 16066 7480 23546 71186 28380 99566
1973 57146 21179 78325 15696 7051 22747 72842 28230 101072
1974 59438 21000 80438 13720 7132 20852 73158 28132 101290
1975 60844 20700 81544 12657 7370 20027 73501 28070 101571
1976 62958 20150 83108 12535 6950 19485 75493 27100 102593
1977 63732 19495 83227 10605 6~52 17457 74337 26347 100684
1978 65484 20874 86358 9954 6283 16237 75438 27157 102595
1979 68130 20056 88186 10452 5680 16132 78582 25736 10,1318
1980 69985 20003 89988 11195 5301 16496 81180 25304 106484
1981 71739 20048 91787 12240 5939 18179 83979 25987 109966
1902 73632 20573 94205 13250 6429 19679 069,82 27002 113804
1983 74083 19028 93111 14560 6425 20985 88643 25453 114096
1984 76193 18471 94664 15413 5335 20748 91606 23806 115412
1985 78815 17571 96386 16509 4716 21225 9532’I 22287 117611
1986 79826 16568 96394 17320 4364 21684 97146 20932 118078
1987 8114"t 15997 97141 18060 4066 22126 99204 20063 119267
1988 82167 15213 97380 18548 3661 22209 100715 18874 119589
1989 83162 14725 97887 19002 3349 22351 102164 18074 120238
1990 84001 14131 98132 20094 2217 22311 104095 16348 120+13
1991 84493 13383 97876 20550 4782 25332 105043 18165 123208
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Recipients of Social Welfare Lone Parent Payments 1971-1991
(ii)
Deserted Wife’s Allowantt         Deserted ll;/ft’s Benefit          Deserted Wife’s Total
rear Recipients Children Total Recipients Children Total Recipknts Children Total
1971 1284 1577 2861 1284 1577 2861
1972 1698 2085 3783 1698 2085 3783
1973 2097 2595 4692 2097 2595 4692
1974 2603 3227 5830 1074 2084 3158 3677 5311 6988
1975 2916 3594 6510 1410 2703 4113 4326 6297 10623
1976 3110 3849 6959 1fi75 3250 4925 4785 7099 11884
1977 3176 4140 7316 1992 3630 5622 5168 7770 12938
1978 3022 4231 7253 2215 4244 6459 5237 8475 13712
1979 2856 3937 6793 2525 4722 7247 5381 8659 14040
1980 2920 4174 7094 2873 5394 8267 5793 9568 15361
1081 3063 4,~31 7494 3124 3416 6540 6187 7847 14034
1982 3282 4748 8030 3416 6271 9687 6698 11019 17717
1983 3438 5044 8482 3825 6526 10351 7263 11570 18833
1984 3653 5759 9412 4403 8029 12432 8056 13788 21844
1985 3965 6240 10205 5165 9472 14637 9130 15712 24842
1986 4445 7396 11841 6165 11507 17672 10610 18903 29513
1987 4870 8172 13042 7302 13770 21072 12172 21942 34114
1988 5125 8600 13725 8492 16139 24631 13617 24739 38356
1989 5271 8816 t4087 9400 17718 27118 14671 26534 41205
1990 5852 9963 15815 10462 19239 29701 16314 29202 45516
1~31 5301 13090 Z8481 11358 20266 31524 16749 33355 50105
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Table A9: Recipients of Social I,Velfare Lone Parent Paymenls 1971-1991
(iii)
Unmarried Mothers Grand Total Grand Total Minus Widows
1"ear Recipients Children Total Rtcipients Children Total Rec-H;ids Chi-I’Vids 7"ot-HZids
1971 71420 30072 101,192 18182 9447 27629
1972 72884 30465 1033,t9 17764 9565 27329
1973 74939 30825 10576,t 17793 9646 27439
1974 2156 2760 4916 78991 36203 115194 19553 15203 34756
1975 2823 3484 6307 80650 37851 118501 19806 17151 36957
1976 3334 4031 7365 83612 38230 121842 20654 18080 38734
1977 3799 4490 8289 83304 38607 121911 19572 19112 38684
1978 4041 4940 8981 84716 40572 125288 19232 19698 38930
1979 ,t574 5586 10160 88537 39981 128518 20407 19925 40332
1980 5267 6419 11686 92240 41291 133531 22255 21288 43543
1981 6222 7582 13804 96388 41416 137804 24649 21368 46017
1982 7592 9251 16843 101172 47272 148444 27540 26699 54239
1983 8534 9851 18385 104440 46874 151314 30357 27846 58203
1984 10309 12685 22994 109971 50279 160250 33778 31808 65586
1985 11530 14324 25854 115984 52323 168307 37169 34752 71921
1986 12039 15026 27065 119795 54861 174656 39969 38293 78262
1987 13930 17596 31526 125306 59601 184907 ,~tl62 43604 87766
1988 15062 19302 34364 129394 62915 192309 47227 ,17702 94929
1989 16564 21291 37855 133399 65899 199298 50237 51174 101411
1990 18761 2,1400 43161 139170 69950 209120 55169 55819 110988
1991 21366 28181 49547 143158 79702 222860 38115 61537 99652
Source: Reports of the Department of Social Wellhre; Statistical Information on Social
Welfare Services.
aVote: These figures include all recipients -- i.e., recipients with and without children. In
1989, there was also ~ small number of ’.’.’idowcr recipients with 429 dependent
children. The DWB and Uh’IA schemes did not commence until 1974. The 1990
and 1991 data are based on the sub-categories of the new Lone Parent Allowance:
Deserted Allowance: Deserted Wife’s data for 1990 and 1991 theretbre include
persons who are separated (see text) and Unmarried "Mothers" data include
unmarried fathers.
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Table AI0: Real Value of Lone Parent Social Security Payments 1974-1991
(Constant 1974 Prices) £ Weekly
£ Weekly
~ear                          Allowance                         Benefit
1974 8.15 10.35
1975 9.51 10.20
1976 9.’t3 10.16
1977 9.50 10.22
1978 10.35 11.15
1979 10.68 11.55
1980 11.Sfi 12.69
1981 12.20 13.16
1982 12.72 13.74
1983 11.64 12.58
1984 11.89 12.83
1985 12.10 13.06
1986 12.3’t 13.31
1987 12.38 13.34
1988 12.52 13.49
1989 12.54 13.54
1990 12.48 13.46
1991 13.95 13.46
Deparm~ent of Social Welfare; Central Statistics Office.
Rates of I~ayment and Consumer Price Index at May annually. Adult payments
are for those uncler 66 years. Child Benefit not il!cludcd. "Allowance" refers to the
Unmarried Mother’s Allowance, Deserted Wife’s Allowance, Non-Contributory
Widow’s Pension and Lor~e Parent AIIov,,ance. Benefit refers to Deserted Wife’s
Benefit and Widow’s Contributory Pension.
Table A I 1: Lone Parent Social l,Velfare Payments and Average Weekly Net
Earnings for Man, I’11~e and Tzvo Children, 1974-1991
Gross aVet    AltowlsVet Benfitl Adjusted Adjusted
~’ear    Allozoance. Benefit Earnings Earnings Earnings Net % %
Earn. (:I/JVE) (BlaVE)
1974 8.15 10.35 41.79 35.46 19.4 23.0 33.9 40.3
1975 I 1.80 12.65 53.25 44.09 26.8 2,t.3 46.9 42.5
1976 13.65 14.70 63.60 50.92 26.8 28.8 50.4 46.9
1977 15.65 16.85 74.25 58.95 26.5 28.6 50.0 50.1
1978 18.10 19.50 84.54 69.21 26.2 28.2 45.6 49.3
1979 21.00 22.70 96.62 78.61 26.7 28.9 46.7 50.5
1980 27.90 30.00 113.02 89.86 31.0 33.4 54.2 58.4
1981 33.75 36.40 131.55 107.48 31.4 33.9 55.0 59.3
1982 42.60 46.00 147.52 115.67 36.8 39.8 64.4 69.6
1983 42.60 46.00 164.58 133.23 32.0 34.5 56.0 60.4
1984 47.70 51.50 184.40 135.73 35.1 37.9 61.4 66.4
1985 51.05 55.10 201.98 149.03 34.3 37.0 60.0 64.7
1986 54.40 58.65 216.66 158.14 34.4 37.1 60.2 64.9
1987 56.15 60.50 227.30 163.89 34.3 36.9 60.0 64.6
1988 57.80 62.30 237.69 170.98 33.8 36.4 59.2 63.8
1989 60.10 64.90 247.86 181.25 33.2 35.8 58.1 62.7
1990 61.90 66.80 257.17 190.65 32.5 35.0 56.9 61.3
1991 66.50 71.00 266.67 198.82 33.4 35.7 58A 62.5
Sources: Irish Statistical Bulletin, Revenue Commissioners’ Annual Reports, Department of Social
I.Velfare (SW4 Booklets, Social Welfare Statistics, and Weekly Rates Bookle~).
Notes: Earnings are rates for aduh nmlcs in industrial employment. Social welfare rates
are rates for April, annually. The adjusted d,~ta are per capita equivalent figures.
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